



THE SECURITY LIMELIGHT



A Special Newsletter of the National Defence College - Tanzania

SEPTEMBER 2022

NATIONAL SECURITY FOR SOCIO - ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT



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
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WILL: EXPOUNDING THE POWER OF
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT IN SHAPING
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CORRUPTION MEASURES IN AFRICA



NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE





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NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE - TANZANIA

VISION

The NDC - Tz seeks to be the most prestigious institution for imparting training in national and international security to selected Senior Defence and Civil Service Officers, equipping them with skills and knowledge necessary for sound decision making in complex national and international security and strategic environment.

MISSION

The mission of the college is “to equip Senior Defence and Government policy makers with the necessary background and understanding of the total system of economic, political, military, scientific, international relations, national organizational aspects and the planning necessary for national security both in its internal dynamics as well as external compulsion”

ROLES

- To provide a facility (forum) to bring together selected Senior Officers from various organizations of the Government for the purpose of giving them a structured exposure to diverse issues related to national security.
- To facilitate the individual development of the selected Senior Officers by creating at the College the necessary academic environment related to national security.
- To develop mutual understanding between different organizations of the Government by creating necessary working environment and opportunities for development of such understanding between course members.
- To be an instrument for the Government to foster understanding, cooperation, regional cooperation and linkages in the national, regional and international security related fields with countries of the region.

FROM THE COMMANDANT'S DESK



Dear readers,

As we celebrate our College's tenth Anniversary, it gives me great pleasure and excitement to reflect on the past, present and future. I take this opportunity to welcome you all to read this Special Newsletter. The central idea in this Edition is that national security is the heart of social, economic and political development. It highlights that development and security are indivisible. One cannot exist without the other. We need to promote national security, if we are to develop.

These articles have been written by some Alumni and Faculty Members both serving and retired. I am confident that you will find the articles academically stimulating and enlightening. I congratulate all authors for their contributions to this Edition, without which this publication would never be possible. I thank the Editorial Team and Faculty Members for their support towards the successful production of this Edition. I also thank Supporting Staff for their support and commitment to this assignment. Indeed, their effort is greatly honored and appreciated. Dear leaders, since this is a Special Newsletter, I wish to make a statement or two; although in passing, as regards the accomplishments the College has so far registered since its establishment. The College has truly been a forum where Senior Military and Civil Service Officers assemble to interact on issues of national security and strategy, and the place of high level practical knowledge exchange and information sharing amongst Course Members, something which may not be easily found in other learning institutions. Because of that the College has indeed gained domestic, regional and international recognition as a highly respected prestigious Centre of Excellence that brings together scholars, policy makers, strategists, decision-makers and leaders from the diverse intellectual and practical backgrounds fundamentally to shape their thinking.

The first Ice-breaking Course had only 20 Course Members who were all Tanzanians. There was none from friendly countries. On graduation, the graduates were awarded the prestigious Symbol 'ndc' only. The Second Course had 30 Course Members including 10 Members from allied countries. The College was later accredited to NACTE (presently known as NACTVET) for the award of Masters' degrees and Diplomas in National Security and Strategic Studies. As years progressed, the number of Course Members not only from Tanzania but also from allied countries has been increasing in an incredible pace. The on-going programme has 50 Course Members in total. This is an encouraging growth and in future this number is expected to even double. Initially, the only challenge we faced was the limited accommodation for our Course Members and the Staff capacity to effectively run the Course. However, we are so thankful to H.E Samia Suluhu Hassan, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Commander-in Chief, for releasing funds purposely for constructing new apartments in a bid to comfortably accommodate our Course



Members and of course, their accompanied families during a 47-week stay at the College. In addition, when we started in 2012, the College had no permanent building to run its Program. In effect, all nine Courses were conducted at the buildings of the formerly planned High Commanders' Defence Studies. However, in 2021, the College moved to its new building and fortunately Course Ten was the first to start using the new building. The building is quite spacious and up-to-the-minute, thus making the learning environment very comfortable and enjoyable. In addition, given the high demand from the general public, the College will soon start tailor-made Outreach Programmes envisaged to be conducted in some selected zones. Among others, the programs are set to create national security awareness amongst lower-cadre leaders, namely; Ward Executive Officers, Village Executive Officers, Councilors and other leaders who are operating at the lower echelons and notably to infuse a culture of patriotism and accountability amongst them. Should all plans go well; the programs are expected to start in December 2022. These are just some of many successes the College has registered, since its establishment.

Lastly, I wish to reiterate that the College has always remained committed towards becoming an exemplary Center of Excellence for training professionals on National Security and Strategies at Diploma and Masters Level, nationally, regionally and internationally towards the realization of a secure, stable, prosperous and peaceful society. Our philosophy has and will continue to be the quest for *Liberty, Wisdom and Peace*. It is for these ideals, we are solidly committed to serve the nation. Nevertheless, while this is true, we are also aware that, this can only be achieved, if all stakeholders will continue to support the College. It is thus my hope that Members of the College, Alumni and Stakeholders will use this opportunity to support the College through writing, reading and submitting Newsletter articles related to national security in our future Editions.

I thank you all,

Welcome and enjoy the reading.

Maj Gen IM Mhona *ndc*
COMMANDANT NDC-TZ

FROM THE CHIEF EDITOR



Dear readers,

It is with profound pleasure and anticipation that we are celebrating a ten-year anniversary of the National Defence College-Tanzania, since its establishment in 2012. On behalf of the Editorial Team, I wish to thank the College's Leadership whose support and commitment have made this Edition possible. Cognizance of the fact that the core College's mission is to train Senior Military and Civil Service Officers on National Security and Strategic Studies; the authors have developed articles, as you will notice, which have a linkage to national security and strategies.

The development and publication of this Edition was guided by year 2021/2022 theme: 'National Security for Socio-Economic Development'. We would like to bring to the attention of our readers that national security is the heart of socio-economic development. This simply means that security and development are indivisible and that the existence of one depends on another. Pure and simple. It also means that security is interdependent as insecurities in one nation can cross borders and have global implications. The on-going War in Ukraine is the case in point. The key message in this Edition is that a nation can only thrive, if it is secure and the opposite is also very true. Thus, if we are to sustainably achieve socio-economic development, we must deject anything that causes insecurities and instead, jointly strive to promote security.

It is expected that after reading these articles, our esteemed readers will also have an opportunity to advise the Management on how best the College can improve its future publications. It is also important to appreciate that, although these pieces were developed concurrently at the time when the College was fully engaged in preparations for the Tenth Course Valedictory event and Capstone Course 13, the ideas and knowledge shared in this Edition are quite useful and enlightening. They truly make significant advances to the existing body of knowledge.

Once again, I thank the College Management, the Editorial Team, Faculty Members and other Supporting Staff for their tireless support and dedication towards the successful publication of this Edition. Equally, I thank all participants who have in one way or another taken part in preparations of this Newsletter. Certainly, their efforts are greatly honored and appreciated. Last but not least, I want to sincerely express my gratitude to all authors who have spent their valuable amount of time to think and write these articles in spite of their busy schedules. I am truly indebted to all of them and I wish them good health and success in their future endeavors.

Thank you and enjoy the newsletter

Dr. Daniel John Pundu (Ph.D)
SDS –Civil
CHIEF EDITOR



NDC GOVERNING BOARD



Amb. Hussein A. Kattanga
Chairman




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FACULTY MEMBERS



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Commandant



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Brig Gen SJ Mkande
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Dr. Lucy Shule
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Dr. Daniel Pundu
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Capt (N) FJ Mwasikolile
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Col EE Mhoro
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Capt (N) BT Rutambuka
Senior Directing Staff Navy



Lt Col CY Mwendi
Junior Directing Staff
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JDS Research



Lt Col RM Kajogo
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Maj HA Mapunda
PRO



Maj LA Mwangulango
SO Comdt



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ADC



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Lt RL Bukambu
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Lt KM Kombo
RSO



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Lt SJ Lipambila
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ADMINISTRATIVE WING



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Camp Comdt



Maj SJ Zilagera
MO



Maj SJ Kihungwe
QM



Maj JS Mkindi
MP Comd



Capt HM Mussa
OPTO



Capt FT Kanganga
SO Finance



Capt EK Buninanya
SO Medical



WO 1 NA Kilimtali
CSM



WO 2 FE Challe
Fire Offr

SOME QUOTES FROM DIFFERENT LEADERS REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE NDC-TZ

‘All Principal Secretaries and Chief Executive Officers in various Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies should regard the NDC training a Special Priority for the future of our national security and by extension, socio-economic development’

Gen RP Mboma (rtd) - Former Chief of Defence Forces

‘Leaders must be prepared, and in my view, National Defence College- Tanzania is the right place for preparing leaders and it could also be used as one of the major sources of the President of United Republic of Tanzania to appoint leaders to man various institutions in the country’

Amb. Ombeni Sefue - Former Chief Secretary

‘NDC –TZ should endeavor to empower policy makers to think strategically in all critical areas of economy, politics, diplomacy, military and technology with a view to promoting and preserving national interests in present and future generations’

Lt Gen JA Mwakibolwa (rtd) - Former Chief of Staff

‘I advise that NDC should concentrate more on doing research that will help to provide solutions on contemporary security, economic, political and social problems for the betterment of our Nation. It is also my opinion that the College can be used as a formal platform for the Head of State to interact with the Course Members to jointly discuss about the national security agenda and how best it can be safeguarded.’

Amb. Lt Gen AA Shimbo (rtd) – Former Chief of Staff



'I think it is very important that all Ambassadors, Members of Parliament and Ministers should attend training at the National Defence College-Tanzania, if we are to truly bring faster socio-economic development in our country'

Amb. Lt Gen ME Mkingule - Former Chief of Staff

'NDC-TZ, among others, aims at preparing potential leaders so that our nation can have a pool of ethical, well-trained and committed leaders who can think strategically and who are also capable of generating workable solutions to the contemporary security economic, political and social challenges for sustainable development and welfare of our nation'

Brig Gen YO Mabongo (rtd)

'I must admit that the 47 weeks that I spent at the NDC have lifted me to a higher level of knowledge and understanding of my responsibility as a citizen, a public servant and a leader on matters of national security. The Course has taught to me to think and do things differently. Honestly speaking, I have become more committed to see that government strategies are geared towards making Tanzania a safe place, not only in terms of not having internal conflicts and war, but also in terms of Tanzania being a place where employment opportunities are vast, people are healthy, good governance is exercised and peace prevails'.

Ms. Neema Mwakalyelye, ndc

Deputy Director General of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB)

REMINISCENCES: MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

Lt Gen CL Makakala (rtd)



I am obliged to begin my recollections by extending my profound gratitude to Providence for bestowing upon me the honor and privilege of being the first Commandant of our esteemed National Defence College (NDC). In the same breath, I would like to show my sincere appreciation to General Davis Adolf Mwamunyange (retired) the former Chief of Defence Forces for entrusting me with the task of establishing the NDC. NDC has completed its First Decade. On this veritable occasion, the 'tenth' anniversary, I sincerely congratulate the Commandant, the Course Members as well as the entire College community. As we exchange well deserved felicitations, however, we need to recollect whence we are from. There could be a lesson or two; that we can learn from the College's history.

On 11 March 2011 the Chief of Defence Forces summoned me to his office and directed that an NDC be temporarily established on the premises of the New High Commanders' Defence Studies Campus at Kunduchi. He appointed a nucleus faculty with myself as the Commandant and four other officers to be members of the Faculty. They were Brigadier General IH Ipanda, Colonel JM Mwaseba and Colonel RS Laswai who were to be Senior Directing Staff (SDS) Air, Army and Navy respectively. Colonel SM Minja was to be the College Secretary. Our noble task was 'to make preparations for NDC Course 01 'soonest'.

We immediately embarked on the task. It was an enormous task indeed. Firstly, we had to formulate a plan for the preparation period. Quite a number of preliminary issues had to be decided on. Secondly, we had to decide on the intended curriculum. The curriculum would then give the direction and nature of studies, the prerequisites for the Course Participants, the direction of the Course, the pedagogical methodology and the awards to the graduands. We decided to hold a workshop of generals (both serving and retired) who had attended NDCs or similar courses abroad and subsequently we conducted a stakeholders' forum which included a wide spectrum of stakeholders from the nation's instruments of defence and security. The Consultative Workshop, held for two days 3 – 4 August 2011, brought together the very best on the Workshop's subject matter: Genesis of NDC: A Focus on Its Perspective Plans.

On the first day the discussions covered The Role and Place of the NDC in the Contemporary and Future Defence and Security Environment. The second day the theme for discussion was The Perspective Plan of the NDC: College Charter. The compulsions that led the Faculty to that debate were that there was need to articulate the Tanzanian strategic culture and delineate the various aspects of the contemporary national security whose purview traverses beyond the military. We, at the NDC are spelled out. Further a skeleton College Charter was necessary for the NDC to be recognized but the Government through the Government Gazette as a legitimate learning institution of higher learning in Tanzania.

On 21 May 2012 we invited representatives of the stakeholders from the TPDF, the Police Force, the TISS, the Prisons Service, the PCCB, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and Finance, Communications and Infrastructure and others. The theme of the Forum was Genesis of NDC: The Role and Place of the NDC in the Contemporary Security Environment – the Tanzanian Perspective. The inauguration and keynote address was delivered by Hon. Dr. Mohammed Gharib Bilal the Vice President of the United Republic of Tanzania. The College also assembled a faculty of eminent academics and practitioners of national and international repute. Among those was Lieutenant General Mollah Fazle Akbar, the Commandant of NDC Bangladesh. The TPDF had been sending course participants to the two NDCs, amongst others, so we deemed it a great honor to have the two generals share the experience of their respective NDCs with us. The five days of the Stakeholders' Forum were very fruitful. Finally, the outcome of the proceedings of the Forum validated the role of the NDC, the justification and rationale of running the Security and strategic Studies Course at NDC was articulated, the major questions of the Curriculum found answers.



In the Faculty's endeavor to reckon with the challenges of preparation of the NDC Curriculum, we embarked on a study of similar institutions. At various time we held consultations with eminent professors from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Dar es Salaam as well as visited a number of colleges abroad including NDC Kenya, NDC India NDC Bangladesh, the Royal College of Defence Studies – UK, The National Defence University – China and the Army War College – US. Thus was the evolution of the NDC Curriculum.

There were a number of issues which remained controversial even after a long in-house debates and external consultations. The first point was award of academic degrees to course members. Apparently this issue continued to raise questions which caused controversy even to long established NDCs. In NDCs the aim has never been the award of academic degrees, which can be done conveniently at other institutions of higher learning. Course Participants of the NDC are senior officers both from the military and civil services with a service bracket of 20 or more years. Their knowledge and experience does not need to be reinforced by an award of an academic degree. Some are holders of PhDs in their respective fields.

In some countries the NDCs themselves have acquired their own reputations and prestige that they do not need the additional award of a degree. But, obviously there are some Course Members who would require a formal degree to enhance their stature either for personal growth or for post-retirement benefits. In such cases some NDCs run a parallel M.A. program through understanding reached with some university. That is understood. But, care should be taken to avoid cases where certain unscrupulous individuals who would use the NDC as a cheap way of academic advancement. In my view, the NDC should remain a forum where senior officers of the military and the others public and civil services 'assemble' to interact on issues of national security and strategy, as well as enable a holistic appreciation of each other's problems in peace and in war.

There are some other notable achievements that we attained in my tenure as Commandant. The College and the First Course was inaugurated by H.E. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete the President of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces on 10 September 2012. The maiden course had 20 Course Members who were all Tanzania. On graduation the graduates were awarded the prestigious symbol 'ndc'. The Second Course had 30 Course Members including 10 Members from allied countries. College had then been accreditation was possible in such a short time because the College had then been accredited to NACTVET for the award of Masters' degrees in Security and strategic Studies. Accreditation was possible in such a short time because the College had met most of the essential requirements for the same. Even before the pilot course was launched a specialized library was established. It had in stock more than 3,000 monographs, journals and periodicals. There was a resident professor, Professor Mihanjo, who became the dean of studies. The College was also able to attract distinguished academics and practitioners as guest lecturers.

When I went on retirement in September 2014 there were two unaccomplished dreams: the first was witnessing a new NDC building. This has already been manifested. The second dream was having apartments for the Course Participants where the member and his or her family could be accommodated for the duration of the course. As we celebrate a ten-year anniversary, I am positively looking forward to seeing the College excelling to greater heights from now onwards. Once again, I sincerely congratulate the NDC-TZ and its entire Staff for the many accomplishments in a span of just ten years; despite the challenges it has encountered.

I thank you all.

SOCIAL MEDIA: A NECESSARY EVIL IN THE COMPLEX SECURITY LANDSCAPE



¹ Daniel John Pundu (Ph.D), *ndc*

² Maj MA Mwinyikombo, *psc*

1. Introduction

The way individuals interact has undergone a radical change due to global technological growth. The emergence of social media, a product of technological advancement, has had a significant impact on communication. Social media have permanently altered the dynamics of production, consumption, and dissemination, whether in the form of social networking (Facebook), photo and video sharing (Instagram, YouTube), or micro-blogging (Twitter) sites.¹ Social media have also challenged information hierarchies and opened up access to and produced an entirely new ecosystem of information exchange.² Contrary to traditional media, social media are distributed in participatory systems of communication where people who were once considered audience members now create significant amounts of 'user-generated content.' Citizens now can influence public opinion and debate as communication topics. Social media allow individuals all over the world to communicate and share information in real-time. Additionally, users choose to follow or be followed by others, arrangements that allow instant diffusion of content and exhibit 'viral' characteristics, where information can quickly spread across networks and often in a chaotic manner. The interaction between social media and traditional media (such as television) is another crucial aspect of social media. Traditional media increasingly depends on social media to fill their 24-hour news cycles and cover stories that originate on social media platforms.

Despite their growing impact and reach, as well as their ability to influence ideas and public dialogue, social media still offer significant potential. They are utilized in political circles as a communication tool to improve participatory democracy. In this regard, social media have opened new avenues for civic participation in political processes, inspiring hopes for a democratic reinvigoration.³ Social media platforms have become crucial instruments for disseminating information on disaster awareness and management during times of disaster.⁴ For example, during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, which shattered a large part of the New York City metropolitan area, The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) used social media to alert the public about the storm before it arrived, places where people could charge their phones, find shelter, water, and food, and other relief that was available in the region.⁵ Similarly, during the Haiti earthquake, social media enabled citizens' engagement by supporting the dissemination of information on evacuation and rescue experiences, as well as sending alert messages.⁶

The relevance of social media in the conversation around police is maybe its most effective application in terms of how it directly affects national security. Open-source intelligence platforms have been used with social media. The police in several nations have taken advantage of social media's potential by deploying intelligence units to conduct online surveillance, reconstruct events, and gather official knowledge about the actions, personalities, and motivations of suspects. This is because social media makes it easy for the police to access secret information. Twitter can be used to send timely warnings about risk and criminal activity, as well as to foster support and develop trust by sharing information about effective enforcement. Social media platforms have also been utilized to combat terrorism and civil unrest.

For example, following the Stanley Cup riots in Vancouver in 2011, officials used facial recognition software to examine

- 1 Walsh, J. Social media and moral panics: Assessing the effects of technological change on societal reaction. *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 1–20, (2020)
- 2 Pandalai, S. The social media challenge to national security: Impact and Opportunities. (2016).
- 3 See Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P. N. Truth and Trust (2018)
- 4 Bruce, R. L Social Media and Disasters: Current Uses, Future Options and Policy Considerations (2011)
- 5 Lumpp, T. G. The Effects of Social Media on National Security within the United States. Published Master of Science in Cyber security Thesis, Utica College (2014)
- 6 Hodge, N. U.S. Diverts Spy Drone from Afghanistan to Haiti. *Wired Magazine*, January 15, 2010. *Interception of Communications Act*, Chapter 11: 20. Government Printers (2010)



images and videos posted on Facebook by participants, onlookers, and outraged people to ‘name and shame’ alleged rioters—efforts that led to hundreds of arrests. Similar to this, during the Boston Marathon bombings, regional and federal law enforcement agencies kept an eye on information shared on Reddit, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to aid in the identification of the offenders. They also utilized Twitter to update the public on the investigation's progress, to calm nerves and request public assistance, and to correct misinformation by the press.⁷

Despite their positive implications on humanity, social media platforms portend a double-edged sword, as they have posed new challenges in the realm of personal and national security. On a personal level, Rose warns⁸ that there are greater chances of private information becoming public, which opens users to various security risks as the information is easily transferred between social media platforms. Over-sharing of information on social media networks also increases the vulnerability of location-based information, thus posing a threat to citizens’ privacy. The threats to privacy are compounded by the fact that social media platforms are relatively easy to access, and posted content can be easily seen and reviewed by anyone with an interest in the user’s personal information. There is much documented evidence of the impact of social media on the broad national security discourse in both developed and developing worlds. Terrorism, one of the leading threats to global security, has been propagated by social media platforms. Terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been using social media to recruit and radicalize citizens. Specifically, ISIS has been using social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp and Skype to lure mostly Western recruits to Syria for terrorist training. Terrorists are using social media platforms to announce their successful attacks, thereby causing fear and panic amongst citizens. The problem is compounded by the fact that once they publish their successful attacks on social media platforms, they create a permanent online record. Similarly, social media platforms have also been used to facilitate violent protests. For instance, during the 2011 England riots, teenage gangs used social media communication platforms to evade authorities, publicize lawlessness and coordinate antisocial behaviour. In some parts of the world, social media platforms have been used as powerful communication tools for fuelling social and political upheavals. Through social media platforms, activists can easily overcome censorship, coordinate protests, and spread rumouring instances where regimes stifle dissent and try to control public discourse. Protests in Tunisia and Egypt, which led to an overthrow of sitting presidents, were coordinated through social media. Summarizing the impact of social media in the Tunisia and Egypt revolutions, Liaropoulos⁹ highlighted that social media managed to spread the message in the early phase, mobilized part of the local population, and drew international attention. His analysis of the Arab Spring revolution also concurred that the usage and growth of social media in the Arab region played a significant role in the mass mobilization of protestors, empowerment, shaping of opinions and influencing change. Social media platforms have also been instrumental in the spread of fake news to cause fear and panic among citizens.¹⁰ Fake news, defined as news which is wholly false or contains deliberately misleading elements incorporated within its content, is widely circulated online. Fake news that is propagated through social media platforms can also have implications for the economic wellbeing of the nation. For example, in 2013, the Associated Press’s Twitter account was hacked and released a tweet falsely claiming that there had been two explosions at the White House and that President Obama had been injured.¹¹ Within 2 minutes, the tweet had reached US stock traders and the Dow Jones dropped over 143 points (a \$136.5 billion loss). Although the tweet was discovered to be erroneous and taken down within minutes, the damage had been done and this was a wake-up call for security analysts and policymakers to consider the negative implications of believing false information.¹² The manipulation of public opinion over social media platforms has also emerged as a critical threat to public life and this phenomenon has been rife during political campaigns in different countries. In their report on social media manipulation during political campaigns, Bradshaw and Howard found out that some organized social media manipulation campaigns were characterized by misinformation in 48 countries. There have also been fears that fake news may have influenced the 2016 United States presidential election’s outcome. For instance, the most engaged-with, yet fake story, was the story which claimed that Pope Francis had endorsed Donald Trump for President and the story amassed 960 000 shares on Facebook.

In his study on social media and moral panic, Walsh¹³ contends that social media favour content likely to generate

7 Pandalai, S. The social media challenge to national security: Impact and Opportunities, (2016).

8 Rose, C. The security implications of social media. Journal of Management and Information Systems, (2021)

9 Liaropoulos, A. The challenges of social media intelligence for the intelligence community. Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence, 1(1) (2013)

10 See Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P. N. Truth and Trust (2018)

11 Forster, P. Bogus AP tweet about explosion at White House wipes billions off US markets (2013)

12 Ghonim, W. Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater Than the People in Power. Harcourt (2012)

13 Walsh, J. Social media and moral panics: Assessing the effects of technological change on societal reaction. International

significant emotion and outrage, thus making it a facilitator of division and hostility. Such content's emotional valence infects other users, influencing their subsequent interactions and escalating bitterness within online environments. Such social media-induced hostilities were witnessed during the xenophobic attacks in South Africa in 2015 and 2019, which were perpetrated by South African citizens on foreign nationals—whom South Africans accused of taking their job opportunities and committing criminal activities. Social media platforms played a significant role in perpetuating such xenophobic attacks, which were characterized by beating and sometimes killing of foreigners, as well as looting of foreigners' shops. The Citizen Research Centre [CRC]¹⁴ noted that during the 2015 xenophobic attacks, a total of 21,660 social media posts were classified as either extreme hate speech or incitement to violence. The study by CRC also noted the influence of social media in broadcasting irresponsible xenophobic statements by key political figures, with some of the reckless statements triggering xenophobic attacks (Citizen Research Centre [CRC], 2019). News24 (2019) also noted the impact of misleading social media posts as a precursor to some of the xenophobic attacks in 2019. Social media were awash with old videos purporting to be current xenophobic attacks, with some of the videos not originating from South Africa. Thus, in the context of South Africa, social media were used to instigate violence in two ways: first, through inciting citizens to act against foreigners, and second, through spreading false information about alleged xenophobic attacks. Despite the existing evidence, little is known about how social media usage promotes or disrupts security in the complex security setting. This article seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge by appraising its advantages and disadvantages. The article is composed of five parts. Part One presents an introduction. Part Two briefly discusses the methodology employed. Part Three covers the literature review. Part Four presents the advantages and disadvantages of social media usage amidst the complex security landscape. Part Five concludes and recommends doable state interventions that can be used to mitigate the negative effects of social media usage while maximizing its positive effects.

2. Method and Materials

This study is basically qualitative desk research based on detailed document analysis. Being a scholarly review, it did not use data collection procedures or statistical methodologies employed by positivist researchers. Instead, the study appraised the advantages and disadvantages of social media usage to national security by using readily accessible and available public domain documents. To obtain information and data, the researcher systematically reviewed both academic and non-academic documents such as written unpublished papers, journal articles, reports, and case studies. The contents were collected from several reputable worldwide publishers' and organizations' websites using search engines. Using the keywords 'social media' and 'national security' in developing nations like Tanzania, a Google Chrome internet search was done. The researcher properly collected, evaluated, and interpreted relevant data by synthesizing rich data drawn from various sources to derive the intended meanings. Nevertheless, despite being the theoretical desk-based review of the subject matter, its key findings, recommendations and conclusions were drawn from valid and reliable empirical data.

3. Literature Review

Social media usage has become a global phenomenon and the number of worldwide users continues to grow. It was expected to reach approximately 2.95 billion people in 2020, nearly a third of the Earth's population.¹⁵ According to Baytiyeh,¹⁶ each social media platform provides features that cater for different types of users. Some platforms are more popular than others, but even the unpopular ones are utilized by a portion of the world's population.¹⁷ Likewise, the use of social media can be manifested in various aspects of human lives.¹⁸ Through social media, users have established an online community as their digital neighbourhood referred to as *super-peer*, which significantly contributes to influencing behaviour, shifting attitudes, and shaping cultural norms.¹⁹ Social media is used to facilitate connections, representation, and airing out their voices. Social media enabled the youth to form identity-based communities and networks.

For example, Brough et al.²⁰ unveil shared success stories among low-income and under-resourced youth of getting work, something which helps them to lead their own lives.²¹ Despite its positive effects, social media is a potential catalyst to increase youth vulnerability to peer victimization and psychosocial difficulties. This supports that uncontrolled use of

Journal of Cultural Studies 1–20, (2020)

14 See Its Report on Xenophobic Violence in South Africa (2019)

15 Chen, C. Y. Smartphone addiction: Psychological and social factors predict (2020)

16 Chen, C. Y. Smartphone addiction: Psychological and social factors predict (2020)

17 Baytiyeh, H. Social Media's Role in Peace building and Post-Conflict Recovery, (2019)

18 Henry, M., &Harte, B. A new model for assessing the value of social media activity, (2019)

19 Stevens, R., Gilliard-Matthews, S., Dunaev, J., Woods, M. K., &Brawner., (2017)

20 Brough, M., Literat, I., &Ikin, A. (2020). 'Good Social Media?': Under-represented Youth (2020)

21 Brough, M., Literat, I., &Ikin, A. (2020). 'Good Social Media?': Under-represented Youth (2020)



social media and available social apps influence adolescents' emotional well-being.²²In particular, the youth perceive social media as a useful tool for self-expression, relational interactions, exploration, and browsing. They can interact to share peer-based learning and new media literacy. Social media is viewed as important in facilitating online and offline friendship ties to support the development of intimacy and connection to others. Social media is also viewed and used as an enabler in building social capital among people, such as youth cohorts, to accomplish various economic activities.²³Many scholars have strongly argued that the costs or benefits of social media usage are, *inter alia*, determined by the users themselves but not social media as tools.²⁴ We also support this position; innovation is not awful but the users of the innovation. Among others, the pains or gains from social media use depend largely on the user's purpose, taste and interests they intend to achieve in a given time and space.

2.1 The Duality of Social Media

Social media can promote peace or cause conflicts, depending on users' intentions and interests. As such, social media can help share beneficial information to overcome crises and maliciously promote terrorist activities and spread harmful propaganda.²⁵ Additionally, violent perpetrators have used social media to recruit youths to their course, posting and displaying hateful messages and texts and propagating their violent ideologies. For example, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are believed to have been using social media to mobilize and facilitate recruiting new members across the world, including from developed countries such as Canada.²⁶ Such groups have also used social media platforms to spread fear and violence.²⁷ Besides, Blevins et al.²⁸ noted that gangs in developed nations use social media to express themselves, send threats and intimidate, brag, display aggression, and mourn. Suzor et al.²⁹ posit that social media have intensified existing patterns of gendered violence and introduced new forms of intrusion, abuse and violence against women. This practice is often referred to as online gender-based violence or technology-facilitated violence. Generally, such forms of violence aim to maintain structural inequalities and spaces that men have traditionally occupied for a long time, causing harm to women's well-being, safety and sense of security, civic and social engagement, education and employment opportunities. Steward et al.³⁰ have shown that excessive and inappropriate social media use brings various socio-economic advantages; if it is not controlled, improper use stimulates conflicts.

In contrast, social media have several positive features in promoting peace in conflict-affected regions and building social cohesion. For instance, social media help to bring together hostile groups and individuals by encouraging dialogue, addressing negative perceptions of violence and reshaping attitudes, as well as promoting tolerance and mutual affection. In addition, social media allows citizens to receive and produce the necessary information, keeping them up-to-date on what is happening concerning the existing socio-economic and political developments. According to Grossman,³¹ the democratic process should promote an 'electronic republic', whereby individuals or citizens are empowered to generate and receive information on issues, decisions and any other legislative scenario that may impact the citizenry massively. Social media provide space for the excluded and marginalized voices to be informed and heard by those who hold positions. In Pakistan, for example, blogosphere positively facilitated the voices of the excluded and marginalized to be heard as well as provided democratic and inclusive public debates among civil society participants and the space for peace education, which cultivates conversation and debates.

Besides, social media has been useful in coordinating peaceful democratic processes such as organizing and archiving protests intending to send a particular message to society to be worked upon, before they bring chaos. So, the advantages and disadvantages of social media usage are discussed below.

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- 22 Weinstein, E. The Social Media See-Saw: Positive and negative influences on Youth (2019)
 - 23 URT. Electronic and postal communications (Online Content). Dodoma, Tanzania (2018)
 - 24 Rice, E., &Barman-Adhikari, A. Internet and SM use as a resource among youth (2018)
 - 25 See Blachnio, A., Przepiorka, A., &Pantic, I. (2016).
 - 26 Naseem, M. A., et al., Social Media as a space for peace education (2016)
 - 27 Blaker L. The Islamic State's use of online social media. *Military Cyber Affairs* 1(1), (2015)
 - 28 Blevins, T., et al, Automatically processing tweets from gang-involved youth (2016)
 - 29 See Suzor, N., et al (2006)
 - 30 Steward, J. H., et al., Informing policies in forensic settings (2006)
 - 31 Grossman, L. The Electronic Republic: Reshaping Democracy (1996)

4. Analysis and Discussion

4.1 Advantages of Social Media Usage

Social media offers new perspectives in understanding conflict contexts, informing how interventions are designed. This includes mapping people and conversations, gathering data about conflict dynamics and overcoming traditional program design challenges. It can amplify peaceful voices and shape the public and political narrative.³² This includes countering fake news and threat narratives and addressing potential trigger points through rumour management. It can also have a bridging function between local, national and international spheres to mobilize action.³³ It can create new spaces for people to connect, coordinate and mobilize around peace. In addition, it can act as a vehicle for collective coping, augment traditional dialogue activities, engage people in dialogue that may not ordinarily participate in offline activities and strengthen peace processes. The Internet and social media have brought with them a new form of empowerment that fundamentally altering relations between citizens and states and having an impact on both global and local levels. The Arab Spring demonstrated how social media can be a powerful platform and tool to facilitate the spread of protest movements, often led by a new digitally connected youth.³⁴ ICTs have also emerged as tools to support more effective humanitarian responses, improve peacekeeping and serve as an information platform to support refugees in crisis. In refugee camps, social media is often the only source of news and information to which the refugees have access. Many refugees depend on apps and websites such as WhatsApp, Facebook and YouTube to fill the information gap.³⁵ Additionally, the dramatic spread of digital technologies and the Internet in fragile and conflict-affected contexts has opened new possibilities for political, economic and social transformation. Access to social media and other forms of cyber-enabled communications facilitates new avenues for civic participation and engagement. Millions of youths have used the Internet to promote peace and help build a better future for themselves and their countries. Today, hundreds of 'Peacetech' initiatives with millions of active users exist in some of the most complex and challenging contexts. These initiatives include crisis mapping, crowd sourcing platforms, peace gaming, blogs, podcasts, WhatsApp groups, online petitions, tech first responder programs and GIS-based security applications. These are transforming relationships between warring parties. Digitally savvy youth from around the world are at the centre of this change. In so doing, they are acting as peace-promoting mechanisms. However, despite the benefits, not all youths are benefiting equally. As the 2016 World Development Report indicated, "There also are persistent digital divides across gender, geography, age, and income."³⁶ Some 4.2 billion people still lack access to the Internet, and the majority reside in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The poorest households are excluded, and women are most often left behind.³⁷ Women in Africa have, on average, 34 percent less access to the Internet than their male counterparts.³⁸ In an increasingly connected society, where digital literacy is essential, a lack of access to the Internet and ICTs by young women will have important long-term consequences on their access to education, economic opportunities and quality social services.³⁹

4.2 Disadvantages of Social Media Usage

4.2.1 Terrorism

Social media are increasingly used by terrorist organizations as tools for ideological radicalization, recruitment, communication and training. Terrorist groups also take advantage of social media to communicate with cyber-crime organizations and to coordinate along with them fund-raising activities (from illicit activities) carried out in part (for example drug smuggling and gunrunning) or completely (for example phishing) on the Internet.

The link between organized crime and terrorist organizations is increasing considerably in the cyber-world, and this coalition will produce new offensive technologies.

⁴⁰To date, the terrorist groups which make the most substantial use of social media for their illicit purposes are the Islamic jihadist ones.⁴¹ Facebook and YouTube channels are often used by al-Qaeda to recruit and increase the number of sympathizers and jihad supporters, especially in the West (for example spreading photos and videos of successful terrorist attacks, publishing lists and biographies of the martyrs, preaching or ideological texts). Social media and, more generally, the Internet allow the publication and diffusion of extremist ideas and material that may lead a weak individual to recruit him/herself, at times unaided by any mediator or someone to help him/her.

32 See Deutsche Welle Freedom (2017)

33 See International Telecommunication Union (2017)

34 See Internet World Stats (2017)

35 This report was written by Raouf Farrah et al., (2017)

36 See World Bank Group (2016)

37 See International Telecommunication Union (2017)

38 See World Bank Group (2016)

39 Ibid

40 Urdal, H. 'A clash of generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence (2006)

41 Urdal, H. 'A clash of generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence (2006)



Social media are used by terrorist groups for propaganda activities to make public successful terror attacks and, consequently, to throw the civil population into a panic. Since spreading news and content on social media can be considered ‘viral’, this kind of propaganda can considerably overdraw the media effect already produced by the traditional means of information and communication (satellite TV, newspapers, radio) and cause consequences even more dangerous than those caused by terrorist attacks (for example, circulating the news of an attack to communication and connection infrastructures used by the stock market might throw investors into a panic and, consequently, lead small money-savers to behave irrationally; hence, it might cause even more severe economic damage than the damage itself to the very material infrastructure). In addition, some organized groups, mainly terrorist groups, could use social media to deliberately spread false information (in part or in full) during a disastrous event (for example an earthquake, a flood, the accidental blast of a nuclear reactor, a pandemic) or immediately after it ends, to overdraw their damaging effects, mystifying the people and delaying emergency operations and the response of a country. For example, al-Qaeda has a ‘net-like’ decentralized structure, Facebook and Twitter can be used as platforms to organize and connect the single groups linked to it, and also the ‘lone wolves and the leadership. Social media are also used to communicate oblique messages, arrange plans for terrorist acts, manage the training of new terrorists, and provide logistical support and operative assistance (for example giving advice about how to go through a roadblock, build them and handle arms and explosives, find and use cyber weapons, dodge and counter investigation by security agencies).

3.1.2 Criminality

Criminal organizations use social media as support, communication and coordination tools to conduct their illicit activities. Such illicit activities can be either pure information ones (for instance spreading child pornography with a fee, ‘virtual’ identity thefts, phishing, the spread of viruses, Trojans, worms), or ‘traditional’ ones (for instance drug smuggling, human trafficking, money-laundering, and transfer of documents from industrial espionage). The criminal groups that use social media are made of people coming from the same geographic area and who know each other personally. They are also made up of people scattered all over the world who are linked exclusively by ‘virtual’ relations.⁴² These ‘criminal communities’ are generally coordinated by one or more moderators who have the power to remove members who do not provide high-quality information or tools and to assign an increasing level of reliability to those who make more contributions than others. The use of social media and, in general, of IT technology for criminal purposes is dramatically expanding, not only because they are spreading but also because the individuals perceive the actions they commit as less unsafe if compared to what happened in the past.

3.1.3 War

According to a recent NATO provisional study⁴³, future conflicts will occur in more and more connected environments, which will be characterized by the use of new communication and information technologies, social media included. It is a few years since social media have been employed by the Armed Forces in several countries, and now they are ready to be employed more and more frequently to accompany traditional offensive means. In particular, the use of social media during a conflict adds to the employment of other mass media such as newspapers, TV, and radio for propaganda, influence and deception activities, as better explained in the subsequent section.⁴⁴

The number of wars between entities with international subjectivity has been very low and open-source material has been sparse in the last decade; accordingly, investigating cases of the military campaigns conducted with actual employment of social media in support of military operations is not possible.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, in this regard, it is crucial to cite briefly the two latest conflicts between Israel and Lebanon. During the second Israeli-Lebanese war in 2006, Hezbollah carried out several attacks. To be precise, during the conflict they published several videos and photos on blogs, social networking sites and YouTube to foster their image and criticize Israel’s capability and their security services. Furthermore, Hezbollah managed to instill a ‘perception of failure’ in the Israeli political-military establishment which conditioned the course of the conflict. During the following war (2008-2009), instead, Israel showed much effective management of social media. It used them responsibly to circulate true information and counter-information campaigns. This indicates that social media can also be negatively used as a war strike.

42 Rao, N. et al., Smart phones, youth and moral panics (2020)

43 See NATO findings about the likely future wars (2019)

44 Ibid (2019)

45 Heywood, A. Global politics. Macmillan International Higher Education (2014)

3.1.4 Protest and Revolution

New technologies and in particular social media constitute an asset of great importance both for protest movements and revolutions. Rebels and revolutionary groups turn to such tools to better organize and spur masses to action, specifically to arrange protests or struggle activities and manage their tactical and operational aspects. Since social media are gaining a great deal of power in determining the conclusion of protests and revolutions, their employment is likely to increase remarkably in the immediate future.⁴⁶ Social media are tools which enable revolutionary groups to lower the costs of participation, organization, recruitment and training. Social media allow revolutionary movements to be more autonomous and, therefore, less easily influenced by people not involved in the organization and less dependent on external financing. Social media let their users 'bypass' the control governments usually makes on them, creating alternative channels to spread fake news.⁴⁷ Lievrouw⁴⁸ agrees with this observation and talks about the role of social media in the course of the protests in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, claiming that the regimes have lost their absolute control of information, gradually losing power while the population has acquired the power to handle and spread such information. Algerian writer and journalist Amara Lakhous⁴⁹ also points out how social media and the Internet make information censorship and manipulation almost impossible. Similarly, Marco,⁵⁰ a freelancer for the cultural magazine *Limes*, studied the protests in Egypt and found that, in societies where traditional public media are controlled by the government and the private ones are censored by the companies they work for, social media represent a unique opportunity for the civil population to counter the regime to enhance their freedom of speech, even if doing that can lead to civil unrest.

3.1.5 Irresponsible use by civil servants

Turning to social media enables the dissemination of confidential or job-related news whose subsequent use or possible manipulation cannot be predicted and circumscribed. Cases of non-authorized and uncontrolled publication of classified or sensitive information or content (audio, video, photo, etc.) through social media are more and more numerous. In these cases, national security can be severely compromised by the use of social media.⁵¹ Freedom of expression and communication has to stop where the need to protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data start, that is to fulfill the general duty of confidentiality at work. Since the civil service is increasingly using social media for their institutional purposes, as well as civil servants are doing it for personal interests, the government must take firm action to prevent their misuse.

4.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

This article aimed to critically appraise the use of social media within the context of complex and unpredictable security environments. The upswing in the adoption of social media as communication platforms has brought a dilemma.

That is, it can either heal or kill depending on the interest and purpose of the users. The resultant security threats have been quite huge and detrimental. One key threat is that they facilitate terrorism, violent protests and revolutions.

Facebook has mostly been used to issue rebellious statements and to urge citizens to revolt against their governments. The challenge of controlling social media communication has facilitated the spread of fake news on social media platforms. Such fake news has negative security, economic, political and social effects.

These are intended to cause terror and despondency in the nation. Moreover, social media platforms have facilitated human trafficking, global threat to human security. Governments ought to formulate policies that minimize the negative effects of social media usage while maximizing the positive effects by changing threats into opportunities for social economic development. Otherwise, all state action to take full control or stop social media usage is impractical. New technologies, chiefly social media, are a necessary evil. The government should invest in public education on the positive use of social media if the World is to remain secure and peaceful.

46 Henry, M., &Harte, B. A new model for assessing the value of social media activity (2012)

47 Kaufhold, M. A., &Reuter, C. Cultural Violence and Peace in social media (2019)

48 Lievrouw, L. A. Alternative and Activist New Media. Cambridge: Polity Press (2011)

49 When discussing how social media can be harmful to political stability (2017)

50 See Marco, H when examining the pains and gains of the social media usage (2018)

51 Mergel, I. Social media in the public sector (2012)



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THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE-TANZANIA ON ITS ALUMNI: MY PERSONAL TESTIMONY

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The National Defence College (NDC)-Tanzania was established to facilitate high-level education, training, and professional development of national security leaders. It is the highest strategic learning and the principal training institution of the Ministry of Defence and National Service. NDC is also set as a centre of excellence for conducting unique and comprehensive National Security Studies. It has been established and mandated to run the Security and Strategic Studies Course for senior officers from the Defence, Security Organs and the Civil Service. It aims to equip defence and government policymakers with requisite economic, political, military, scientific, international relations and national organizational knowledge necessary for understanding national security in its internal and external dynamics.

In 2015, after returning from my abroad diplomatic service, I was among the few privileged and selected to join a 47-week course for the Fourth Course since its inception. I say that I was among the privileged because I knew many colleagues in the diplomatic service had wished to join this exceptional course. At first, when I received the appointment letter to join the NDC-Tanzania, many questions lingered on my mind. I perceived 47 weeks as a century of being away from my routine diplomatic life. It is normal and indeed human to be suspicious about something new that comes in between your usual undertakings. However, after reporting at the college and beginning the program, I could attest that the 47 weeks turned into days.

I met and made new friends across the spectrum of countries that had sent their officers to participate in the Fourth Course. It was a new beginning that saw all of us sail through daily discussions, seminars, lectures, simulations and field practical understanding of our national security architecture. This was the beginning of military life, as most colleagues from both Tanzania and abroad came from the military background. The experience is worth telling.

This opportunity provided us both military and civilian equivalents from governmental institutions with a platform to further develop networking and performance at the highest executive levels in national and international assignments, particularly by prioritizing national security interests. This course provided an understanding of the contemporary regional issues while also providing opportunities to strengthen and sustain a comprehensive network among course members.

Protecting the security of our nation, our people, territory, and way of life—should be the foremost mission and constitutional duty of every citizen. As citizens and beneficiaries of the course, we have an unprecedented opportunity to make our country safer and more prosperous. We have the duty to sense, monitor, and report any security threats that we detect from our daily undertakings. Our security and military forces cannot be everywhere; hence, we need highly trained personnel to filter any threat, thereby improving the prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution, and greater hope for Tanzanians and the rest of the world.

At the same time, the complexities of the dangers we face are unprecedented. Ethnic conflicts and outlaw states threaten regional stability. Terrorism, drugs, organized crime and proliferation of small arms are global concerns that transcend national borders. As an alumnus of the National Defence College-Tanzania, I acquired vital skills from this crucial course. These skills have made me more conscious of matters related to defence and security. In 2020, during Tanzania's general elections, through the Centre for International Policy (CIP), we were fully engaged in observing the elections. The general principle that guided us during such a demanding moment was putting the country first. We agreed to send out the message to all stakeholders, including the political parties, that there was life after the elections, and we ought to uphold our security above all other things.

During the course, I was involved in drafting Tanzania's National Security Strategy (NSS). One of the core functions of any government is to provide for the security and safety of its citizens. Moreover, security is a precondition for sustainable investment, job creation, and development; these are the preeminent priorities of many African governments. Security is, therefore, central to the confidence and trust that the citizens have in their government. Yet, most African countries do not have an overarching national security strategy.



This exercise of drafting Tanzania's National Security Strategy informed and equipped me with key skills that the lack of a grand strategy inhibits prioritization of security threats, effective coordination and resource alignment.

Without a national security strategy, there is no shared understanding of national security vision and objectives or national leveraging partnership assistance. Consequently, in most African countries, security does not serve public good. Therefore, given the excellent training at the National Defence College, it is worth mentioning that National Security Strategy Development is a policymaking process to deliver better state and citizen security. As such, it provided me with the opportunity to understand the critical need for protecting national security and being aware of any threats therein. By so doing, it forges a new social contract between the government and its people.

Through this understanding, some of us have been involved in research to analyze the ongoing security threats in the southern part of Tanzania and northern part of Mozambique, particularly Cabo Delgado. Tanzania is a country considered 'at risk' of increased levels of violent extremism in the region and particularly in connection with the emergence of the Mozambique crisis, due to the porous nature of borders in the region and the prevalence of common drivers and enablers of extremism. Therefore, urgent interventions should be undertaken by multiple stakeholders to compliment national support and efforts for preventing and responding to violent extremism in Tanzania. In May 2022, I was among the security analysts who were asked to research and analyze the situation in southern Tanzania.

The study assessed the radicalization and recruitment of youths in their localities, the extent and effectiveness of non-state actors' engagement in PVE initiatives, the extent and effectiveness of governments' responsiveness to PVE and recruitment initiatives, the extent and effectiveness of states' engagement with non-state actors and the community around VE/PVE, the effectiveness of state and non-state collaboration in designing and implementing strategies and initiatives on PVE and recruitment, and finally, make recommendations for possible solutions to violent extremism challenges and preventions of recruitment within their localities. To undertake this important task, we relied on the knowledge acquired from the National Defence College. Undoubtedly, my colleagues and I, who had the privilege to study at the National Defence College, continue to contribute immensely to strengthen our National Security Strategy, addressing the challenges of Tanzania's national security threats.

We are not left out in following up the outcome of the Kenyan general elections which were held on the 9th of August, 2022. Elections are widely thought to be a major source of internal conflicts, which may have spill over effects beyond borders, particularly in Africa. As professionally trained security analysts from the Tanzania National Defence College, we see the role of our analysis so that we can provide possible predictions in protecting our national security. In this vein, on the 26th of August 2022, I will be participating in an online debate on *Lessons for Tanzania from Kenyan elections*. All these emanate from the skills acquired from the National Defence College-Tanzania.

Lastly, I wish to seize this opportunity to thank the National Defence College-Tanzania for having accepted me as one of their Fourth Course Member. I thank all my Fourth Course Members, who through their cooperation, we exchanged ideas on national security matters. I thank the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, especially through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, which fully funded my studies at the NDC.

I highly recommend that the NDC increases the intake of more Course Members so that we can have more security analysts in the country. Without security, there will be no development; without development, there will be no security. Let us create more *Strategic Leaders, For Strategic Development*, in line with our 2016 Course Members' Motto.

AKHSANTENI SANA!

NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE– TANZANIA’S PERCEPTION OF SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW

Maj MA Mwinyikombo, *psc*



1.0 Introduction

Security is a multifaceted concept which involves myriad stakeholders to deal with it in any state. It does not only demand local thinking but also a mindset across borders and specialities. Naturally, no nation in the world accepts insecurities, whether real or perceived. Thus, every state strives toward protecting its sovereignty as well as territorial integrity against any foreign invasion. The same applies to curbing domestic and international contemporary security threats. This is done via raising awareness by imparting relevant and requisite skills to its citizens.

At the onset, I wish to define the term security, but I am confronted with many words. Writers often fail to offer any clear definition of security. If one is offered, it is rarely accompanied by a discussion of why one definition is preferred over another. This could be due to its ambiguity, complexity and changing nature over time. With this in mind, I am convinced that security in its broadest sense has never existed throughout history. As Baldwin argues,¹ ‘If we cannot name it, we can ever hope to achieve it. Indeed, I am following the same line of argument by undertaking lifelong research for a secure state. Buzan² for example substantiates, ‘throughout the history of mankind, each state has been made insecure by the existence of others.’ Hence, this leads me to concur with Wolfers³ on the title of his article, ‘national security’ as an ambiguous symbol. Therefore, as far as security has failed to adopt a blanket definition, the same applies to national security. As Buzan⁴ further makes a point, ‘...we cannot expect the concept of national security to exhibit much unity of meaning in any general sense. Thus, Bernard et al.,⁵ in the words of General Jacob Devers, also complemented that, ‘national security is a condition which cannot be qualified. We shall either be secure, or insecure. We cannot have partial security. ‘If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all.’ Accordingly, security is defined as a pursuit of freedom from threats. However, if this definition triggers any discussion, then Baldwin is correct. Consequently, among numerous definitions of national security Buzan⁶ managed to put forward; he quoted one from the National Defence College–Canada that, ‘national security is the preservation of a way of life acceptable to ... people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attacks or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values which are essential to the quality of life.’ Thus, I deliberately adopted this definition, not because it is from National Defence College, but because it does not defeat the purpose of this article. In the case of Tanzania, security issues are dealt with at different levels. However, in terms of national security, a central forum such as the National Defence College (NDC)–Tanzania is required to provide its people with wider knowledge about national security.

It is against this backdrop, this article draws from the institutionalism, collective security and social contract theories to assess the NDC’s perception of security in the context of the changing security environment. It covers the historical overview of the National Defence College–Tanzania, the NDC’s Perception and its role in security, some achievements of the College registered so far, its future prospects and conclusion. Hence, this article does not claim to be exhaustive but makes a valuable plus to the understanding of the NDC’s perception of security.

2.0 Historical Overview of the National Defence College–Tanzania

The idea of establishing the NDC as the country’s main security and strategy nucleus did not sprout like a mushroom. It has deeper roots, dating back to the immediate aftermath of independence in 1961. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, the forerunner and pioneer of Tanganyika’s independence, was concerned with the security of both his country and other African countries.

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- 1 See his conception of security (2000)
 - 2 See Buzan (1983)
 - 3 See Wolfers when discussing on national security (1952)
 - 4 See Buzan (1983)
 - 5 Refer to their conceptions of security (2000)
 - 6 Ibid (1983)



Thus, when Tanzania (then Tanganyika) gained her independence before other East African countries, Mwalimu Nyerere saw it meaningless if other African countries remained under the yoke of colonialism. Tanzania played a significant role in the liberation struggle. Mwalimu stood firmly in articulating the country's position on Africa's liberation. With this in mind, Mwalimu Nyerere agreed that Dar es Salaam to be the headquarters of the Africa Liberation Committee (ALC) after the Organization for African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963. The establishment of the ALC headquarters in Dar es Salaam reflected Tanzania's commitment to supporting conflict resolution strategies in the region by providing training and material support. Considering Tanzania's potential geostrategic nature, the Portuguese, who dominated Mozambique in the southern part of Tanzania, the apartheid regime of South Africa and the Smith regime of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), did not agree with the Tanzania's decision to harbour liberation struggles. Hence, these colonialists started to threaten Tanzania. The provision of the rear base turned Tanzania as an enemy of the apartheid and Portuguese governments. The country's southern regions became a target of the Portuguese military attacks. The notion of Tanzania getting involved in southern Africa affairs was not received by the repressive regime of apartheid South Africa. Tanzania had to learn these acrimonious strategic lessons from its infancy. At this time, there was a strong desire to establish an institution that would coordinate the national strategic thinking among stakeholders from various branches of government, including the military, civil service, intellectuals, strategic establishments and others. Only the NDC could be such an institution whose thrust was on national security and strategic studies.

However, one may wonder why the idea of establishing the NDC did not materialize five decades after independence. There were numerous predicaments for its delay; however, to say the least, the first was the Tanganyika Rifles (TR) mutiny of January 1964. Consequently, TR was disbanded and an entirely new Tanzania People's Defence Forces (TPDF) was established in September 1964. Temu et al.,⁷ in the words of General Mrisho Sarakikya, the first TPDF Chief of Defence Force (CDF), 'As you remember, there was an occurrence of a mutiny. All British officers were removed from the army, and we controlled the army under my leadership as CDF.' As infant and young as it was, TPDF would not manage to establish NDC since it was lacking the know-how and broad expertise in security and strategic related matters. Second, up to the mid-1970s, there were insufficient Senior Military and Civilian Officers to run a National Defence College. Hence, only joint training of Officer Cadets and 'Party Cadre' was possible. A Party Cadre Military School (PCMS) was established in Monduli in 1973. This was later amalgamated with the Officer Cadet School to form a National Leadership Academy (Chuo cha Taifa cha Uongozi – CTU) at the premises of the current Tanzania Military Academy. Third, the Kagera War, imposed on Tanzania by Ugandan maverick Idd Amin Dada in 1978–79, stymied the NDC's arrival, which was followed by a period of severe economic difficulties. As Mkapa⁸ accentuates, 'we suffered a major economic disruption because of the war, which took us years to recover from. Going to war is a very grave decision and ought not to be taken lightly, for it causes enormous destruction and cripples the economy. The war was the last stroke that broke the economy's back, costing one of the world's poorest countries USD 500 million.' However, all these predicaments did not diminish the need to establish an NDC in Tanzania. As a first step towards fulfilling this desire, a Command and Staff College was established in 1980, and High Commanders' Defence Studies began to be offered in 1982 for military-professional studies. Thus, the establishment of the NDC–Tanzania in 2012 was met with joy and elation nationally, as well as regionally and internationally. The College has been named the prestigious institution

The NDC–Tanzania was founded when H.E. Dr Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete was the President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Commander-in-Chief. He played a significant role throughout. This was not until Dr Hussein Ali Mwinyi, Minister of Defence and National Service, signed the Establishment Order in January 2012. Dr Mwinyi is currently the President of Zanzibar and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. However, in February 2020, the then-President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Commander-in-Chief, the late Dr John Pombe Joseph Magufuli assented to the National Defence College–Tanzania Instrument which revoked the Establishment Order by the minister. The subsequent registration and accreditation by the National Council for Technical Education (now NACTVET) established the NDC as an autonomous higher learning institution. In addition to the National Defence College's prestigious symbol '*ndc*,' which is a unique and internationally recognized award appended just after an alumnus' name, the College confers Master's degrees and Diplomas in Security and Strategic Studies. The College also offers capstone courses for one to two weeks. It draws participants from both governmental and non-governmental institutions. So far, the College has managed to conduct 13 capstone courses.

3.0 NDC's Perception of Security

Different schools of thought, academic institutions and security platforms perceive security differently depending on time, space and technological and scientific developments.

7 See Temu and Tembe (2015)

8 See Mkapa (2019)

The NDC does not isolate itself from this viewpoint in terms of curriculum and candidates. It admits senior officers from the Tanzania People's Defence Force, the Police Force, the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service, the Tanzania Prisons Service, the Immigration Services Department, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau and Civil Servants from various ministries. It also accommodates senior military officers from both within and outside Africa. Mihanjo⁹ supports this composition of Course Members when he rightly said: 'NDC is a mindset change agent which seeks to integrate all sectors to impart knowledge on national security. With this mix of Course Members, the NDC has departed from the traditional perception of security (the realism approach) which assumes that armed forces are the only key players in security matters. It has moved away from merely military dimensions and it includes economic, societal, political and environmental issues, focusing on people rather than positing a state-centric perspective in security studies. This is due to dynamic security threats as well as advances in science and technology. The contemporary security threats are contagious that know no geographical boundaries. They can spread from one individual to another, within society, institutions, and countries. Thus, dealing with them requires a coordinated and integrated approach. Therefore, the concept 'national security' now encompasses much more than national defence and internal security. This is also due to the rambling proliferation of new threats to human security which can be classified as non-traditional threats. In fact, the current security climate is very unpredictable and complex. This is the security landscape the NDC-TZ is currently operating.

The inclusion of civil society to pursue the NDC course is a result of time and circumstances. Climate change, which is a catalyst for environmental problems and water scarcity, not to mention food insecurity, cannot be solved with a gun barrel. It requires a multitude of stakeholders. Certainly, NDC's sole purpose is to train senior officers to be experts in economic, political, military, scientific, international relations, national organization aspects, and planning in both internal and external complexities. As Mihanjo¹⁰ remarks, 'the NDC is a higher learning academic institution that aims at preparing 'think tanks' for the nation's economic development.

Furthermore, retired Lieutenant General JN Waweru, former Commandant of the National Defence College-Kenya stated that, 'the aim of the College is to train leaders who make things happen with the capability to strategically see far beyond the normal horizons to the future.' His point is that security threats do not have short-term effects or only last a short time but can be long-lasting, and strategists must be prepared with solutions. In Booth's words, those strategists who do not try to be part of the solution will become an increasingly important part of the problem. For instance, today, everyone is proud of the world's technological and scientific advancement. However, this development has both positive and negative impacts. A good example is Artificial Intelligence (AI) which is lauded for a variety of benefits while also posing a security risk. Precisely, AI poses a serious threat to human security. It has begun to replace human labour in various occupations. This could eventually lead to massive unemployment, though it has started slowly. Indeed, the same scenario happened during the 19th-century industrial revolution.

Biotechnology will replace human doctors, who will no longer perform consultations, diagnoses, and prescriptions. Harari¹¹ underscores, 'AI continues to improve; human employees will need to repeatedly learn new skills and change their profession. General practitioners (GPs) who focus on diagnosing known diseases and administering familiar treatment will probably be replaced by AI doctors...No remaining human jobs will ever be safe from the threat of future automation because machine learning and robotics continue to improve.' Human insecurity caused by advances in information technology and biotechnology may result in the scramble over scarce employment vacancies to cover for massive unemployed people. Hence, the situation may escalate into violence, resulting in a more insecure society. In this respect, Harari asks, 'What do we do in order to prevent jobs from being lost; what do we do to create enough new jobs; and what do we do if, despite our best efforts, job losses significantly outstrip job creation?' These appear to be strategic questions, as well as strategic thinking. Harari's questions coincide with statement issued by Major General Ibrahim Michael Mhona, Commandant of the National Defence College – Tanzania, when opening the 9th NDC course in August 2020. He said, 'You are strategic Course Members; at the end of the course, you should ask yourself, do I think strategically? Do I decide strategically? Do I implement my decisions strategically? This is the role of NDCs around the world, and NDC – Tanzania in particular: to transform people's minds. It transforms the way its graduates think, make decisions and implement those decisions differently in comparison to others who have not attended the NDC course. The NDC's curriculum is structured to look far beyond the normal horizons into the future. In addition, the College is ready to accommodate other relevant security-related topics to improve its curriculum.

In one of his lectures, Elisante Ole Gabriel¹² appreciated the role of NDC-TZ by emphasizing that: 'NDC will always be remembered for preparing 'the brains,' not just people'.

9 See Mihanjo (2015)

10 Ibid 2015

11 See Harari (2019)

12 Prof E. Gabriel in one of his lectures (2016)



This statement underscores the role of the College. Since insecurities are dynamic, investment in education and research is inevitable. Some of the contemporary threats are neither visible nor tangible, and therefore requires some appropriate countermeasures. Harari¹³ substantiates that, 'Today the main economic assets consist of technical and institutional knowledge...and you just cannot conquer knowledge through war.' In fact, he emphasizes that traditional wars have dramatically decreased, and a new wave of wars has emerged that are muddled and complex.

In the 1990s most of the armed conflicts in the world had been intrastate rather than being interstate. Of the fifty-seven major armed conflicts occurring from 1990 to 2001, only three were interstate conflicts.' For example, today's world is overwhelmed by cyber warfare, which lacks guns and soldiers on the ground. Therefore, countering cyber war by artillery, missiles, rockets or even infantry skirmishes is nearly impossible but by means of smart, knowledgeable and intelligent brains they can be fought. This is consistent with Andrews et al.,¹⁴ quotation of Barrack Obama, the former President of the United States of America, '...military action cannot be the only - or even primary - component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail. This is not to say that every problem has a military solution.' This statement exhibits the paradigm shift in the NDC's perception of security. This is exactly what the College is doing: Bringing the world to the auditorium to discuss global security issues and impart vast knowledge in various expertises on current issues.

The NDC does not prepare only leaders but more importantly; strategic leaders. However, not everyone is a leader, except those who are born with the natural qualities of a leader. This implies that leaders are born; leadership is a natural gift given to a few people. No one can be a leader unless they possess leadership traits. Thus, the late Lieutenant General Paul Peter Massao, former NDC Commandant, remarked that the NDC course is for a few selected potential leaders who are gifted and talented as leaders to assume the leadership hierarchy of their respective institutions.' This is the essence of not applying directly to the College. Slots are assigned to the respective institutions, and it is their responsibility to earnestly scrutinize the prospective candidates. Hence, the College sharpens and moulds them into exceptional strategists, outstanding policymakers and leaders. Therefore, the brains are not just people but the ones to lead people. As such, they are think tanks that accommodate all ethics, and cross-border patriotism, and, above all, they are strategy and policy machinery.

Holding the '*ndc*' prestigious symbol after 47 weeks of intense training was an unusual experience in Tanzania. Before the College's establishment, only a few senior military officers were trained outside the country; however, no one from civil service attended such a course. This does not deny that, in the past, national security issues were exclusively associated with the military. Because of the paradigm shift in the conception of national security, the NDC, like all other NDCs across the globe, brings together both uniformed personnel and civil servant senior officers to participate in the course, which, among other things, instils national pride and patriotism. Whilst emphasizing the bifurcated nature of national security, hence the need for multi-participation of varied stakeholders, H.E. Jakaya Kikwete, asserts, 'the NDC provides an excellent forum where the minds of senior officers and public servants converge to widen their horizons of knowledge and thinking, also develop synergy regarding the promotion of national security.' He went on to emphasize the significance of the role played by NDC by saying, 'It is only at the NDC where Course Members are imparted with knowledge and expertise ... so that, when they go back to their places of work, they become better players, as they will no longer be thinking inside their cocoons or in silos, but [they will] work like a powerful functioning system.

Despite the mix of Course Members, this article's analysis of the NDC curriculum shows that it covers security in its broadest sense by including, among others, studies on the domestic security environment such as social-political studies, agriculture and industry. This does not conclude with theoretical lectures at the College but with two weeks of field practical training (FPTs) in various regions and key strategic institutions throughout the country. It aims at evaluating how policies and strategic directives are implemented from the ground; to also assess the synergy between the ministries, institutions and departments in the performance of their duties; and to observe real security challenges in addition to those learned in College. At the end of the visit, Course Members prepare an analytical report that addresses the identified challenges and their proposed solutions. Thereafter, one report is sent back to the visited regions for implementation.

As previously stated, the NDC perceives security in its broadest sense; however, this does not mean a complete neglect of the classical realist ideas. There is a special session in its curriculum that is often covered by lectures delivered by the heads of security organs, including the Chief of Defence Forces, who leads the Tanzania Peoples Defence Force, one of the instruments of national power (military).

13 Ibid (2019)

14 See Andrew (2020)

The College then conducts a study tour to these security organs. This indicates that hard power is still important. Hence, this is inconsistent with Saleh,¹⁵ who claims, 'that by the end of the 1980s, however, a decline in militarized thinking was becoming apparent and consequently the theory of realism will fall out of fashion. The NDC-TZ largely supports the view that the theory of realism is still relevant; although it is currently being applied differently. From the analytical point of view, this article assumes that the NDC considers security in its dual sense: state security and societal security, as advocated by the Copenhagen school. Thus, for the avoidance of contradictions, I adopted a definition of security as propounded by Buzan who also emphasizes the essence of about human security. However, the concept of state security, societal security, and human security is a lengthy lecture which is far beyond the ambit of this article.

As elucidated, security threats are contagious. In fact, given the interdependence nature of the globalized world, no single country today can claim to be safe if its surrounding neighbours are insecure. External threats will almost always comprise a major element of the national security problem. Thus, the College foresees the international security environment as part of the curriculum, which narrows into studies on global issues, Tanzania's immediate and strategic neighbourhood and international security environment studies. The lectures on these subjects are delivered by eminent speakers with in-depth expertise and long-service reputable experience.

Besides, the theoretical part and domestic study visits, Course Members are exposed to international field practical training to merge and bring a nexus between the lectures delivered in classes and the practical world (realities). To achieve this, the Course Members are allowed to visit countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and America. Due to globalization, strategists, policymakers and decision-makers need to be acquainted with knowledge beyond their borders because the current national security threats are both dynamic and volatile. Taking this into account, the NDC prepares more flexible and patriotic strategists for any situation, anywhere and anytime that is likely to endanger our security. Thus, NDC's one-year intensive training focuses on developing leaders who can work tirelessly in situations of mental and physical exhaustion while maintaining making sound, wise and workable decisions for the betterment of our nation.

Therefore, 'the brains' at NDC are prepared through lectures from numerous distinguished guest speakers. These include both serving and retired Presidents from the United Republic of Tanzania, Zanzibar inclusive; Ambassadors and High Commissioners representing their countries to the United Republic of Tanzania; ministers; permanent secretaries (from mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar); Heads of Defence and Security Organs; outstanding practitioners from relevant fields, as well as lecturers from the renowned and highly reputable universities.

4.0 Some Achievements

Since its inception, the College became a unique higher learning institution in the country, bringing together prospective strategic leaders to acquaint them with prerequisite knowledge in the pursuit of national interest on both national and international scales. It has acquired reputation both locally and internationally. It is undeniable fact that the development of any state is in the hands of strategists and policymakers; without them, the state sinks into an abyss. Hence, the NDC is tasked with ensuring the security of the United Republic of Tanzania. Recognising this, the College is implementing its role in a patriotic, professional and dedicated manner. It has become a platform that promotes patriotism, accountability, and commitment in government, private organizations, and the community at large. When NDC alumni return to their workplaces, they demonstrate their transformations. The NDC's alumni excel in ranks and appointments. As noted above, the NDC prepares potential leaders, as evidenced by the majority of graduates being appointed to various higher positions. Good examples are the following ambassadors: Lieutenant General Yakoub Mohamed (Former TPDF Chief of Staff); Major General Jacob Kingu (Former NDC Commandant and Permanent Secretary), Major General Richard Makanzo (Former Navy Commander), Commissioner of Prisons Phaustine Kasike (Former Commissioner General of Prisons Service), Deputy Commissioner of Police Abdulrahman Kaniki and Ambassador Mindi Kasiga. Additionally, the alumni who were appointed to Permanent Secretary and Deputy Permanent Secretary positions are Ms Khadija Rajabu (Zanzibar) and Mr Gerald Mweli, (Mainland Tanzania), respectively. Lieutenant General Mathew Mkingule (Former TPDF Chief of Staff), Ms Nenelwa Wankanga (Clerk of the National Assembly of Tanzania) and Major General Ibrahim Michael Mhona (the current NDC Commandant). Others who have held or continue to hold high positions in the public sectors include Major General John Mbungu (Former Director General) and Ms Neema Mwakalyeye (Deputy Director General) of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau respectively. This implies that the NDC has added value to the government service by imparting senior government officials with unique and high-level security and strategy knowledge.

Since the NDC views security in its broader context, it considers the security of state in terms of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and other national interests. As a component of the state, people are also the main subject of the College in terms of human security, environmental security, food security, and many others.



This compels the institution to visit different regions yearly to ascertain all security-related matters. Through these visits, the College witnesses security challenges at the grassroots level. After discovering them, the College assesses and analyses the challenges as well as advises on the best solutions to tackle them. In addition, it offers strategic consultations about security issues to the government. Thus, since its establishment, the College has managed to visit all regions in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar.

As mentioned above, study visits are conducted in different countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and America to exchange experience and expertise. Through them, the College avails itself a chance to learn about the contemporary security issues facing the world and the approaches adopted to address them. More importantly, the NDC establishment has saved the government coffers because previously senior military officers were sent to Bangladesh, China, India, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America for national defence courses. However, civil servants were not sent abroad for the same course. The College has managed to accommodate them by creating an appropriate composition of Course Members who accept the broad and non-military sense of what national security is all about.

5.0 Future Prospects

In November 2021, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Commander-in-Chief, Her Excellency Samia Suluhu Hassan, visited the College for the inauguration of new premises. In her speech, she emphasized, 'The time has come for the College to expand the scope of NDC Courses to start conferring doctoral degrees (PhDs)' Again, the President stressed her point by saying, and 'I will be delightful if one day I will be invited in the valedictory function for PhD graduates.' The President's remarks are already directives to the College. In response, the College administration has promptly started working on it by presenting the agenda to the College Governing Board, and the process to implement the President's directives is underway. However, by conferring PhD degrees, the College will meet the standards of other NDCs that do so, such as the NDC–Bangladesh and the NDC–India to cite but a few for illustration. Additionally, the President emphasized the importance of allowing more young leaders to attend NDC courses so that, after graduating, they will have a longer time to apply their strategic knowledge before their retirement. In reality, the President's directive will have a long-term impact on various public service offices as the graduates will have sufficient time to mentor other officials in their respective workplaces. The College has started to walk the talk by accommodating these directives in its future plans. The NDC plans to conduct outreach programmes. Since the President has directed to widen the scope of the NDC's courses to ensure that a good number of government officials and non-government officials' benefit from the courses, the College has a plan for outreach programmes. Numerous benefits will be realized from this programme. First, it is cost-effective and will reach many people at once. Also, it will not affect other College's long and short courses commonly known as the Capstone courses.

6.0 Conclusion

The NDC has achieved domestic, regional and international recognition as a centre of excellence that brings together potential strategists, decision-makers and leaders drawn from diverse academic, proficiency and experience. It transforms their diversities into commonness toward national security. Since national security encompasses a multidimensional approach, it cannot be handled in isolation, thus necessitating the need for various people with diverse know-how who can decide to participate in the course. The NDC was founded for this reason. It enrolls senior military officers from Bangladesh, Botswana, Burundi, China, Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, the Republic of South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Only senior civil servants are enrolled in the category of civil servants.

LONG LIVE NDC-TZ AS WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING MORE SUCCESS

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PROMOTING NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH DIPLOMACY IN TANZANIA

Noel E. Kaganda



Mainland Tanzania attained independence in December 1961, while Zanzibar did so in January 1964. The two sovereign states united in April 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania (henceforth Tanzania), a nation-state whose people are united by ancestry, history, culture, and, most importantly, Kiswahili, a language spoken by over 200 million people worldwide. The concept of security has traditionally been associated with states and how they project power toward one another; this is realism. However, since the end of the Cold War, the concept has been broadened to include a wide array of threats facing humankind, such as protracted intrastate conflicts, pandemics, natural disasters, poverty and hunger, terrorism, as well as violent extremism. These threats can impact individuals, communities and economies, necessitating collaborative efforts.¹

Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact in the conduct of official relations between sovereign governments or between these governments and international entities.² Diplomacy is one of the instruments employed by nation-states to secure their core national interests. Intelligence, military, and economy, collectively abbreviated 'DIME,' are other instruments of national power.

In mainland Tanzania, diplomacy appears to be the most refined instrument of national power, having been used to secure the country's political independence. The late Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere (henceforth Mwalimu Nyerere), famously known as *the Father of the Nation*, and his fellow leaders, negotiated intensively in the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations and succeeded in persuading its members that Tanganyika was ready for full independence. As for the military, mainland Tanzania inherited the King's African Rifles (KAR) from the British, which, despite its transformation to Tanganyika Rifles, preserved the culture, discipline, and personnel of the colonial force. The mutiny of Tanganyika Rifles soldiers in January 1964 influenced the creation of an indigenous armed force known as the Tanzania People's Defence Force in September 1964. Similarly, after independence, Tanzania inherited a shattered economy and an intelligence service designed to serve the interests of the colonial administration. These instruments have since been strengthened to work effectively with diplomacy to secure the nation's strategic objectives.

Tanzania's foreign policy – that is, the approach chosen by the government to achieve its strategic objectives in relation to external entities³ was first clarified by Presidential Circular No. 2 of 1964. The policy placed emphasis on the virtues of humanity, tolerance, non-alignment, and good neighbourliness, among others. It also provided for the actors involved in the formulation and execution of the foreign policy, namely the President as the principal executive authority, commonly referred to as the Chief Diplomat, who is closely assisted by the Minister responsible for foreign affairs, the Permanent Secretary, and other foreign service officials serving both at the Ministry's headquarters and its bilateral and multilateral missions abroad.

Despite being born at the peak of the Cold War, Tanzania managed to maintain relations with both the Western and Eastern blocs. Through the principle of non-alignment, Tanzania refrained from being involved in major power disputes, albeit it always used appropriate fora to render advice to parties in dispute on the appropriate cause of action for achieving peace, as prescribed in the United Nations Charter. Only recently, at the United Nations General Assembly, did Tanzania call on the parties involved in the crisis in Ukraine to resolve the conflict through dialogue and mutual accommodation, underscoring that there will be no military solution to the crisis, which has endured for over six months, causing wanton suffering to the civilian population while also disrupting global trade in essential products such as oil.

1 Buzan, B. (1991). New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. *International Affairs*, 67.3, pp. 432-433.2.
2 Roberts, I., & Satow, E. M. (2009). *Satow's diplomatic practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3 Smith, S., Hadfield, A., & Dunne, T. (2012). *Foreign Policy: theories, actors, cases*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In the spirit of good neighbourliness, Tanzania has remained safe and secure in a region that is prone to conflicts, as witnessed in Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the spirit of humanity, Tanzania shelters thousands of refugees from conflict-affected countries in the region.

In 2014, the government naturalized over 162,000 former Burundian refugees who fled their country in 1972. During the same year, the government naturalized around 3,000 Somali Bantu refugees that had sought refuge in the country since the early 1990s. In 1982, the government made a similar decision by naturalizing around 32,000 Rwandan refugees. These humanitarian acts, along with the assistance provided to southern African freedom fighters from the 1960s to the 1990s, mediation facilitation provided to Burundi, Kenya and Rwanda, operations to restore legitimate governments in the Comoros and Seychelles and operations to support peace in the DRC and elsewhere, are just a few illustrations of Tanzania's adherence to the principles of humanity, friendship, good neighbourliness and support for United Nations goals.

Tanzania's diplomatic efforts in the multilateral fora as well as her moral and material support for liberation struggles in southern Africa contributed to Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980 and Namibia's independence in March 1990. It also influenced the commencement of negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa in May 1990, which led to the repeal of the apartheid legislation in 1992, consequently paving the way for the first multiracial democratic election in South Africa in 1994. With all the aforementioned achievements, the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was transformed into a Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, with the latter focusing on developing the economy, alleviating poverty, improving the quality of life of the people of southern Africa, and ensuring political stability as well as peace and security. As a founding member of SADC, Tanzania espouses these noble goals, whose realization is creating a condition for continued peace, tranquillity, and prosperity in the region, despite a few challenges in some member states.

Like SADC, the East African Community (EAC) has been providing a useful forum for Tanzania and other partner states to deliberate on the challenges facing them, either individually or collectively, to find long-term solutions to those challenges. The challenges include constrained trade; restrictions on the movement of goods, people, labour, services as well as capital; proliferation of armed groups, small arms and light weapons; illegal migration; human and drug trafficking; the growing wave of terrorism and violent extremism; as well as energy and infrastructure deficiencies. Besides such deliberations, the EAC Treaty has established institutions for nurturing and promoting good governance and the rule of law, such as the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ).

Likewise, through the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Tanzania has been able to participate in discussions seeking long-term solutions to the insecurity in eastern DRC, which is exacerbated in part by the presence of over 120 armed groups and the availability of vastly distributed natural resources that are being illegally exploited by both internal and external actors. The interventions by the ICGLR and other sub-regional, continental and international organizations, though modest, have prevented the conflicts from spiralling out of control and spilling into neighbouring countries, including Tanzania. Tanzania also participates in a peacekeeping mission in the DRC as a result of ICGLR and SADC discussions and resolutions.

The introduction of multi-party democracy in Tanzania in 1992 ushered in a new era of political dispensation. The first multi-party elections were held in 1995, with the candidate of the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the late Benjamin William Mkapa, becoming the third president of the United Republic of Tanzania. President Mkapa called for the review of Tanzania's foreign policy, considering the economic and socio-political developments that transpired nationally, regionally and internationally during its implementation phase, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Whereas the traditional foreign policy emphasized the value of humanity, the pursuit of political emancipation and decolonization in Africa and beyond, as well as Pan-Africanism, the New Foreign Policy, as it is famously known, launched in 2001, emphasises the promotion of economic diplomacy, while preserving the past gains and consolidating traditional foreign policy fundamentals.

During their tenure, Tanzanian successive presidents participated in several multilateral engagements that resulted in agreements that had a significant impact on Tanzania's core national interests. These include, but are not limited to, the United Nations Millennium Summit, which resulted in the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a new global framework for combating extreme poverty and achieving economic growth. The MDGs were translated domestically through the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, also known as MKUKUTA in Kiswahili.

In his part, President Dr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete championed Tanzania's participation in the evaluation of the MDGs and negotiations as well as the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which replaced the latter.

Tanzania has been able to continuously forge global partnerships for addressing vices such as poverty, illiteracy, and



diseases that have threatened her national security since independence, through negotiations and persuasion – that is diplomacy. The late President, Dr John Pombe Joseph Magufuli, focused on strategic transnational infrastructure projects, such as the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), to connect Tanzania's land linked neighbours to the Indian Ocean, thereby enhancing both their and Tanzania's national security. Furthermore, he persuaded Uganda to transport its crude oil from Hoima to the Tanga port via the yet-to-be-built East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP). Similar to how the Tanzania Zambia crude oil pipeline (TAZAMA) and Tanzania Zambia Railways (TAZARA) projects, which were launched in 1968 and 1975, respectively, were regarded as tools for political liberation, the SGR and EACOP are contemporary tools for economic emancipation and the protection of national interests of the countries involved.

As was the case with the third phase, the sixth phase government, led by President Samia Suluhu Hassan, has called for a review of foreign policy to account for the changes that have occurred since its formulation and adoption in the late 1990s and early 2000s, respectively. Among other things, the goal of these reforms is to ensure that diplomacy remains an effective tool for ensuring Tanzania's national security. Since assuming office, President Samia has visited Tanzania's neighbouring countries, namely Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia, confirming the validity of the principle of good neighbourliness. Moreover, she has attended several meetings of both the EAC and the SADC, confirming Tanzania's continued commitment to regional economic integration. Similarly, she has attended African Union and United Nations meetings, reaffirming Tanzania's unwavering commitment to both African Unity and the virtues of multilateralism through the United Nations. Likewise, several joint permanent commissions have been held during her tenure, and Tanzania is currently being visited by several foreign envoys. During such visits, numerous agreements are signed, to attest to the effectiveness of this instrument of national power. With the current trajectory, diplomacy will undoubtedly remain an indispensable tool for achieving Tanzania's strategic national objectives.

JUST AND UNJUST WAR

Brig Gen CE Msola



The world has witnessed many wars. Some of which were devastating and took many lives. Examples are the first and second world wars and the 30 years' war in Europe. Some of these wars have attracted people knowingly or unknowingly and made them side with one of the belligerents. Before siding with any state waging war against another like the current war between Russia and Ukraine, we have to ask ourselves whether that war is justifiable as scholars in security term it 'Just War'. The Just War theory is a largely Christian philosophy that was first developed by St Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas was one of the most influential theologians of the last 1,000 years. The theory set out conditions against which to judge whether a war should be waged (*jus ad bellum*) and if it could be justified, and how it should be waged (*jus in bello*).¹ The theory attempts to reconcile three things: one, taking human life is seriously wrong; two, states must defend their citizens and defend justice; and three, protecting innocent human life and defending important moral values sometimes requires the willingness to use force and violence.

The theory specifies conditions for judging if it is just to go to war and conditions for how the war should be fought. Although it was extensively developed by Christian theologians, it applies to people of all faith and none. The Just War Theory aims to provide a guide for states to follow in potential conflict situations.² It only applies to states; it does not apply to individuals. However, an individual can use the theory to help them decide whether it is morally right to take part in a particular war. The Just War Theory provides a useful framework for individuals and political groups to use for their discussions of possible wars. The theory is intended not to justify wars but to prevent them. It shows that going to war, except in certain limited circumstances, is wrong, and thus motivates states to find other ways of resolving conflicts.

The principles of a Just War originated with classical Greek and Roman philosophers like Plato and Cicero and were added to by Christian theologians like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. There are two parts to the Just War theory, both with Latin names: *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. The former refers to the conditions under which the use of military force is justified, and the latter refers to how to conduct a war ethically. The two are also the basis for the law of war under the International Committee of the Red Cross formerly known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

1 www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zbygjxs/revision/5, accessed 16 May 2022.

2 www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/war/just/introduction.shtml, accessed 16 May 2022.

These are a set of international rules that set out what can and cannot be done during an armed conflict. The IHL's objective is to maintain some humanity in armed conflicts, saving lives and reducing suffering.³ The rules are known universally as The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are at the core of IHL, the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They specifically protect people who are not taking part in the hostilities (such as civilians, health workers and aid workers) and those who are no longer participating in the hostilities such as the wounded, sick and shipwrecked soldiers and prisoners of war.

The Conventions and their Protocols call for measures to prevent or end all breaches. They contain stringent rules to deal with what are known as 'grave breaches.'⁴ Those responsible for grave breaches must be sought, tried or extradited, irrespective of their nationalities. It can be argued at what point do we reach a point to say the cause is right, and the war is just?⁵ Seven main criteria apply. First, a just war can only be waged as a last resort; all non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified; second, a war is just if only a legitimate authority wages it. Even just causes cannot be served by actions taken by individuals or groups who do not constitute an authority sanctioned by whatever the society and outsiders to the society deem legitimate. Third, a just war can only be fought to redress the wrong suffered. For example, self-defense against an armed attack is always considered to be a just cause, although the justice of the cause is not sufficient. – (see the fourth point.) Further, a just war can only be fought with 'right' intentions: the only permissible objective of a just war is to redress the injury; fourth, a war can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success. Deaths and injuries incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable. Fifth, the ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace. More specifically, the peace established after the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been fought. Sixth, the violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered. States are prohibited from using force not necessary to attain the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered, and seventh, the weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians are never permissible targets of war, and every effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians. The deaths of civilians are justified only if they are unavoidable victims of a deliberate attack on a military target.⁶ From the detailed analysis of these criteria, we can completely judge whether the war is just or not.

A war that starts as a just war may stop being a just war if the means used to wage it is inappropriate. A war is only just if it is both justified and carried out in the right way. Some wars fought for noble causes have been rendered unjust because of how they were fought. A war is only just if it is fought for a reason that is justified and that carries sufficient moral weight. The country that wishes to use military force must demonstrate that there is a just cause to do so. On the same note, the war may start as unjust and end as just. Hugo Grotius observes that it is possible that war can begin without a just cause but become just when a just cause arises during the fighting and takes over as the goal of the war. When this happens, it is absurd to say that an unjust war has concluded and a new, just war has begun. Rather, the same war may cease to be unjust and become just—just as a war that begins with a just cause may continue after that cause has been achieved or has simply disappeared on its own.⁷ However, if a war in progress can either acquire or lose a just cause, then the requirement of just cause must apply not only to the resort to war but also to its continuation.⁸ The key point here is that, once the just cause of the war has been achieved, the war should be ended; otherwise, the war lacks justification and is thus illegal. Although the theory is silent on the scale and magnitude of war, this is well captured in the law of armed conflict and its additional protocols, which limit the means and how war is to be fought.

Many Just War theorists agree that preventing future aggression can be a legitimate goal of war once it has begun. Samuel Pufendorf, for example, writes: 'It is permitted to apply force against an enemy not only to the point where I have repelled the danger which he threatens against me, or where I have recovered or wrested from him that which he has unjustly seized from or refused to furnish me, but I can also proceed against him to obtain a guarantee for the future. So long as the other allows this to be wrested from him through force, he gives a sufficient indication that he still intends to injure me even thereafter.'⁹ Robert Mc Kim and Jeff McMahan distinguished between an independent just cause, which could justify war or the resort to war on its own, and a conditional just cause, which could contribute to the justification for war, but only when triggered or activated by the presence of an independent just cause.

3 www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-rules-of-war-geneva-conventions, accessed 16 May 2022.

4 www.icrc.org/en/doc/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm, accessed 16 May 2022.

5 Howard Zinn, "A Just Cause Not a Just War." *The Progressive*, 1 December 2001.

6 Garry Wills, "What Is a Just War?" *New York Review of Books*, Volume 51, Number 18, November 18, 2004, review of *Arguing About War* by Michael Walzer Yale University Press, p. 208.

7 Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace (1625)*, trans. A. C. Campbell (London: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), p. 273.

8 David Mellow, *A Critique of Just War Theory* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Calgary, 2003), p. 201.

9 Craig L. Carr, ed., *The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf*, trans. Michael Seidler (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 259.



10 The so-called preemptive attack may be attributed to this fact if one country believes that the adversary is likely to invade, citing some previously demonstrated actions that are preparations for a major attack. These can include the acquisition of new weapons, specific types of training, or captured individuals suspected of gathering information to use it during wartime. If a country is affected in this way, it may decide to attack before the adversary completes its preparations. A preemptive attack or anticipatory use of force will be justified only if the threats of attack are more clearly imminent and not based on speculation, and they will be accepted in international law. The advantage of a preemptive strike is that, by being the first to act decisively, a state renders the enemy unable to carry out aggressive intentions. This strategy also has several drawbacks. First, the threatened state might be wrong in its assessment of the threat and launch an unwarranted destructive attack. Second, one state's use of preemptive force may set a precedent that leads to widespread abuse of the preemptive option. Scholars and politicians disagree sharply on the ultimate legitimacy of using preemptive force. However, most of them agree on several fundamental requirements for a preemptive strike to be considered potentially justifiable. Proponents of preemptive force cite Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.' Opponents of the strategy of preemption argue that the article conditions defensive action on the prior occurrence of an attack, rather than the perception of the possibility of an attack.¹¹ The state that responds to the threat must demonstrate that a preemptive attack is the only effective way to defend itself. The scope and scale of the preemptive action must be proportionate to the perceived threat. However, because these judgments are entirely subjective, the onus is squarely on the attacking state to justify its actions to the international community.

Today, the Just War Theory is divided into three categories, each with its set of ethical principles. The categories are *jus ad bellum*, *jus in Bello*, and *jus post bellum*. These Latin terms translate roughly as 'justice towards war', 'justice in war', and 'justice after war'. When political leaders are trying to decide whether to go to war, the just war theory requires them to test their decision by applying several principles: first, is it for a just cause? This requires that war be used only in response to grave wrongs. Self-defence is the most common example of a just cause, but many people consider coming to the defence of another innocent nation to be a just cause as well (and perhaps the highest cause). Second, is it with the right intention? This requires that wartime political leaders be solely motivated, at a personal level, by reasons that make a war just. For example, even if war is waged in the defence of another innocent country, leaders cannot resort to war because it will assist in their re-election campaigns. Third, is it from a legitimate authority? This demands the war is declared only by a recognized political community's leaders and with that community's political requirements. Fourth, does it have due proportionality? This requires us to imagine what the world would be like if we went to war. For a war to be 'just,' the peace that results from it must be superior to what would have occurred if no war had been fought. This also necessitates a reasonable chance of success in going to war; otherwise, people will suffer and die in vain. Fifth, is it the last resort? This says that we must exhaust all other reasonable options before going to war. These involve negotiation, diplomacy, economic sanctions and so on.¹² Even if the principles of *jus ad bellum* are followed, the war can still be unjust.

The following ethical principles govern how combatants conduct themselves in the 'theatre of war' (*jus in Bello*). First, discrimination requires combatants to attack only legitimate targets. Civilians, medics and aid workers, for example, cannot be deliberate targets of a military attack. However, according to the principle of double-effect, military attacks that kill some civilians as a side effect may be permissible if they are both necessary and proportionate. Second, Proportionality applies to both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in Bello*. *Jus in Bello* requires that, in a particular operation, combatants do not use force or cause harm that exceeds strategic or ethical benefits. The general idea is that you should use the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve legitimate military aims and objectives. Third, no intrinsically unethical means is a debated principle in the just war theory. Some theorists believe that some actions are always unjustified, whether they are used against enemy combatants or are proportionate to our goals. Torture, shooting to maim, and biological weapons are commonly used examples, and fourth, following orders is not a defence, as the war crime tribunals after the Second World War established. Military personnel may not be legally or ethically excused for following illegal or unethical orders.¹³ Every person bearing arms is responsible for their conduct – not just their commanders. Once a war is completed, steps are necessary to transition from a state of war to a state of peace. *Jus post Bello* is a new area of the Just War theory that aims to identify principles for this period.

10 Jeff McMahan and Robert McKim, "The Just War and the Gulf War," pp.502–506.

11 www.britannica.com/topic/preemptive-force, accessed 08 July 2022.

12 <https://Just War Theory - The Ethics Centre Ethics Explainer>, accessed 08 July 2022.

13 The Ethics Centre Ethics Explainer, accessed 08 July 2022.

Although there is no consensus yet, the following principles have been proposed: First, Status quo ante bellum, a Latin term meaning 'the way things were before the war' – basically rights, property, and borders should be restored to their pre-war state. Some consider this as a problem because those can be the exact causes of war in the first place. Second, punishment for war crimes is a crucial step to re-installing a just system of governance. Any serious offences committed on either side of the conflict, from political leaders to combatants, must be prosecuted. Third, compensation of victims suggests that, as much as possible, innocent victims of the conflict be compensated for their losses (although some harms of war will be almost impossible to adequately compensate, such as losing family members), and fourth, peace treaties need to be fair and just to both parties, including the guilty party. The Just War theory provides the basis for exercising 'ethical restraint' in war. Philosopher Michael Ignatieff argues that the difference between a 'warrior' and a 'barbarian' lies in ethical restraint. In an ideal world, those in the profession of arms are trained to use force with ethical restraint.¹⁴ It is also critical for advisers to understand international law as it applies to the conduct of war to advise decision-makers on the consequences of their decisions regarding the best way to prosecute a war. Although ignorance of the law is not an excuse, all parties involved must be educated so that they are aware that they may be held accountable for their actions in the future. This is what prompted the international community to decide to establish courts soon after the conflicts ended. After the Second World War, such courts included Nuremburg and Tokyo, as well as the ICTR and ICTY, which were intermittent before the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998. If restraint is not exercised, we will see many suspected war criminals being tried in the future, especially those whose countries will attempt to protect them unnecessarily.

14 <https://ethics.org.au/ukraine-hackivism/>, accessed 08 July 2022.

THE INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGES AS SOFT INSTRUMENTS OF POWER: THE CASE OF KISWAHILI IN TANZANIA

Maj MA Mwinyikombo, *psc*



1. 0 Introduction

There has been a significant shift in international relations and diplomacy as a result of new international undertaking strategies. The current focus is on solicitation rather than coercion. Most countries are investing in attracting others through questing rather than resorting to the barrel of a gun. Countries use several persuasion techniques to accomplish this. The Kiswahili language, which is widely spoken both regionally and internationally, is Tanzania's soft power tool. The effort to empower Kiswahili began with Tanganyika's birth as a new nation. Yahaya -Othman¹ remarked, 'Kiswahili had made it possible to rally Tanganyikans to the *uhuru* cause, and Nyerere decided to put in place the cultural policy based on language. On 10 December 1962, the President addressed the first Tanganyika Republic National Assembly in Kiswahili.' The language has been adopted in different regional organisations, including the East African Community (EAC), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU). It has also gone above and beyond to be recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Indeed, the language has gained international recognition by being celebrated on July 7th each year as International Kiswahili Day. Apart from that, individual countries, academic institutions and other platforms have been using it as a formal medium of instruction.

In its various forms and manifestations, language is central to everything human beings do and as a matter of fact, human beings can hardly function without it. Indeed, language as a tool for communication has inextricably become a tool for development. It is difficult to imagine progress without communication.

1 See Yahya- Othman (2020)



Human communication is effectively achieved using language. Therefore, language issues could not be separated from international relations issues. Communication has a crucial role to play in diplomacy, and language issues will always emerge during any efforts to foster bilateral and multilateral relations. Language, therefore, becomes an important component of the development of international relations.² Mutembei³ rightly substantiates, 'Language has always been important in the Department of Defence...but it is particularly important now because we are operating in parts of the world where English is not widely spoken, where we need to work with local leaders and local populations and where we need to understand more about their culture.' Mutembei's assertion has a grain of truth because Tanzania is not isolated in international affairs. Indeed, the world is now free of the colonial era. Countries do not dominate one another by using coercion since it is against the laws of international communities, particularly the United Nations. It also violates the *jus cogens* norms. The ability to influence tends to be the focus of many states. This is done in several ways, cultural diplomacy being one of them. Hence, it is defined as a specialized branch of the foreign policy of many states. This is why teaching the national language as a soft power strategy becomes an effective policy action⁴.

2.0 Kiswahili as a Soft Power Strategy in relation to other Languages

Power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to achieve the desired outcomes. While soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments, seduction is always more effective than coercion⁵. Tanzania has every reason and intention to embrace soft power as a means of gaining international support because of its peaceful nature. Soft power appears to be gaining deeper roots in many jurisdictions as a result of the global wave in furthering and nurturing their foreign policies. Thus, soft power is a diplomatic strategy for positively influencing foreign perceptions in favour of your foreign policy agenda⁶.

Kiswahili was declared an official language in Tanzania in 1967.⁷ However, before that, it played a great unifying role during the independence struggle. Due to this diversity, Nyerere's first strategy was to emphasize the use of Kiswahili as a national language to play a unifying role, while individual tribes maintained their ethnic language.⁸ Nyerere united 120 tribes into a unified state, preventing the tribal conflicts that plagued much of Africa⁹. Recent research, however, has shown that Tanzania has 150 languages.¹⁰ All these examples demonstrate that Kiswahili can be received and spoken even outside the Tanzania's borders. This is because Tanzania is one of the few multi-ethnic countries with one national language spoken by every tribe. Both Tanzania and Nigeria have diverse ethnic languages, but the latter, like many others, has failed to adopt a national language that is spoken by everyone in the country.

Tanzania differs from some of its neighbours in the sense that, Kiswahili is spoken as a second language by the vast majority of the population (and the first language of some people in the coastal areas and on the islands).¹¹ It is both an official and the national language. It is estimated that Kiswahili is currently being spoken by 200 million people globally.¹² More specifically, the number of Kiswahili speakers has increased since the language was designated as one of the AU's official languages. Kiswahili, along with English, French, Portuguese, and Arabic, is undoubtedly one of the world's major languages. In this context, it is clear that Kiswahili is a primary language with a broader range of applications because of the bigger number of speakers (users). The language is ranked second among the languages spoken by most people in Africa. Kiswahili is the world's sixth most widely spoken language.¹³

3.0 Some Strategies for Fostering Kiswahili as a Soft Power Strategy

Tanzania has long multilateral relations with various states. Numerous embassies around the world represent her interests. For instance, in the southern African region, these relations emerged during the period of the liberation struggle and continued to the post-colonial era. Indeed, Tanzania was a pioneer of such liberation movements.

It trained freedom fighters. Tanzanian soldiers also participated in the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Mozambique. Some freedom fighters from these countries lived in Tanzania, specifically in Morogoro, Bagamoyo, Dodoma and Nachingwea.

- 2 See Toboso et al., (2018)
- 3 Refer to Mutembei (2011)
- 4 See Rivas (2014)
- 5 See Nye (2004)
- 6 Ibid
- 7 See Othman (2008)
- 8 See Shivji (2020)
- 9 See Othman (2005)
- 10 See Yahya – Othman (2020)
- 11 See Kishe (2004)
- 12 See UNESCO (2020)
- 13 Ibid (2014)

In essence, their time in Tanzania allowed them to learn Kiswahili, and when they returned, they already knew a lot about the language.¹⁴ Mozambique gained her independence through armed struggle, and the majority of FRELIMO freedom fighters were trained in Tanzanian soil. Apart from the African experience of spreading Kiswahili, the language is also widely spoken on other continents such as America, Asia and Europe. Kiswahili's widespread use is critical to the country's promotion of international relations and diplomacy. It is a good soft power strategy since most countries are becoming more interested in the language and cooperating with Tanzania in various fields. Another strategy involves signing inter universities agreements. The University of Zimbabwe began teaching Kiswahili and later Bachelor's Degree of Applied Arts in Kiswahili under the Faculty of African Languages and Literature in August 2013. According to the Memorandum of Understanding between the University of Zimbabwe and the University of Dar es Salaam, the lecturers were coming from the Institute of Kiswahili Studies of the University of Dar es Salaam. In addition, through a Memorandum of Understanding between the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Zimbabwe, three graduates of Kiswahili from the University of Zimbabwe got scholarships to pursue Master's Degrees in Kiswahili at the University of Dar es Salaam in 2016.¹⁵ Apart from the University of Zimbabwe, more than 200 institutes outside Africa engage in teaching Kiswahili and undertaking post graduate research. For instance, Yale University in the United States of America has embarked on a significant project of writing a Kiswahili Dictionary.¹⁶

Kiswahili is one of the fast-growing and extending languages in its application in the artistic field. For instance, modern Tanzania movies, famously known as Bongo Movies, and new generation music, popularly known as Bongo Flavour, have crossed the borders all over Africa, to America, Europe and Asia. In Zimbabwe, musicians use Kiswahili in their works. Additionally, Kiswahili songs are also played on radio stations and televisions in Zimbabwe. A good example of Bongo Flavour Musicians is Nasibu Abdul (Diamond Platinumz) who in 2016 jointly performed with Mukudzeyi Mukombe (Jah Praizah), a famous Zimbabwean musician. Their performance included Kiswahili.¹⁷ The media play greatly promotes Kiswahili. Due to its regional and global reception and acceptance, Kiswahili scooped front pages in several media houses. In this sense, approximately 30 radio stations broadcast in Kiswahili outside Tanzania. These radio stations in Africa include Radio Malawi, Radio Kenya, Radio Uganda, Radio Burundi, and Radio Congo. Other international radio stations are Radio Vatican, Russia Radio, Deutsche Welle, BBC London and Voice of America.¹⁸

Additionally, the influence by higher-ranking leaders from other countries is another strategy. National leaders from other countries also speak Kiswahili. The former President of Zimbabwe, the Late Robert Mugabe concluded his speech on 19 November 2017 by thanking the audience in Kiswahili by saying 'Asanteni Sana,' meaning *thank you so much*. Another good example is the 2004 AU Summit, where the then Mozambique's President, Joaquim Chissano, addressed the audience of his counterpart presidents in Kiswahili. In any case, Kiswahili is no longer the language of only Tanzania; it is the language of the entire African continent, having been adopted as one of the African Union's official languages. The audience applauded enthusiastically when former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano addressed the African heads of the State Summit in Kiswahili for the first time.¹⁹

In addition, the then Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo, at the 2005 AU summit, greeted the audience in Kiswahili.²⁰ The Late Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations supported Kiswahili. He used some Kiswahili proverbs in his book, 'Intervention: A Life in War and Peace.' He aptly used a Kiswahili proverb: 'Tembo wanapogombana, nyasi ndizo zinazoumia'. In English this simply means that '*When the elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers*'.²¹ This demonstrates that Kiswahili has crossed borders and thus presenting itself as a global commodity.

Two of Tanzania's three former presidents, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and Ali Hassan Mwinyi, were strong supporters of Kiswahili from the country's independence in 1961 to 2005.²² This scholar further argues that President Kikwete delivered his first speech in Kiswahili at the AU Heads of State Summit. Subsequently, his successor; the late Dr. John Pombe Joseph Magufuli was a staunch advocate of Kiswahili on both domestic and international platforms. He supported Kiswahili from the time he took over power in 2015 until his sudden demise in 2021. President Samia Suluhu Hassan began to promote Kiswahili domestically almost immediately after taking office, signing Act No. 1 of 2021 which calls for the use of Kiswahili in the judiciary.

14 See Dzomba (2019)

15 Ibid

16 See Kishe (2014)

17 See Dzomba (2019)

18 See Kishe (2014)

19 See Othman (2008)

20 See Dzomba (2019)

21 Seen Annan (2012)

22 See Othman (2008)



The law provides for extended use of the language in all judicial proceedings. It also provides for all proceedings that were recorded in English to be interpreted and translated in Kiswahili. Although Kiswahili is not explicitly mentioned in the United Republic of Tanzania's constitution, which would give it more power and status, the implementation of Act No. 1 of 2021 is a significant step towards promoting the language. The culmination of all these efforts by Tanzanian leaders and other stakeholders resulted in Kiswahili being recognized by UNESCO in 2021. Meanwhile, every year on July 7, International Kiswahili Day is observed. Furthermore, the African Union began to use Kiswahili as its working language. Consequently, it is the first African language recognized by UNESCO and used in the African Union.

In the defence sector, a Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF) officer teaches Kiswahili to Egyptian officers at the Ministry of Defence Language Institute (MODLI) in Cairo. Similarly, Tanzania Officers learn Arabic at the same institute. Both countries are using the soft power strategy to influence one another via cultural interaction. Tanzania sends military personnel, police officers and civilians to various Peace Keeping Missions to spread Kiswahili throughout the world. Currently, Tanzania works with countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Lebanon. Through these missions, officers interact with numerous officers from other nationalities. They use this opportunity to teach them Kiswahili. When they return home, they continue to speak and learn Kiswahili. The country also uses joint military exercises and sports. Tanzania participates in several regional and international joint military exercises and sports. This event allows TPDF officers to interact with officers from other countries and a chance for cultural, as well as, linguistic, interactions. All these efforts are meant to promote the use of Kiswahili language as one of the instruments of soft power.

4.0 Conclusion

The widespread use of Kiswahili is expected to rid Africa of the colonial syndrome and mentality. From a historical standpoint, Tanzania managed to unite more than 120 ethnic diversities into commonality during and after the struggle for independence. In this sense, we can unite Africans and do away with the mental boundaries imposed by the colonialists. There will be no more 'Divide and Rule.' Business ties between countries are expected to grow stronger. For instance, landlocked African countries, like Zimbabwe and Zambia, depend on the Dar es Salaam Port. Due to a language barrier, they may not be persuaded to use it. Kiswahili's popularity may compel them to visit Tanzania for commercial purposes. This may contribute to government revenues and ultimately boost the living standard. Kiswahili's expansion beyond Tanzania's borders has also opened doors and increased job opportunities. Since it is taught in several countries, Tanzanians have greater opportunities to secure jobs. More importantly, the use of Kiswahili at the regional and international levels has significant implications for national security. It will improve human security by increasing government revenue and ensuring a decent standard of living. Furthermore, it will reduce threats among nations due to good diplomatic relations fostered by the use of Kiswahili as a one of the powerful instruments of soft power strategy, which if used properly, Tanzania as a country stands to benefit more than other African nations.

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FROM POLITICAL TO BUREAUCRATIC WILL: EXPOUNDING THE POWER OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT IN SHAPING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN AFRICA



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1. Introduction

The quest to reduce corruption has become a universally acknowledged goal of policy-makers and public alike across a bewildering array of environments, including authoritarian and democratic, wealthy and impoverished, and politically stable and all-but-failed ones. The creation of organizations, laws, and policies have all centered on combating corruption, leading to the international adoption of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption by the General Assembly in 2003. Over the past ten years, domestic anti-corruption legislation has likely been spurred by rising social demand in the majority of countries around the world.¹ Despite this spell of activity, it is not astonishing that many anti-corruption initiatives fail to achieve their objectives. Anti-corruption institutions can seem hopelessly ‘outgunned’ in an uneven fight against systemically corrupt institutions. For every high-profile success story, there are dozens of spectacular failures or efforts that would appear to be on the fast track to nowhere. What then determines whether anti-corruption reforms succeed or fail? There are several levels at which one can search for an answer. Much explanation identifies ‘political will’ as a decisive factor,² generally denoting robust consensus on action among political elites. But as an explanatory category it has an elusive quality. Institutional interests even among elites are always fragmented, and never more so than when changes in the institutional rules of the game affect resource accumulation strategies. Political will can thus often be a front for what amounts to a symbolic or ‘ideological’ goal.³ For simplicity purposes, this article adopts the commonly known and used definition of corruption to mean ‘any act of using official powers for private gains’.

From the institutionalist perspective, this article explains the power of organizational context in shaping the implementation of anti-corruption measures in the public sectors. It posits that, despite a myriad of literature to support the importance of political will in combating corruption; political will alone cannot warrant success in the fight against corruption; if the bureaucrats themselves are unwilling to support the national anti corruption efforts. It asserts that the bureaucrats who are expected to passionately adopt and implement anti corruption measures, lack genuine commitment to effectively implement anti corruption measures. It further argues that, over the last three decades, the experience has proved that, ‘political will’ has become a redundant idiom frequently used as an excuse by the bureaucrats to justify their unwillingness to implement anti corruption measures. The article is composed of six parts. The first part covers an introduction. Part two discusses the power (influence) of organizational context in shaping the implementation of anti corruption measures including a few examples from the developing economies akin to Tanzania. Part three discusses the reasons for increased bureaucratic corruption in Africa. Part four discusses the importance of institutions. Part five examines the efficacy of the current anti corruption measures in curbing corruption. Part six offers some concluding remarks and one major policy option for curbing bureaucratic corruption.

1 Transparency International. Global Corruption Report (2004)

2 Brinkerhoff, D.W. ‘Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An Analytical Framework’. Public Administration and Development 20 (3): 239-252 (2000)

3 Quick, S. ‘the Paradox of Popularity: ‘Ideological’ Program Implementation in Zambia’. In Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, ed., M. Grindle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1980)



2. Power of Context in Shaping the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Policies

In Africa, oftentimes the bureaucrats attempt to increase their level of compensation by lobbying lawmakers and politicians and by engaging in other activities to influence the political system and maximize benefits accruing to them. Many civil servants also illegally increase their compensation by providing services to interest groups that seek favors from the government. Political coalitions seeking ways to subvert the existing rules to redistribute national income and wealth in their favor can achieve their objectives by bribing civil servants whose job is to enforce state regulations and implement national development plans. Bureaucrats may give more consideration to the demands of such interest groups than to the proper enforcement of state laws and regulations and the efficient implementation of national development plans if they learn that providing services to groups seeking state favors can pay off financially better than their regular (public) jobs. In societies where civil service compensation levels are relatively low, a significant part of the public employee's total compensation may be derived from engagement in outside activities, resulting in a significant increase in bureaucratic corruption.⁴ This also explains why some senior state officials would like to associate with the rich business people.

The rules that regulate socio-political relations in a country have a significant impact on the ability of civil servants to seek and secure (either legally or illegally) outside income. In nondemocratic societies, as has been shown by⁵ bureaucrats are less constrained in their employment of public resources to lobby legislators and influence those individuals with direct responsibility for determining levels of compensation for the public sector. In fact, most public workers in many African nations are part of the political elites and have a substantial impact on how resources are allocated. Under these conditions, civil servants behave like interest groups whose primary objective is to put pressure on the political system in an effort to redistribute wealth to elites. Opportunistic behavior, especially rent-seeking, is typically quite prevalent in nations with poorly designed, ineffective, and non-self-enforcing constitutional laws. The laws that control socio-political interaction in these nations have not been effective at reining in the government.

In countries with poorly constructed, inefficient, and non self-enforcing constitutional rules, opportunistic behavior (including rent seeking) is usually quite pervasive. In such countries, the rules that regulate socio-political interaction, have failed to adequately constrain the government.

As a result, state intervention in private exchange is equally subtle. Excessive regulation of economic activities creates many opportunities for rent seeking, including bureaucratic corruption. Bureaucratic corruption provides civil servants with the opportunity to raise their compensation above what the law prescribes. Through the practice of corruption, private entrepreneurs are able to capture and maintain monopoly positions in the economy. Politicians, who serve as wealth brokers, obtain the resources they need to purchase security and continue to monopolize the supply of legislation. The biggest loser from corruption is society as a whole. Corruption is harmful as it allows inefficient producers to remain in business, encourages governments to pursue perverse economic policies, and provides opportunities to bureaucrats and politicians to enrich themselves through extorting bribes from those seeking government favors. Thus, corruption distorts economic incentives, discourages free enterprise, and slows economic growth.⁶

In examining bureaucratic corruption in Africa, it is important to discuss the supply side. Unless entrepreneurs and groups seeking government favors supply the bribes, then most bureaucratic corruption would be limited to nepotism, illegal levies, and the illegal appropriation of public resources. In African context, payments from entrepreneurs seeking state favors represent an important source of extra-legal income for bureaucrats. A society's laws and institutions have a significant impact on the level of bureaucratic corruption. State-imposed expenses imposed by regulatory programs can be quite onerous on businesses and entrepreneurship, which motivates investors to look for ways to reduce them. Of course, the majority of intervention strategies produce rents, which are often sought for through a political process. Bribing government employees has been a crucial strategy for vying for those rents. Bureaucratic corruption can be seen as a survival tactic for profit-maximizing businesses confronted with upsetting state laws.⁷

The above account clearly indicates that it is not, as many social science researchers would want us to believe that, political will is the ideal 'magic bullet' for curbing public sector corruption. Actually, the bureaucrats whose major role, among others, is to advise policy makers on how best to stop corrupt practices, have turned to be the 'perpetrators' of the corrupt practices. Even where anti corruption policies, rules and regulations are so clear and the politicians have demonstrated real support to anti corruption crusade, bureaucrats fail to demonstrate genuine commitment to implement the adopted anti corruption measures in many African countries.

4 Mbaku, J.M. 'Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents' Public Choice (1991a)

5 Kimenyi, M.S. 'Bureaucratic Rents and Political Institutions.' Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice (1987)

6 Mbaku, J.M. 'Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents' Public Choice (1991a)

7 Harch, E. 'Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa.' Journal of Modern African Studies (1993)

It is therefore fairly concluded that, it not the problem of policy makers (i.e. politicians though they partly share the blame) but it is actually the problem of technocrats entrusted to run public institutions. We turn to a discussion of causes for bureaucratic corruption in African countries.

3. Why Bureaucratic Corruption is rampant in Africa?

Much research has been done to determine the causes of bureaucratic corruption in Africa. According to,⁸ African civil servants may be obliged to share the proceeds of their public offices with their kinfolk. The civil servant is under intense pressure from his extended African family, which drives him to use unscrupulous methods. It is thought that bureaucrats take advantage of their public positions to gain advantages for themselves, their families, and their ethnic or social groups. Researchers have so tended to emphasize the institutional and personal factors that contribute to corrupt behavior when investigating corruption in Africa. The civil worker is forced to utilize dishonest tactics by the overwhelming pressure of his extended African family. It is believed that bureaucrats exploit their public positions to benefit their families, ethnic or social groups, and themselves. When examining corruption in Africa, researchers have a tendency to stress the institutional and individual variables that contribute to corrupt behavior'.⁹ Numerous studies have claimed that excessive levels of bureaucratic corruption in these economies are connected to the inhabitants of many developing countries' seeming lack of commitment to serving the public good. Employees in the civil service in many African nations view public service as a chance for personal growth. For example, all political coalitions and organizations in post-independence Nigeria have been documented as making serious attempts to seize control of the state apparatus in order to use the state's wealth-redistribution powers for personal gain.¹⁰ Immediately after seizing power, governments typically erects formidable obstacles to entry and monopolizes the production of legislation, ensuring that other parties do not participate in the distribution of resources. In order for locked-out groups to participate in the economic systems, bribes must be paid to the in charge officials, who are all members of the politically dominant group. Nigeria is not the only nation in Africa where the government's machinery has been turned into a tool for the elitism of the politically powerful clique. South Africa, long regarded by many scholars in the West as a stronghold for free enterprise in Africa, has for many years promoted laws that allowed the white minority to use the redistributive powers of the state to enrich itself while sentencing the black majority to perpetual poverty and deprivation.¹¹ Politicians and bureaucrats all over Africa, from Algeria to Zaire, advocate unfavorable economic policies that, while impoverishing the majority of population, offer concentrated and sizable benefits to the national elites and interest groups. Incompetence and inefficiency among civil servants have been given as other institutional issues associated with bureaucratic corruption in Africa. Sustainable economic and social development requires an efficient and professional civil service. The regime bureaucracy must be receptive to the demands of the entrepreneurial class in order to efficiently implement national development programs and foster entrepreneurship and innovation in the economy.

To effectively carry out national development plans and promote entrepreneurship and innovation in the economy, the government bureaucracy must be responsive to the needs of the entrepreneurial class. Additionally, public goods and services should be delivered efficiently. The inference is that a high level of professionalism and competence are required of the country's civil service. Senior positions should only be given to individuals who have distinguished themselves and have the capacity and experience to effectively carry out the activities allocated to them. Hiring decisions should be based on merit and qualification. Positions in the civil service shouldn't be given in exchange for political favors, exchanged for bribes, or used to fulfill responsibilities to one's ethnic group. Incompetent, unqualified, and unprofessional civil servants contribute significantly to failures in development and force the country to remain essentially underdeveloped. Many African nations embraced statism as their preferred development strategy soon after gaining independence. This method of resource distribution placed a focus on state control and led to the transformation of numerous African governments into powerful economic entities. The majority of investors, exporters, importers, and bankers today are African governments. Additionally, the state is heavily involved in income redistribution and employs a substantial share of the nation's labor force. Through a series of regulations and statutes, the state is able to extract wealth from the poorly organized rural farm sector for use in subsidizing the relatively well-organized and politically volatile urban sector. Public personnel whose duty is to implement the laws have benefited from excessive governmental intervention in private transaction in several African countries. Government restrictions have been used by bureaucrats to benefit themselves at the expense of the rest of society because they control a vast quantity of public resources. Bureaucrats have frequently created shortages to pressure potential demanders into paying bribes. Laws and regulations are generally badly, capriciously, ineffectively, and arbitrarily enforced in African countries.

8 Apter, D.E. *Ghana in Transition*. New York: Antheneum (1963)

9 Gould. *Bureaucratic Corruption Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaïre*. New York: Pergamon Press (1980)

10 Mbaku, J.M. 'Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents' *Public Choice* (1991a)

11 Alam, M.S. 'Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment.' *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 48(4): 441-56 (1989)



As a result, those who are harmed by the regulations must practice opportunism, including paying bribes to government officials. According to numerous academics, one of the major causes of corruption in post-independence Africa was the transformation of the state infrastructure into a tool for the enrichment of the politically dominant group. Significant inequality in the allocation of resources, significant levels of material deprivation and pervasive and chronic poverty have all been identified as key contributors to corruption in African nations.¹² Many regions of the world have made significant advancements in economic and human development during the past 40 years. Yet, Africa has remained essentially poor and severely deprived. Evidence shows that Africa is today the poorest region of the world. The post-independence period saw the development of the African military as a significant player in resource allocation, which has further affected income distribution. The budget for the armed forces is disproportionately large in many African nations. Numerous experts contend that these post-independence trends have considerably aided in the growth of corruption, underdevelopment, and widespread poverty and misery. Some academics think that corrupt cultural norms and practices are what cause corruption in Africa and other emerging nations.¹³ Other researchers believe that corruption in Africa is related to the clash between traditional and foreign norms that accompany modernization and industrial development. As such, corruption is seen as an unavoidable consequence of economic modernization and political development. In the majority of developing societies, individual rights are often subordinate to the rights of the group or social cleavage. As a result, loyalty to the ethnic group is considered more important than individual rights or personal accountability. In Africa, these particularistic attachments are quite strong and have been cited as important determinants of bureaucratic corruption. Individuals who become successful in the public sector or the exchange economy are expected to share the benefits with their extended family and their ethnic cleavage. Thus, a civil servant may engage in corrupt activities in an effort to meet personal obligations to members of his family or ethnic group. Public choice theory, on the other hand, argues that governmental oversight and regulation of economic activity are the main causes of bureaucratic corruption. Political coalitions will attempt to use the government to redistribute income and wealth in their favor after constitutional rules has been chosen, ratified, and a government has been constituted. Rent seeking will spread as organizations look for methods to benefit themselves at the expense of the rest of society unless the laws imposed successfully limit the government's power to provide special-interest legislation. At the same time, civil servants will be able to extort bribes from entrepreneurs seeking ways to minimize the burden of state regulations on their enterprises and attempting to enter economic sectors closed by state intervention in markets.

The majority of Africans live in civilizations with weak, ineffective, and poorly crafted constitutional laws that give the government virtually unrestricted authority to interfere in private transactions. Such economies completely politicize resource distribution, and the civil service now serves as the main tool for resource distribution in place of the market. Civil employees are aware that valuable monopoly rights produced by regulatory actions of the government generate significant monopoly profits for their owners. As a result, authorities try to extort bribes from business owners in order to collect rent. Entrepreneurs can reduce costs when government regulations place a heavy burden on their company by offering bribes to law enforcement officials. It is anticipated that the bribe will either have the business exempt from the laws or result in a lower tax rate for the person's enterprise. Bureaucrats wouldn't be able to demand bribes from business owners if these limits on economic activity were removed. Thus, bureaucratic corruption is primarily rent-seeking behavior, which is directly related to the level and extent of government activity in the economy. Below the importance of rules is explained.

4. The Importance of Institutions

Some institutionalist researchers such as¹⁴ argue that institutions (herein referred to as the generally accepted rules for governing public servants' behaviors and conduct) which regulate the activities of individuals within a society matter and are a major determinant of how individuals and organizations behave. Only within the framework of current regulations can the actions of officials and the business people who pay them be accurately evaluated. Therefore, any attempt to examine or comprehend corruption inside a society would be fruitless without a thorough comprehension of that nation's laws and structures. It also means that any anti-corruption program that is created without considering how current laws affect how people behave in society, including bureaucrats, business people, voters, and politicians, will be futile. Rules define how individuals can interact with each other, provide a means for the settlement of conflict, and generally place constraints on individual behavior, as well as that of the group and collectivity.

12 Leys, C. 'What is the Problem About Corruption'? (1965)

13 Jabbara, J.G. 'Bureaucratic Corruption in the Third World: Causes and Remedies' Indian Journal of Public Administration 22: (1976)

14 Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J.M. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press (1985)

Effective rules allow individuals to pursue their private ends in such a way that they do not infringe on the ability of others to do the same. The rules that regulate socio-political interaction can be explicit (e. g., a written constitution) or based on custom and tradition. Corruption can be seen as an opportunistic action on the part of people or groups given an existing system of norms. In this light, it is possible to view corruption as a problem of constitutional upkeep that can only be adequately resolved through comprehensive and game-changing rule revision.

In an attempt to highlight the importance of institutional norms and rules for controlling the conduct and behaviors of bureaucrats, researchers¹⁵ have occasionally opted to explain the relevance of rules by using the 'tragedy of the commons,' an illustration that is used quite often in economics. If, for example, the rules of a society require that agricultural land be owned communally, and farmers are assumed to be utility maximizers in the traditional sense, then overgrazing will be the outcome. As opposed to what is frequently believed, overgrazing is an issue related to the nature of the laws that govern socio-political interactions in this society, including the actions of farmers. In other words, utility maximization will result in overgrazing under the current restrictions. As in many African communities, policing is typically used as a strategy to reduce the issue of overgrazing. Unfortunately, attempts to impose particular results within the current set of laws are rarely successful due to either insufficient accountability mechanisms or utility maximization, among other reasons, in the absence of privatization and appropriate institutions to safeguard and enforce property rights.

Africa's current anti-corruption initiatives face a number of challenges. First of all, they are being implemented within unworkable and ineffective rules. The second aspect of anti-corruption operations is policing, which aims to influence outcomes while adhering to the law. Third, the counteracting institutions tasked with policing and enforcing the rules and the bureaucrats who work in those agencies are not appropriately limited by the laws. This is in addition to poor accountability systems and a culture of 'protectionism'. Finally, a large number of bureaucrats are corrupt themselves and cannot be trusted to offer the direction required to manage successful anti corruption initiatives. To ensure that the outcomes produced within the rules are those that society desires, effective corruption cleanup must thus start with rule reform. If the laws that govern socio-political interactions include an incentive structure that makes opportunism extremely profitable, efforts to eradicate corruption would be ineffective. If, as a result of the adopted rules, rent-seeking activities, as opposed to genuine entrepreneurship, are highly rewarding, entrepreneurs are likely to devote most of their time and effort to rent seeking. In such a case, using the police force to prevent individuals from taking advantage of lucrative rent seeking opportunities is unlikely to be effective, especially if members of the police are corrupt and inefficient. Again, the fundamental problem is the absence of a rule of law, not the corrupt outcomes. Thus, appropriate procedures for effective control of rent seeking and other opportunistic behaviors, including bureaucratic corruption, is to reform the rules of the game and change the incentive system. According to public choice theory, combating corruption and other opportunistic actions is a challenge of maintaining the constitution or regulations. Opportunistic behavior also includes shirking, unfair selection, moral hazard, and free riding in addition to corruption.¹⁶ Even if individuals select an efficient set of rules (i. e., rules that generate mutual gains for all parties), opportunistic behavior (including corruption) would still be a problem for the post-constitutional society. Making certain that opportunism is minimized in the post-contractual society requires an efficient and effective enforcement system to ensure cooperation and compliance. Unfortunately, third-party enforcement of constitutional rules is usually unreliable, inefficient, and not particularly workable. Some academics have even advocated allowing the national judiciary and police to work as opposing forces to ensure compliance and reduce opportunism. However, those organizations are also subject to pressure from interest groups. Additionally, those institutions lack adequate legal restraint and are heavily corrupted in the majority of African nations. Consequently, the national judiciary and police are not appropriate instruments for curbing corruption or enforcing the constitutional rules.¹⁷

The problem of rule maintenance has been examined by several researchers. Emerging from these studies is a theory of constitutional maintenance whose main objective is to find ways to minimize opportunism in the post-constitutional society.¹⁸ It is generally believed that making the constitution or set of rules selected self-enforcing will eliminate most opportunities for rent seeking and other opportunistic behavior. A constitution can be made self-enforcing by endowing it with principles and procedural rules that introduce, maintain, and enhance political and economic competition in the post-constitutional society.

15 Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J.M. *The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press (1985)

16 Ostrom, E.; Schroeder, L.; and Wynne, S. *Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press (1993)

17 Lowenberg, A.D. 'A Post-Apartheid Constitution for South Africa: Lessons from Public Choice.' *Cato Journal* 12(2): 297-319 (1992)

18 Anderson, T.L., and Hill, P.J. 'Constraining the Transfer Society: Constitutional and Moral Dimensions.' *Cato Journal* 6(1): 317-39 (1986)



In other words, during constitutional negotiations, the rules are designed to make both political and economic markets competitive and accessible to all members of society. An important characteristic of a self-enforcing set of rules is its ability to constrain government and limit the exercise of government agency. If the state's ability to intervene in private exchange is constitutionally restrained, political coalitions will find it very difficult to engage in inefficient redistributions. Constitutionally, constraining the ability of the government to engage in ex-post resource redistributions will significantly limit redistributions of income induced by majority vote and rent seeking. Once the constitution limits the ability of the state to redistribute income and wealth, interest groups are unlikely to invest in rent seeking, because such investments would either yield meager returns or be unprofitable and in so doing curbing corrupt behaviors.

5. How Effective are the extant Anti –Corruption Reforms in Africa?

Today's constitutional laws govern the majority of independent African nations. Nonetheless, most African countries have failed to create proper laws and institutions, especially those that would ensure the kinds of outcomes wanted by members of society, in spite of numerous attempts at post-independence rule reform. Many African countries have adopted constitutions that are essentially copies of European constitutional models, which have allowed the politically dominant parties to continue to hold a monopoly on power especially in African countries.

The institutions brought to the African colonies by the Europeans were primarily 'structures of exploitation, despotism, and degradation.'¹⁹ As argued,²⁰ 'the colonial state was conceived in violence rather than by negotiation.' Thus, the rules established to regulate socio-political relations in the African colonies were not the outcome of negotiations among representatives of relevant population groups in those societies. Instead, those rules were imposed by Europeans and designed to satisfy their desired outcomes. The colonialists swiftly created a reform program as it became clear that the colonies would be granted independence, but it was unable to properly address the fundamental problems related to the meaningful participation of the indigenous people in post-independence development. This is why some academics think that these last-minute reform initiatives fell short of enabling a fundamental change in the fields of economics, culture, or bureaucracy.²¹ Thus, the Europeans left behind rules and institutions that were weak and potentially wobbly. The rules, rather than controlling corruption, they actually facilitate it.

Most of the constitutional rules that African countries adopted at independence were developed abroad with the interests of the indigenous people represented by urban elites, most of them had been educated in Europe and had accepted Western political norms and beliefs. In addition to the fact that these urban elites were not well informed on conditions in the rural sectors of their countries, they usually had objectives and interests that were significantly different from those of their peasant countrymen. Since the design of rules often excluded a significant part of national political opinion, the documents adopted were thus not efficient.

Many African countries later abandoned the rules that they had adopted at independence and undertook constitutional reforms in an effort to design more efficient and appropriate rules. Unfortunately, a sizable portion of the country's political opinion was shut out of the constitutional discourse, which was still restricted to a small group of urban elites. In some nations, the constitution was suspended and government was established by military order. In reality, a number of African countries, like Ghana, the former Zaire, Nigeria, Libya, and Somalia, have spent most of their time as independent states under the control of military elites.

In addition to the fact that constitutional discourse was dominated by urban elites, the process did not seriously consider the aspirations, desires, and needs of the rural populations, and the people were not enfranchised and provided the facilities to participate effectively in the selection of rules. For example, in South Africa (until 1994), participation in rules selection was limited to whites.²² The constitutional rules produced by post-independence efforts produced Leviathan states, whose redistributive powers were used by political coalitions to amass wealth for themselves while impoverishing the rest of the people. Today, a large portion of the population of Africa abides by laws that were not unanimously adopted by the relevant demographic groups within each nation or by their representatives. Agreement must be reached willingly and must be unanimous in order to produce an effective set of rules. Due to the aforementioned and the fact that post-independence attempts at constitutional reform largely failed to result in more effective constitutions, bureaucratic corruption levels have awfully increased over the last three decades.

19 Fatton, R. Jr. 'Liberal Democracy in Africa.' *Political Science Quarterly* 105(3): 455-73 (1990)

20 Etzioni-Halevy, W. *Political Manipulation and Administrative Power*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1979)

21 Fatton, R. Jr. 'Liberal Democracy in Africa.' *Political Science Quarterly* 105(3): 455-73 (1990)

22 Cowen, D.V. *The Foundations of Freedom: With Special Reference to Southern Africa*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press (1961).

6. Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this paper was to examine the power of organizational context in shaping the implementation of anti corruption measures in public institutions. African countries, like many developing countries, have tried several strategies in an effort to minimize levels of bureaucratic corruption. These include societal, legal, market, and political strategies. All those approaches to curbing corruption represent the manipulation of outcomes within a given set of rules and presuppose the existence of efficient counteracting institutions. The evidence has shown, however, that most judiciary systems and police forces in African countries are not properly constrained by the law and that most civil servants including judges and police officers are themselves corrupt. As a result, most anti corruption programs [despite being technically good and well-crafted] have proved to be futile. Bureaucratic corruption is thus an outcome generated within a given set of rules. In other words, success or failure of the anti corruption measures depends largely on the organizational context in which the rules are implemented. It is also important to note that an effective evaluation of such an outcome can only be undertaken after a thorough understanding of the rules that generate the outcome. Thus, to understand why bureaucrats engage in corruption requires an examination of the rules that regulate the socio-political behavior of individuals. Much as these rules determine how individuals behave and relate to each other, they also determine the outcomes to be generated in society. Thus, effective combating and prevention of corruption should not involve efforts to manipulate outcomes within rules. Instead, an effective approach should involve reforming the existing rules and the subsequent selection and adoption of new rules that can generate the outcomes desired by the society. It is fairly deduced that, despite a myriad of literature to support the importance of political will in combating corruption; political will is admittedly a necessary condition but not sufficient to warrant success in the fight against corruption, more so in developing countries. On the contrary, public bureaucrats expected to adopt and properly implement policies for curbing corruption; often lack genuine commitment to effectively implement anti corruption measures for private gains. In many occasions, the 'political will thesis' has been used as an excuse by the bureaucrats to justify their reluctance to well implement anti corruption policies. One policy option this article offers is that, there is a need to move from the popularly sang song of 'political will' to a more genuine 'bureaucratic will', if corruption is to be controlled in public institutions.

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THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN THE EXECUTION OF TANZANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Noel E. Kaganda



Tanzania is a united republic, a sovereign nation-state that came to existence in April 1964, following the union between Tanzania Mainland, then known as Tanganyika and Zanzibar. It is worth noting from the outset, however, that Tanzania's nationhood is neither a product of the aforementioned amalgamation, nor the outcome of the nationalist struggles that culminated in the political independence per se, nor the product of the Berlin Conference that partitioned the African continent in the 1880s; rather it is a product of long historical process – one that stretches back thousands of years.

This process involved the cultural, economic, social and political developments and interactions of people and civilizations, ranging from Arabs, Portuguese, Chinese, Persians, Germans and the British. The geographical location of Tanzania prior to encounters with these foreigners would reveal a large number of tribes and varied political units, some of which were complex democratic states, chiefdoms and large centralized kingdoms.¹ Those encounters, which were not always peaceful and consensual, have had a huge impact on the nations that attained political independence in the 1960s. Moreover, historical legacies and the nature of asymmetrical relationships that existed between the colonizers and their subjects, particularly in the realm of cultural interactions, persist to date, whereby the powerful prescribe and the less powerful assimilates, either voluntarily or otherwise.

Towards its independence, Tanzania Mainland had at least 120 tribes. These were mobilized and unified through Kiswahili language that originated in the east African coast and spread into the hinterlands as far as Katanga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, the father of the independent Tanzanian nation once remarked: 'in Tanzania it was more than one hundred tribal units, which lost their freedom, it was one nation that regained it.' Kiswahili language, thus served as a tool for general mobilization and unification of the populace for independence of Mainland Tanzania, having been chosen for that task by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in July 7, 1954.

In addition to unifying the nation, Kiswahili was also instrumental in the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, where most freedom fighters from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe interacted and embraced it whilst receiving military training in Tanzania.

In recent times, Kiswahili has spread further to become the tenths most used languages in the world, with over 200 million speakers globally. In November 2021, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declared July 7 as World Kiswahili Language Day. It is no wonder therefore that the language is among the cherished core values of the country, others being unity, humanity, brotherhood, peace and stability. Tanzania has endeavoured to project these values in her relations with other states in Africa and beyond, invoking humanity, for

1 Sutton, J.E.G. (1969). The Peopling of Tanzania. In I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (Ed.). A History of Tanzania. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, pp. 1-2.

instance, as a basis for its involvement in the decolonization endeavours.

Culture has been defined as a sum total of people's ways of national life, their political system, customs and traditions, juridical system, religious beliefs, literary and artistic manifestations, games and amusements.² Being a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious country, Tanzania is truly diverse. Whilst some countries struggle to cope with such diversity, Tanzania has thus far managed to benefit from it owing to the deeply rooted culture of unity, tolerance and mutual respect.

Diplomacy is the management of relations between independent states through negotiations and mutual accommodation. It is a peaceful – that is non-coercive method employed by states to influence actions of other states with the view to achieve their foreign policy objectives that are determined by national interests. National interest as a concept has been defined widely. Simply put, these are goals and objectives necessary for achieving national security and prosperity. Each and every nation-state has its own goals and objectives, but the most paramount, also dubbed vital interests, are the ones that determine its survival as a sovereign and cohesive entity, with its chosen politico-economic system and cultural identity.

Cultural diplomacy is, therefore, the application of culture in the conduct of relations between sovereign states. It is a set of actions that are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, information, art, lifestyles, value systems, traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests.³ The classical theories of international relations, namely realism and liberalism, despite their many differences, both believe that states are the principal actors in international relations, whether being anarchic in nature in pursuit of self-interest and power and cooperating with each other in pursuit of common global public goods.

What the two theories have in common, however, is the belief that culture is not an important element in these theories, worthy of consideration. Constructivism on the other hand, perceive culture as an important element in international relations, firmly believing that every human behaviour, whether driven by self-interest or the desire for cooperation is influenced and determined by the individual's cultural orientation.⁴ Given the application of cultural diplomacy since the end of the Second World War, especially by major powers, one finds the constructivists' argument quite compelling.

In view of the strategic importance, cultural diplomacy has been employed, to a varied extent, by several nation-states both, developed and developing. All major powers have employed and continue to employ cultural diplomacy in the execution of their foreign policies, in a manner described by Joseph Nye as "soft-power".⁵ The United States, for example, has been employing cultural diplomacy during the Cold War to-date, through inter alia educational and cultural exchange programme. Similarly, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, Germany and emerging powers such as Brazil, China and India are using cultural diplomacy in securing foreign policy objectives. In Tanzania's immediate and strategic neighbourhood there are also Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa that use cultural diplomacy in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives.

Of course, there are many benefits of undertaking cultural diplomacy. These include, but are not limited to building mutual trust among individuals and government officials that policy makers can utilize during negotiations and forging alliances; enabling states to promote its values and interests so as to persuade others to accommodate or tolerate them; facilitating bonds that endure beyond changes in governments and/or regimes; reaching stakeholders that cannot be reached through normal diplomatic approaches; serving as a tool of rapprochement with countries where diplomatic relations have been strained or are absent; fostering growth of civil society as a mechanism for holding governments into account; countering negative and damaging publicity – that is propaganda against a people or government, especially those that can incite hatred, violence; and fostering a culture of peace and harmony among civilizations.

Tanzania like other states, including those in the global south, is aware of the benefits that emanate from well-planned and executed cultural diplomacy strategies, as a way of complementing other forms of diplomacy, such as economic diplomacy, environmental diplomacy and Diaspora diplomacy. As early as 1969, Mwalimu Nyerere underscored the essence of engaging foreign publics with the view to persuade them to adopt Tanzania's values pertaining to socialism and self-reliance, while also appreciating and supporting her firm stance against colonialism, racialism and oppression in Africa and beyond.

2 Ruhumbika, G. (Ed) (1974). Towards Ujamaa: Twenty Years of TANU Leadership. Dar es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, p. 275.

3 Cummings, M.C., Jr. (2003). Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: a survey. Washington D.C.:CAC

4 Idoko, B. O. (2021). A Philosophical Reflection on the Role of Culture in International Relations. *Ogirisi: aNew Journal of African Studies*. 17(1), 118 – 142. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/og.v17i1.7>

5 Nye, J.S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.



The Triennial Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation calls for the promotion of Kiswahili within the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and internationally. Since then, Kiswahili has been promoted as a lingua franca of the East African Community, while in 2017 the East African Legislative Assembly passed a resolution to adopt it as one of the official languages of the Community. Similarly, in August 2018, SADC adopted Kiswahili as its fourth official language, noting the contribution it had played in the liberation struggles in southern Africa. Kiswahili is also the official working language of AU, whereby the continental body has agreed to work collaboratively with EAC to promote Kiswahili as a Pan-African lingua franca and using it as a catalyst for achieving the AU's Agenda 2063. Kiswahili has the potential to unify the African states as it managed to unify the people of Tanzania.

In addition to diplomatic arena, Kiswahili has been promoted through music such as *Taarab* and '*Bongo Flava*' as well as gospel music, with new fans in Tanzania's immediate neighbourhood, the African region and world at large. Tanzania, under the leadership of President Samia Suluhu Hassan has also made great strides in sports, including in the just concluded Commonwealth games, held in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Similarly, the Tanzania Royal Tour documentary that was filmed in 2021 and launched in the United States this year has showcased Tanzania's impressive tourist attractions, such as Mt. Kilimanjaro, the Ngorongoro crater, the Serengeti and Zanzibar as well as the culture of her people, which is rich in diversity. These and other cultural endeavours serve to portray Tanzania in a positive light to the rest of the world, and could, if systematically and purposefully undertaken, contribute to the realization of its foreign policy objectives and national interests, hence safeguarding its national security.

Whereas cultural diversity is desirable and cultural crosspollinations-inevitable, Tanzania must continue to guard against the threats to its national cultural identity, which form part of her vital national interests. It must also be cautious of the evolving nature of global politics, with the resurgence of old rivalries between the major powers, which scout for supporters and sympathisers for their respective camps. Tanzania's stance pertaining to getting involved in such struggles for power and influence during the peak of Cold War was crystal clear and remains so to date.

There is also a need to be watchful and guard against the negative effects of globalization, especially in relation to disruptive communication technologies, which currently are the primary agents for eroding the natural cultural values and norms. These technologies, such as social media, provide a platform for violent extremist and terrorist to spread hate, incite violence, recruit young and desperate youth into their nefarious networks; using religious radicalism as both a bait and justification for their actions.

RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON GLOBAL HUMAN SECURITY: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY

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1. Introduction

The entire global economy is now unstable after two years of combating COVID-19. Today, 60% of workers have real incomes that are lower than they were before the pandemic; 60% of the world's poorest nations are in or are highly likely to enter debt distress; developing nations miss out on \$1.2 trillion annually to close the social protection gap; and \$4.3 trillion annually is required - more money than ever before - to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).¹ The capacity of nations and people to overcome hardship has also been declining. The average household has lost 1.5% in real income as a result of price increases in corn and wheat alone since the start of the war, and global average growth prospects have been revised downward as well. Worldwide, more people have been facing famine-like conditions, and more people have faced severe hunger emergencies.² The pandemic's lingering effects are likely to cause the numbers of the poor to rise once more, along with the war in Ukraine and the repercussions of climate change.³ Additionally, vulnerability rises along with poverty, primarily for women and girls. In light of the interconnectedness of the globalized globe, this article makes the case that every developed or developing country has, to varied degrees, been impacted by the War, as detailed below

2. The Cost-of-Living Crisis

The continuous cost-of-living dilemma mostly affects nations and populations with little adaptability. These consequences are produced by three main transmission channels: increasing food prices, increasing energy prices, and tightening financial muscles. Each of these factors has the potential to have significant consequences on its own, but they may also feed into one another to create vicious cycles, which, regrettably, are already beginning. High fuel and fertilizer expenses, for instance, raise farmers' production costs and could lead to higher food prices and poorer farm yields. This may strain household budgets, increase poverty, lower living standards, and promote social unrest. Increased demand for higher interest rates leads to higher borrowing costs for developing nations and a devaluation of their currencies, which drives up the cost of imports of food and energy and restarts the cycle. These dynamics have significant effects on financial systems, international peace and security, and social cohesiveness. Food should never be considered an extravagance; it is a basic human right. However, this problem might quickly develop into a global food catastrophe. Although this disaster has been coming for years, many nations can no longer take it in the wake of the conflict. In 41 of the 53 nations where data are available, between 179 million and 181 million people are anticipated to be experiencing a food crisis or worsening conditions in 2022.⁴ In addition, 19 million more people are expected to face chronic undernourishment globally in 2023, if the reduction in food exports from the Russian Federation and Ukraine result in lower food availability worldwide.⁵

1 Global Impact of the War in Ukraine: Billions of People face greatest Cost-of Living Crisis in a Generation, (2022)
 2 World Bank Group: Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions, Policy Brief (2022)
 3 UNCTAD. The Impact of Trade and Development of the War in Ukraine (2022)
 4 Global Network Against Food Crises Report (2022)
 5 Forthcoming State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World Report (2022)



While the FAO food price index had reached a record high in February 2022 before the war started, since then it has had some of the largest one-month increases in its history, with its record high in March 2022.⁶ And yet, despite a very challenging situation today, some factors suggest the food security situation may get much worse still in coming seasons.

Fertilizer prices have increased even more quickly than food prices as a result of growing energy costs, trade restrictions, and a loss of fertilizer supplies from the Russian Federation and Belarus. As a result, many farmers, particularly smallholders, are forced to cut back on production because the fertilizers they require now cost more than the grains they are selling. Importantly, it takes at least two years for new fertilizer factories to become operational, which means that the existing supply of fertilizers is largely constrained. The global food supply may not be able to keep up with the growing demand in 2023 as a result of this significant fertilizer issue. The most popular staple in the world, rice, which has historically had low pricing due to plentiful supplies, might be greatly impacted by this trend of decreased fertilizer affordability for the coming growing season. There is not much time left to avoid a food catastrophe in 2023, when both food availability and access will be issues. The availability of food will be curtailed at the worst possible time, and the current crisis in corn, wheat, and vegetable oil might spread to other staples, impacting billions more people, if the war continues and high grain and fertilizer prices last throughout the upcoming planting season. This situation calls for global concerted efforts to ensure peace; stability and human security are maintained, otherwise the future is uncertain.

Since the beginning of the war, export restrictions on food and fertilizer have increased dramatically. The extent of restrictions currently exceeds that of the 2007–2008 food price crises, which was a major factor in the 40% spike in agricultural prices. Almost a fifth of all calories exchanged globally now are affected by trade restrictions, which makes the situation worse. Every food crisis is a distributional one. Nothing is special about this one. Export limitations impede the trade necessary to transport fertilizer and important food supplies to the areas where they are most needed to assist the agricultural sector's expansion, mostly in emerging nations.

Everyone is affected by the shock waves of the conflict in some way. A country's level of exposure and shock tolerance is what determines its level of susceptibility. And in the developing world, this presents a problem. Together with the United Nations Regional Economic Commissions, the UN Worldwide Crisis Response Group conducted a global vulnerability assessment on the capabilities of nations to deal with each of the routes of transmission and the vicious cycles they can produce. The findings support a generalized perception of vulnerability: 94 nations, home to around 1.6 billion people, are exposed to at least one aspect of the crisis and unable to handle it. Out of the 1.6 billion people, 1.2 billion, or over 75 percent, reside in 'perfect-storm' countries, which are vulnerable to the three factors of finance, food, and energy.

Governments and people can become vulnerable by having their families and national budgets slashed, which forces them to make unfavorable but necessary trade-offs. If social protection systems and safety nets are not sufficiently expanded, hungry poor families in developing nations may cut back on health-related expenses; COVID-19-related temporary school absences in children may now result in permanent exclusion from the educational system; and smallholder or micro-entrepreneurs may close their businesses due to rising energy costs. Meanwhile countries, unless a multilateral effort is undertaken to address potential liquidity pressures and increase fiscal space, will struggle to pay their food and energy bills while servicing their debt, and increase spending in social protection as needed.

When all of this information is considered, it strongly shows that, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations recently stated, 'there is no answer to the cost-of-living crisis without an answer to the financing crises.' It is necessary to reactivate all readily available rapid disbursement mechanisms at international financial institutions and to pursue a new issuance of Special Drawing Rights. But it is also crucial to make sure money is spent wisely. Countries can respond to the crisis with additional targeted and/or time-bound emergency measures, which should be in line with needs for sustainable development and not distributed generally. This will supplement efforts to develop social protection systems.

6 Calculations based on FAO Food Price Index Data (2022)

Last but not least, it is imperative to prevent a cascading debt crises in developing countries brought on by solvency issues. The G7 and G20 must accept the task of presenting debt restructuring tools that are appropriate for the situation.

The biggest cost-of-living problem of the twenty-first century has occurred at a time when people and nations are less able to adapt. The conflict in Ukraine has put people all over the world in a difficult situation. Given the importance of both the Russian Federation and Ukraine in these markets, the war's price shocks in food, energy, and fertilizer sectors are the crux of the problem. The FAO food price index is 20.8 percent higher than it was at this time last year and very close to record levels. Recognizing that a protracted battle will result in higher energy costs in the medium to long term has increased the volatility of the energy market. Crude oil has now reached over \$120 per barrel and energy prices overall are expected to rise by 50 per cent in 2022 relative to in 2021.⁷ The price of European gas has risen ten-fold compared to 2020. Europe is also not spared and many countries have stopped relying on the Russian natural gas.

The extremely unstable environment in which this catastrophe emerged—a world dealing with the cascading crises of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change—is the hard place. No of the timing, a shock of this size would have been difficult; right now, it has historic, century-defining proportions possibly driving some emerging nations away from the market for liquefied natural gas, from which they import their energy.⁸ Fertilizer prices are more than double the 2000–2020 average. Maritime transport costs are more than triple the pre-pandemic average,⁹ due to the lingering effects of the COVID-19 crisis and the destruction of the transport infrastructure (and especially the ports) of Ukraine, as well as higher volume of traffic and congestion related delays and other factors such as rising fuel costs. On North-South trade routes, the aggregated fuel cost increase of the last three months is estimated to already result in a 5-to-14% increase of total maritime transport costs.¹⁰ Rising interest rates and growing investor uncertainty has eroded both the value of developing countries' currencies, as well as their capacity to borrow in foreign markets. After the first 100 days of the war, the currencies of 142 developing countries have depreciated, on average, by 2.8% against the US dollar (2.7% YTD), and their bonds yields have increased by an average of 77 basis points.¹¹ Of greatest concern are the vicious cycles beginning to emerge along the transmission channels of the crisis. Higher energy prices, especially diesel and natural gas, increase the costs of fertilizers and transport. Both factors increase the costs of food production. This leads to reduced farm yields and to even higher food prices next season. These in turn raise inflation indicators, adding to the already rising pressure on interest rates and tightening financial conditions. Tighter financial conditions decrease the purchasing power of developing nations' currencies, driving up the price of food and energy imports, shrinking budgetary room, and raising debt service expenses.

The story is still not over, though. A cost-of-living problem' vicious cycles can also cause social and political unrest. A higher cost of living and higher energy and food prices result from rising inflation. In consequence, this lowers families' real income and, consequently, their standard of living and chances for the future. Some families begin to make difficult trade-offs, such as lowering the quantity or caliber of their meals, dropping out of school, or cutting back on healthcare expenses. Frequently, women and girls are most impacted by these choices. These decisions have worrying long-term effects, from higher poverty levels, to rising inequality, lower education, lower productivity and declining real wages. All of this weakens people's and governments' capacity to handle the crisis, escalating social and political turmoil. For instance, the combined consequences of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine pose a risk of poverty for 58 million people in Africa who are already just above the poverty line.¹² About 4.1 billion people lack social protection. The gender gap in global working hours has increased due to pandemic; globally, women spend 18.9 hours weekly in employment, or 57 per cent of the average 33.4 hours worked by men.

7 World Bank. Commodity Markets Outlook, April (2022)

8 World Bank. Commodity Markets Outlook, April (2022)

9 UNCTAD. Secretariat Calculations, based on Data from the International Food Policy Research Institute (2021)

10 UNCTAD. Secretariat Calculations, based on Data from the International Food Policy Research Institute (2021)

11 UNCTAD. Secretariat calculations, based on Refinitiv data (2021)

12 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2022)



More than 20 million people are forcibly displaced each year due to climate change effects.¹³ Nearly 90 million people in Asia and Africa, who had previously gained access to electricity, can no longer afford to pay for their basic energy needs.¹⁴ Globally, between 2019 and 2021, 30 million people lost access to clean cooking fuel and the global figure now stands at 2.4 billion who lack access. In 2020, 15 million people in sub-Saharan Africa who had recently gained tier electricity access were no longer able to afford it and slipped back into energy poverty. About 568 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa lacked access to electricity in 2020.¹⁵ In addition, empirical evidence shows that high food and energy prices will affect the most vulnerable societies the most, especially in developing countries, in which more than 50 per cent of the income of the poorest households is spent on food.¹⁶

However, because of their close approach to the poverty line, a significant number of the populations that are termed ‘non poor’ are also extremely vulnerable. It is crucial to engage these groups, who are also severely impacted by the crisis, in safety nets and social protection networks, not only to aid the poor but also to stop these vulnerable groups from becoming even more impoverished. Since many of these at-risk groups reside in cities, they frequently serve as the catalyst for social instability processes. A 10 per cent increase in food prices erodes the buying power of these households by more than 5 per cent, or about as much as poor families in developing countries spend on average on health. Steep rises in the cost of living will increase poverty worldwide. The pandemic has already caused a tremendous rollback in poverty reduction. The challenge is further exacerbated by additional rises inflation resulting from the war in Ukraine. According to the World Bank, the war in Ukraine might push up to 95 million people into extreme poverty, making 2022 the second-worst year ever for eradicating poverty, only after 2020. In general, with every percentage point increase in food prices, 10 million more people fall into extreme poverty. In fact, the cost of living crisis is most felt in terms of food security, where an increasing number of people are going hungry. In 41 of the 53 countries where data are tracked by the Global Network against Food Crises, between 179 and 181 million people are anticipated to experience Crisis or worse conditions (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in 2022¹⁷. The increase in hunger since the start of the war may in fact be higher and more widespread. In planning ahead for its operations in 81 countries, as of now WFP estimates that in just two years, the number of severely food insecure people doubled from 135 million pre-pandemic to 276 million at the start of 2022. The ripple effects of the war in Ukraine are expected to drive this number up to 323 million in 2022. Moreover, 36 million people are forecasted to face Emergency conditions or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or higher) in 36 countries in 2022, according to the Global Network against Food Crises. Because of the shock of the war, among other factors, the number of chronically undernourished people is expected to increase in 2022, according to FAO. Under a moderate shock scenario, the global number of undernourished people in 2022 would increase by 7.6 million. Under a severe shock scenario, the number of undernourished people will increase by 13.1 million, if the war continues and no appropriate actions are taken.

The livelihoods of more than 2 billion small producers, farm laborers, rural workers and their families are at risk, not least because they already cannot afford a healthy diet. Women comprise 43 per cent of the agricultural labor force in developing countries and account for two thirds of the world’s 600 million poor livestock keepers. At particular risk are young informal workers contributing to family farms, home-based micro-level entrepreneurs and unskilled workers, as well as the poor in rural and urban areas, particularly those whose incomes depend on the agric-food economy, including many refugees and displaced people. In terms of fertilizer crisis, two factors – declining fertilizer affordability and rising export restrictions – may worsen the medium-term outlook. Both act by disrupting markets and accelerating the ‘distributional’ component of this crisis: fertilizers may not arrive on time and in the right quantities and prices to the fields where they are needed, and export restrictions may further complicate the delivery of essential food supplies to the most vulnerable. In sum, they threaten to transform the current crisis of access into a future crisis of availability. Vulnerability assessment is discussed below.

13 See <https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html>

14 World Bank, Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report. World Bank, Washington, D.C.(2022)

15 Tracking SDG 7, the Energy Progress Report. IEA, IRENA, UN Statistics Division, the World Bank, (2022)

16 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2022)

17 See <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/pandemic-prices-and-poverty>.

3. Vulnerability Assessment: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly

As noted in the preceding sections of this article that, the effects of the war in Ukraine are not only confined to Europe as a region due to the interdependence nature of the globalized world. In this part, an attempt is made to briefly make an assessment of the regional capacity in responding to various adversities caused by the war in Ukraine by making reference to six regions, namely; (i) Sub-Saharan Africa (ii) Middle East and North Africa (iii) Eastern Europe and Central Asia (iv) South Asia (v) East Asia and Pacific and (vi) Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sub-Saharan Africa: the majority of the nations in this region are particularly vulnerable to a ‘perfect storm’. In the area, one in every two Africans resides in a nation which is exposed to all three dimensions. In general, the region is especially vulnerable to the financial aspect due to high number of nations that are at danger of debt distress and the food crisis, which is made worse by the severe drought in the Horn of Africa.¹⁸ This year, an addition of 58 million Africans could become impoverished. Currently, 568 million Africans lack access to electricity, which has a significant impact on their ability to access healthcare, education, and income-generating opportunities.¹⁹ The region’s capacity to respond to adversity caused by the war is very low.

Middle East and North Africa: despite the fact that the region has several energy exporters, it is exposed to the energy and financial dimensions, particularly in the Levant and the Maghreb. In the region, there may be 2.8 million more people living in extreme poverty by 2022.²⁰ This data suggests that the region’s capacity to respond to negative socio-economic repercussions of the war in Ukraine will also be weakened, if appropriate interventions are not timely taken.

Eastern Europe and Central Asia: this region is severely exposed to the energy and finance dimensions, given the importance of remittances and energy exports from the Russian Federation. Public debt has increased from 43.2 to 51.7% of GDP between 2019 and 2021. Governments are projected to allocate 11% of their revenues to servicing external debt in 2022. The cost of public borrowing has increased by 89.8% since the start of 2022. The region’s capacity is also weak.

East Asia and the Pacific: the largest countries in this particular region are not severely exposed, yet many small islands developing States in the Pacific are severely exposed to the food and fuel dimensions. In 2022, extreme poverty in the region (including some countries in South Asia) is expected to increase by 2.5 million people and poverty is expected to increase by 8.5 million people.²¹ The region’s capacity to respond to adversity arising from the war in Ukraine is fickle.

The Latin America and the Caribbean: the largest countries in this region are not severely exposed, yet 19 countries face the perfect storm, the second largest group facing all three dimensions, after sub-Saharan Africa. This means that the region’s capacity to respond to adversity caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war is extremely low akin to Sub-Saharan Africa.

South Asia: in this particular region, 0.5 billion people are severely exposed to food and finance dimensions, a situation made worse by severe heat waves affecting the region’s crops. This means that the region’s capacity to respond to socio-economic repercussions of the war in Ukraine is also stumpy. It is fairly deduced that the reviewed regions’ capacity to respond to adversity caused by the Russian-Ukrainian War varies from one region to another, depending on several factors including but not limited to the regions’ economic muscles, political stability and leadership. However, of great concern is that some regions have only been affected by food and finance dimensions such as the Eastern Europe, Central Asia and East Asia and the Pacific as well as Middle East and North Africa. Unfortunately, Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean are severely affected by all three transmission channels: high food prices, energy prices and tightening finances. This suggests that Africa and Latin America are the ‘ugliest’ regions. We now turn to short and long term socio-economic implications of the war.

18 UNDP. The Impact of the War in Ukraine (2021)

19 Estimations by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2021)

20 Estimations by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2022)

21 Estimation by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2022)



4. Short Term Implications

Firstly, it is obvious from the aforesaid justifications that the conflict has considerably worsened short-term prospects for the world economy, portending challenging times ahead. Through a variety of routes, including the commodity and financial markets, trade, migratory links, and confidence, the war is having an impact on world activity. Advanced economies thus have bleaker economic prospects. As terms of trade deteriorate, emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) that import commodities are also likely to experience significant negative effects, a softening of advanced-economy growth, a deceleration in trade, and a substantial tightening of financing conditions due to rising inflation and higher borrowing costs.²² However, if these sudden increases in commodity prices result in a long-term improvement in their respective terms of trade, certain developing countries that export commodities may gain from them.

Secondly, the war increases a number of the short-term outlook's adverse risks. Geopolitical tensions may increase, financial stress would increase, refugee crises would deepen, food shortages would worsen, inflationary pressures would increase, and long-term growth drivers would continue to deteriorate. Due to global vulnerabilities like high debt levels and limited stockpiles of some commodities, like wheat and oil, these risks are probably going to increase. These dangers are interconnected, mutually intensifying, and may cause the world economy to experience a hard landing. In fact, Russia's actions and the responses of other countries have increased the level of geopolitical risk, weakening confidence and likely heralding a period of high policy uncertainty. Due to the uncertainty surrounding a possible escalation, the transfer of economic and political stressors to neighboring nations, more sanctions, or other policy reactions, the war may further destabilize the region. Geopolitical tensions have raised the likelihood of cyber security incidents, including attacks on financial and public infrastructure. High policy uncertainty is linked to poorer trade and investments because businesses are now trying to protect themselves from unfavorable outcomes.

Thirdly, regarding financial stress, the war will exacerbate the risk-off attitude in a number of EMDEs, and rising market volatility will exacerbate financial stress. Market-specific disruptions are a persistent danger due to the significant intraday price swings in various commodities and financial assets. Due to the unexpected volatility of nickel prices, large corporations have already experienced significant margin calls, which have caused transaction cancellations and trading to be suspended. Financial institutions may also experience greater losses than anticipated due to undervalued exposures to Russia, such as through leveraged non-bank financial assistance.

Fourthly, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, more than 4.7 million people have fled their homes. In 2020, there were over 26 million refugees worldwide, with the Syrian civil war being the primary cause of their forced displacement. Globally, the number of refugees was already at a historical high. More people are likely to flee for safety abroad because of the conflict in Ukraine, which has a population more than double that of Syria (44 million compared to 18 million), largely women and children. Accommodating the sudden arrival of a very large number of refugees with extensive needs is a challenge for host countries which puts pressure on public finances and the delivery of basic services. Refugee crises can contribute to social unrest and political polarization if they last longer. Although many may just be in transit, the ratio of migrants to local populations in nations like Moldova and Poland could reach exceptionally high levels. This confirms that concerted efforts are necessary to find a solution to the issue. It is improbable that the two warring nations will end their battle without the assistance of international community.

Fifthly, food and energy insecurity will be made worse by interruptions in commodity production. Major exporters of agricultural products are both Russia and Ukraine, particularly to EMDEs in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Agricultural commodities shipping through ports in Ukraine and Russia is being seriously disrupted by the war, and these delays are likely to last for a considerable amount of time. A prolonged conflict can severely curtail Ukraine's agricultural output in the near term and weigh on future global agricultural output by sharply increasing the price of inputs, including fertilizer. The reduced global availability of grain—wheat in particular—could cause food prices to raise further across EMDEs, triggering a rise in food insecurity.²³

22 Estimations by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2021)

23 UNDP. The Impact of the War in Ukraine (2022)

The consumption baskets of nations that rely heavily on imported grains and oilseeds are at jeopardy. More than 40 nations sponsored by the World Food Program of the United Nations, particularly those in Africa, consume imported cereals for more than 30% of their daily dietary energy.

5. Longer-Term Implications

Firstly, networks of international commerce, industry, and investment might fragment. A number of industries, including those in the food, construction, petrochemical, and transportation sectors, might be severely disrupted by shortages and price increases of the afflicted commodities. Palladium and neon, for instance, are crucial inputs in the manufacture of catalytic converters in the car sector and microchip lithography in the semiconductor industry, both of which have limited supplies. Copper and nickel are both utilized extensively in construction and manufacturing. The majority of the sunflower oil used in cosmetic products is produced in Russia and Ukraine. To the cost of consumers everywhere, global supply chains and trade may react and shift toward more dependable but inefficient producers if interruptions continue.

High commodity prices and the war are likely to exacerbate debt and other fiscal challenges in many EMDEs, particularly commodity importers. Even for energy exporters the benefits of higher prices will be somewhat offset by fossil fuel subsidies; more than 30 EMDEs, including both commodity importers and exporters, subsidize fossil fuels. Fiscal space in many EMDEs had narrowed significantly due to the pandemic, and higher energy prices are likely to further erode fiscal and current account balances in commodity-importing EMDEs. Pressures for food and energy subsidies, trade protectionist measures, and price controls may increase, despite many of them being fiscally costly and poorly targeted. Indeed, already since the war began, there has been a marked acceleration in governments introducing trade restrictive measures on food products and fertilizers. Once in place, these policies are typically difficult to dismantle. A number of countries have also announced plans to ramp up defense spending, putting further pressure on fiscal budgets.

Tanzania and other African nations, for instance, stand to gain from growing demand as European nations gradually wean themselves off of Russian gas. The offshore and non-offshore gas reserves of a number of nations, including Algeria, Tanzania, Senegal, Nigeria, and Mozambique, are sizable. Senegal wants to use the 40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas that was discovered between 2014 and 2017. Tanzania, on the other hand, expects USD 30 billion in foreign investment to launch the building of offshore liquefied natural gas projects in 2023. A 13 billion dollar agreement has already been struck by Algeria, Niger, and Nigeria to build the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline. Concerning peace and security, voting patterns for the United Nations Russia-Ukraine resolution revealed a possible return to Cold War-type strategic alliances that could re-define geo-political realities on the continent. This highlights the sensitivity of the crisis for some African countries,²⁴ perhaps due to the fear of retaliation (disinformation campaigns, election-meddling schemes among others), significant economic dependence, new Russian diplomatic and military engagements (especially in Mali, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Madagascar), pressure to accommodate domestic public opinion on Russia, or the need for countries to preserve their neutrality and non-alignment due to ideological factors.

6. Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this article was to examine how the conflict in Ukraine has affected global human security. The evidence leads to the conclusion that the war has indeed caused and is continuing to cause massive humanitarian crises. Over 12 million people are believed to have been displaced so far, and over 13 million require immediate humanitarian aid. The economy of Ukraine is in ruins. Peoples' exposure to trauma continues to have long-lasting effects. Through a variety of avenues, including commodity markets, trade, financial flows, displaced people, and market confidence, the war is having an impact on the entire global economy. A significant influx of refugees is placing strain on service delivery capacities. Transfers of funding to numerous neighboring nations are hampered by the war's effects to Russia's economy. Disruptions to regional supply chains and financial networks, as well as heightened investor risk perceptions, have paralyzed the regional growth.

24 UNDP. The Impact of the War in Ukraine (2022)



In sum, all nations have been impacted by the war to varied degrees, but if it continues, Sub-Saharan Africa will suffer most due to its weak governance systems, inability to handle the challenges of the war, and feeble economies, among others.

7. Policy Interventions

Firstly, in preparing an effective policy response, it is important to think of the economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on EMDEs as coming in two rounds—one immediate and the other indirect. The war is already affecting the region and the global economy through large and unanticipated changes in the movement of people and commodities, leading to major socio-economic consequences. If protracted, the conflict will affect EMDEs through sizeable debt and equity flows triggered by policies to contain the macroeconomic effects of the first round. These changes could have major fiscal and financial implications. Secondly, global, regional, and national responses are needed. Thus, addressing the worsening humanitarian crisis triggered by the war will require a concerted and coordinated effort by the global community. At the same time, tackling the conflict's spillovers, including unprecedented refugee flows, commodity market disruptions, food insecurity, and increased financial market instability will necessitate an all-inclusive menu of policy priorities. For this reason, policy responses at the national level encompass schooling, health services, safety nets, and other essential services are of paramount importance. Thus, blame shifting will not help. Rather, it is argued that the World needs to cooperate in finding the solution to the crisis. Otherwise, if the war continues, the future is very dismal. The developing countries 'the ugliest' are bound to suffer most compared to the developed countries; herein referred to as 'the good' due to their enhanced capacity to respond to unanticipated adversities such as pandemics, climate change, hunger and financial crises.

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SKILLS DEVELOPMENT: A NEGLECTED COMPONENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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1. Introduction

The primary development problem of our time is regarded to be the economic hardships in developing countries, and in particular Sub-Saharan Africa. Without South Africa, the average per capita income in 2005 was \$477, which was lower than the global average of \$583 for developing nations. Sierra Leone and Zambia have poverty rates as high as almost 70%, and the other nine nations with the relevant survey data for 2000-2005 had rates no lower than about 35%. Underlying the low per capita level and high poverty rate are high rates of unemployment or under-employment and low rates of productivity. Across the continent, policy makers feel under pressure to provide productive job opportunities, particularly to the youth. To do this, the economies have to grow faster. Faster economic growth would require a number pre-conditions which are now familiar—a stable macroeconomic environment, good governance, an environment supportive of the private sector, higher capital investment. However, a critical ingredient that does not usually get the attention it deserves is skills development; skills development to increase productivity, make economies competitive, and to provide increased incentives for investors to provide the capital and to engage in the economic activities that will propel growth. Unfortunately, skills development is expensive, and to be able to afford it on a sustained basis, countries have to grow in order to generate the resources and government revenues required. So, in a sense countries, at least in the short term, face a ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem—they need increased skills to help accelerate growth and employment; but they also need growth in order to finance skills development. Furthermore, although African countries are, relative to other parts of the world, deficient in skilled manpower, they are also confronted with the irony that significant numbers of their trained people end up unemployed, working in areas unrelated to their training or emigrating out of their countries—a misallocation and waste of resources that these countries can ill afford. Skills development is considered as key for productive employment. Hence it is an important means for increased productivity, private-sector development, inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction. Economic diversification and structural change towards high productivity sectors is necessary for combating poverty in a sustainable way. This requires a better skilled and more adaptable labor force which can spur domestic and foreign investment. Linking skills development to broader education and employment, growth and development strategies and systems is essential to ensure relevance, policy coherence, coordination and alignment. Studies show that effective, sustainable approaches to workforce development and employment must improve a combination of skills for employability of individuals, and at the same time build a sustainable system for improved private-sector competitiveness. Especially, youth unemployment resulting from mismatch between the supply of the education system and labor market needs could in part be addressed through adequate skills development within a future-oriented, flexible and holistic education system for lifelong learning. Global mega trends such as the rising role of technology, climate change, demographic shifts, urbanization, and the globalization of value chains are changing the nature of work and skills demands. The development of skills can contribute to structural transformation and economic growth by enhancing employability and labor productivity and helping countries to become more competitive. Investment in a high-quality workforce can create a virtuous cycle, where relevant and quality skills enable productivity growth and foreign direct investment, which result in more and better jobs for the current workforce and more public and private investment in the education and training system. This, in turn, increases the employability and productivity for both the current and future workforce.



Yet, most countries continue to struggle in delivering on the promise of skills development. There are huge gaps in basic literacy and numeracy of working-age populations, as 750 million people aged 15+ (or 18 percent of the global population) report being unable to read and write, with estimates being nearly twice as large if literacy is measured through direct assessments. Large-scale international assessments of adult skills generally point to skills mismatches as well as large variation in the returns to education across fields of study, institutions, and population groups. Employers in many developing countries report that a lack of skilled workers is a major and increasing bottleneck for their operations, affecting their capacity to innovate. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought the pre-crisis vision of equitable, relevant, and quality skills development into sharper relief, adding unforeseen urgency to the calls for reform and highlighting the huge costs of inaction. Despite the fact that several studies have been conducted to examine the importance of youth skills development in developing countries; there are a few if any which have analyzed its implications on national security. This article argues for youth skills development as an integral part of national security in the context of changing security environment. In particular, it explains how a neglect of skills development in developing countries can disturb national security. The article is organized in seven parts. Part one presents an introduction. Part two will cover conceptual clarification. Part three briefly discusses about methods and materials used in the study. Part four describes and states the problem to be examined. Part five covers literature review. Part six discusses and interprets the findings based on document evidence. Part seven, covers two covers some concluding remarks and three core policy recommendations.

2. Conceptual Clarification

2.1 Skills

The notion of skills is ideologically and theoretically contested, as it is often used to mean a variety of things, from technical manual work, to high-level expert knowledge, to scientific and other applied mathematical fields. The term 'skill' has also come to denote a set of training activities both before and in employment. Winch¹ argues the concept of skill, as it is used in the labour market, expresses the view that to possess a skill is to have mastered a technique for carrying out a type of task within a work situation, traditionally within a context of a trade but in technically orientated occupations as well. In relation to youth employment, the term 'skills' has tended to refer more to programs such as vocational training, learnerships, internships, graduate placement programs and other such processes, which are aimed at facilitating the transition from school (and higher education) to employment. From a more conceptual and theoretical point of view, the notion of skills has been seen to result in the instrumentalisation of education to meet the demands of the labour market, whereas education's primary objective is to retain its intrinsic value of providing knowledge for knowledge's sake. Skills have also been presented as a 'solution' i.e. what Motala et al.,² define as a 'social and economic panacea' to developmental problems confronting society. In a paper entitled 'What are skills?' Allais³ criticizes the notion of 'skills as tasks' as a narrow way of defining skills which tends to be decontextualised from power, social policy and the structuring of the labour market. In Argentina, a similar debate is present between the narrow perspective related to the interventions of the Labour Ministry and the larger academic perspective of the Ministry of Education. It is argued that skills refer to different types of knowledge about work, related not only to the concrete task that needs to be performed, but also to the 'know how' that is used in that performing and to the capacity to face conflict situations. This last type of knowledge was called knowledge about situation.⁴ McGrath⁵ contends that the notion of skill has shifted from an input orientated concept of 'Education and Training' to an outcomes-orientated perspective, due to the rise of globalization and the increasing dominance of market-led ideologies in society. The differing perspectives on what constitute skill and the search for a common language has implications for statisticians, researchers and labour market research in general.

- 1 Winch, C. 'Skill- a Concept Manufactured in England?' in Brockmann, M., Clarke, L. and Winch, E. (Eds), *Knowledge, Skills and Competence in the European Labour Market. What's in a vocational qualification?* Abingdon and New York: Routledge, pp.85-101.1 (2011)
- 2 Motala, E., Vally, S. and Spreen, C.A. 'Transforming Education and Training, or Reconstituting Power and Privilege?' In Desai, A., Maharaj, B. and Bond, P. (Eds.), *Zuma's Own Goal*. Trenton: Africa World Press, pp. 241-259 (2010).
- 3 See Allais on definition of skill (2011)
- 4 Spinosa, M. 'Los saberes y el trabajo. Ensayo sobre una articulación posible.' in *Anales de la educación Común* 2(4) (2010)
- 5 McGrath, S. 'Vocational Education and Training for Development: A Policy in Need of a Theory?' *International Journal of Educational Development* 32(5): 623-631 (2012)

The notion of skills is central to the various distinctions between members of the labour force and subsequently the bargaining levels for purposes of remuneration. There is a more critical view within the South African literature,⁶ which contends that the mainstream explanations of a 'skills shortage' are not only insufficient but also paralyzing: 'The nation, and regrettably it seems even organizations of the working class, is hostage to a particular way of thinking and are largely paralyzed by it. In this thinking the main proposition is the idea that there is a great shortage of skills in our society and that in particular areas of skills these are so critical as to make any possibilities for economic advancement in particular sectors of the economy unimaginable; that the education and training system is hopelessly in concurrent with the demands of the economy, that the lack of skills is one of the (if not the) greatest obstacles to achieving high levels of economic growth, that the lack of skills is the primary cause for low levels of productivity, and the country cannot compete internationally given this poverty of skills and will therefore fall further behind relative to the developed and other developing economies of the world.'⁷ To succeed in the 21st century labor market, one needs a comprehensive skill set composed of:

- (i) **Cognitive skills:** which encompass the ability to understand complex ideas, adapt effectively to the environment, learn from experience, and reason. Foundational literacy and numeracy as well as creativity, critical thinking, and problem-solving are cognitive skills.
- (ii) **Socio-emotional skills:** which describe the ability to navigate interpersonal and social situations effectively, and include leadership, teamwork, self-control, and grit.
- (iii) **Technical skills:** which refer to the acquired knowledge, expertise, and interactions needed to perform a specific task, including the mastery of required materials, tools, or technologies.
- (iv) **Digital skills:** which are cross-cutting and draw on all of the above skills, and describe the ability to access, manage, understand, integrate, communicate, evaluate, and create information safely and appropriately

2.2 Skills Development

Skills development is generally used to refer to the productive capabilities acquired through all levels of learning and training, occurring in formal, non-formal, informal and on-the-job settings. It enables individuals to become fully and productively engaged in livelihoods, and to have the opportunity to adapt these capabilities to meet the changing demands and opportunities of economy and labor market. The acquisition of such capabilities depends on many factors, including a quality lifelong learning system and a supportive learning environment. The types of skills required for employment can be divided into: (i) Basic and foundation skills, which are acquired through the primary and secondary formal school system or through non-formal and/or informal learning processes (e.g. active learning, oral expression, reading comprehension, written expression, and ICT literacy, active listening). These are pre-requisites for acquiring further skills enhancing the prospect of sustainable employment (ii) Transferable skills, which include the abilities to learn and adapt, solve problems, communicate ideas effectively, think critically and creatively and the ability to manage self and others. These skills enable people to adapt to different work environments as well as improving their opportunities to career-building. (iii) Technical and vocational skills, which are specialized skills, knowledge or know-how to perform specific duties or tasks, mainly in a professional environment. These include, but are not limited to, the traditional forms of technical and vocational education and training (TVET), skills acquired through the secondary level of the formal school system or through non-formal and/or informal learning processes. (iv) Professional and personal skills, including individual attributes relevant to work such as honesty, integrity, reliability, work ethic, and judgment.

2.3 National Security

For the purpose of this study, the broadest sense of national security is adopted to include military and the non-military dimensions to cover a wide spectrum of issues of economic, social, cultural, human, health, ecological and energy aspects of what national security entails. If one of these elements is threatened, then we can conclude that a particular society is under threat and thus insecure. This broad definition is not substantially exhaustive but for the sake of simplicity and to avoid confusion this definition will be used.

6 Motala, E., Vally, S. and Spreen, C.A. 'Transforming Education and Training, or Reconstituting Power and Privilege?' In Desai, A., Maharaj, B. and Bond, P. (Eds.), *Zuma's Own Goal*. Trenton: Africa World Press, pp. 241-259 (2010)

7 Ibid (2010)



The definition includes defending, preserving and safeguarding territorial integrity, national values and national interests for survival and prosperity. Also the word ‘security’ as used in this study means freedom from fear or any threats.

3. Method and Materials

This study is basically a qualitative desk research based on detailed document analysis. Being a scholarly review, it did not use data collection procedures or statistical methodologies employed by the positivist researchers. Instead, the study examines how lack of integration between youth skills development programs and national security education impairs effective implementation of the current skills development programs in developing countries by using the readily accessible and available public domain documents. To do that, information and data, both academic and non-academic documents such as written unpublished papers, journal articles, reports, and case studies were scientifically reviewed. The contents were located on several websites of reputable publishers and organizations using search engines. Using the keywords ‘Youth Skills Development and National Security’; a Google Chrome internet search was done. The researcher was able to collect, evaluate, and interpret relevant data by synthesizing rich data drawn from different sources to derive the intended meanings. However, despite being theoretical review, its key findings, recommendations and conclusions were drawn from reliable empirical data

4. Statement of Problem

Lack of integration between skills development programs and national security education among youths is the main concern examined in this paper. It is argued that lack of skills among youth is not necessarily a cause of political unrest but a powerful enabler which is neglected and incoherent to national security. The central thesis is that the current youth skills development programs cannot deliver sustained results, if they are planned and implemented in isolation with national security strategies. This is because highly skilled people create jobs and skilled people can be absorbed into employment when jobs are created. Also entrepreneurs can create jobs, particularly when the entrepreneurs themselves are skilled. In addition, skilled people can become self-employed and create income generating entities that sustain their livelihoods. As opposed to lowly skilled people, highly skilled people are more likely to adapt to the changing needs of the economy and thereby remain in employment. Unfortunately, the current Africa’s labour market is characterized by low levels of education and skills. Many of those leaving formal education do so without the requisite basic life skills. In effect, graduates are viewed by employers as not being adequately prepared to work in the corporate world and as a consequence, a sizeable number of youth [although educated] end up being unemployed. This increases the possibility of youth to engage in criminal activities. They are likely to develop hatred against the government due to either grievance or feelings of being relatively deprived of their rights at the expense of few elites who are enjoying the national cake. Worst of all, youth skills development programs are chaotically implemented, seriously underfunded and understaffed, let alone the incapacity of the skills training providers to deliver quality training.

5. Related Literature

5.1 Youth Unemployment and Political instability

Across the globe, the recent financial and economic crisis has led to soaring youth unemployment. However, before the crisis, the job situation, including youth unemployment, was already a major concern in most of the countries. In Africa for instance, youth unemployment is exacerbated by the additional challenges of a youth population which is considerably higher than other regions, weak national labour markets and persistently high levels of poverty. 70 percent of the region’s population is under the age of 30, and slightly more than 20 percent are young people between the ages of 15 to 24.² More recently, the North Africa region, which has the world’s highest youth unemployment rates and where one in four young people is reported as jobless, experienced violent social uprisings in which young people played a critical role. Numerous studies argue that youth unemployment and underemployment are threat to the social, economic and political stability of nations.⁸ This statement follows the increasing body of literature on the causes of political instability and conflicts.⁹

8 Urdal, H. The devil in the demographics: The effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict, 1950–2000. *Social Development Papers*, 14, 1–25 (2004)

9 Collier, P. et al., *Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy* (2000)

Cross country evidences suggest two main lines of theorizing. One set of theories stresses the role that political repression plays in driving conflict. In this view, ethnic groups that experience discrimination should be the most likely to organize armed insurrections against the state, and conflicts should be most likely to erupt in undemocratic states and those with pronounced social divisions.¹⁰ This is also likely to happen in less divided society, but where people feel marginalized because of lack of job or extreme poverty. A second set of theories focuses on economic conditions as paramount, rather than political factors. In other words, in this view, poverty and falling income is the key to sparking civil conflicts. This may either be because poverty breeds armed violence aimed at looting assets and natural resources or because poor states simply have limited institutional capacity to repress armed uprisings. Thus, Urdal¹¹ shows that large youth populations—youth bulge—are sometimes linked to outbreaks of violence. According to him, demographic trends and pressures are creating tensions that lead to the outbreak of low-intensity conflict such as protests or riots, or more organized political upheaval and internal armed conflict. This means that the demographic transition is a big challenge for developing countries with large youth populations. Similarly, Collier¹² has suggested that large youth cohorts may be a factor that reduces recruitment costs through the abundant supply of rebel labor with low opportunity cost and so increases the risk of armed conflict. If young people are left with no alternative but unemployment and poverty, they are more likely to join a rebellion as an alternative way of generating an income. According to this point of view, rebellion is feasible only when the potential gain from joining is so high and the expected costs so low that rebel recruits will favor joining over alternative income-earning opportunities. The role of the labor market in the explanation of civil violence outbreak has also been emphasized in the literature. If the labor market cannot absorb a sudden surplus of young job-seekers, a large pool of unemployed youths will generate strong frustration. The socioeconomic problems associated with youth bulges may provide fertile ground for recruitment to terrorist organizations. Other authors emphasize on the role of the expansion of higher education as a strategy to reduce the risk of political violence. Higher levels of education among men may act to reduce the risk of political violence. Other authors emphasize on the role of the expansion of higher education as a strategy to reduce the risk of political violence. Higher levels of education among men may act to reduce the risk of political violence. These findings suggest that political instability occurs particularly in countries where youth unemployment, as well as social inequalities and corruption are high. Our results are conclusive and add to the literature that asserts that economic conditions are the most critical determinants triggering political instability in developing countries. In order to avoid instability and violence, focus should be on monitoring economic opportunities for young people, and particularly on providing employment or invest in life skills development programs. Creating viable jobs for young people is a precondition for sustainable development and peace in all countries; and particularly in countries which have already experienced violent conflict. Without a doubt, unemployment is a threat to political stability in Africa. The theory of deprivation also explains the relationship between insecurity and unemployment. This does not mean that all unemployed young people are potential terrorists but rather suggests considering youth unemployment as an additional push factor in violence. Following Ted Robert Gurr's theory on relative deprivation,¹³ violence does not take root in absolute deprivation but rather in relative deprivation. Thus, specific attention should be paid to the particular patterns of youth unemployment where highly qualified, educated young people suffer more from unemployment than any other group. This widens the gap between individuals' expectations (job, salary, and lifestyle) and reality within broader segments of the population than merely unemployed lower-class people. Added to the mismatch between education skills and the labour market, the lack of economic opportunities for educated people contributes to exacerbating the gap between expectations and reality and thereby feeds the feeling of relative deprivation. In a broader perspective, recent research on Arab youth confirmed Gurr's theory: the drivers of political violence are rooted in the sense of injustice, discrimination, corruption, and abuse by security forces. In this respect, one of the most counterproductive risks of the security approach is to make room for practices that could further push vulnerable individuals into violent extremism.¹⁴

- 10 Mihyo et al., *Urban Youth Unemployment in Eastern and Southern Africa Features, Challenges, Consequences and Cutback Strategies*, Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) (2015)
- 11 Urdal, H. The devil in the demographics: The effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict, 1950–2000. *Social Development Papers*, 14, 1–25 (2004)
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According to the paper by¹⁵ large rate of youth unemployment makes countries more unstable at all. The research tried to show the effect of youth unemployment on political instability using a sample covering 24 developing countries over the period 1980–2010, a 30 years panel data. The paper finds that youth unemployment is significantly associated with an increase in the risk of political instability. Finally, the research recommended that large youth unemployment rate associated with socioeconomic inequalities and corruption makes countries more vulnerable to political instability and national insecurity especially in poor countries. The study by¹⁶ examines the microeconomic determinants of youth unemployment in the MENA region using a unique and novel data on young people aged 15–29 from the year 2016. The results show that being a male and graduated from a public school increase the probability of being unemployed. Moreover, job concerns, corruption, and unequal rights in the society are also found to have a positive incidence on unemployment. However, it was found that gender equality in the labor market, education, family codes, and political participation decreases the probability of employment. Similarly, the results indicate that improving economic inclusion in the post-Arab spring decreases the probability of unemployment. Apolte and Gerling¹⁷ investigated the link between armed insurrection and large youth cohorts using cross-country panel data from 169 countries. They develop a model of insurrection markets and integrate the youth bulge as measured by the relative youth cohort size. They find that it is not the demographic structure or the relative size of the youth cohort as such but rather the reality of large youth populations facing significant unemployment that coincides with insurrection. By testing their implications in an empirical model based on cross country panel data and find that the effect of the relative youth cohort size on insurrection outbreaks is moderated by changes in the underlying institutional setting, and more precise changes in the labour-market conditions as approximated by unemployment rates. While statistical analysis may be useful in establishing broad trends, a great deal of criticism has been leveled against how these studies have causally linked violence with unemployment in African countries.¹⁸ The study by Collier¹⁹ shows that large youth cohorts may be a factor that reduces recruitment costs through the abundant supply of labour with low opportunity cost and it increases the risk of armed conflict. If young people are left with unemployment and poverty, they are more likely to join a rebellion as an alternative way of generating an income. The author also recommended that the expansion of higher education as a strategy to reduce the risk of political violence. Since educated men have better income earning opportunities than the uneducated, they would have more to lose and hence be less likely to join a rebellion. Paul Collier, former Director of the Research Development Department of the World Bank, has suggested that relatively large youth cohorts may be a factor that reduces recruitment costs through the abundant supply of rebel labour with low opportunity cost, increasing the risk of armed conflict. According to the opportunity perspective, rebellion is feasible only when the potential gain from joining a rebel or terrorist organization is so high and the expected costs so low that certain individuals will favor joining over alternative income-earning opportunities. Urdal²⁰ examined the effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict. The research hypotheses are tested in an event history statistical model covering a high number of countries and politically dependent areas over the period 1950–2000. The study finds robust support for the hypothesis that youth bulges increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, and especially so under conditions of economic stagnation. He notes that while youth bulges are strongly associated with increased levels of domestic armed conflict, the reasons for this are not easily generalized, cannot be assumed, and must be empirically investigated. However, the combination of youth bulges and widespread unemployment increases the likelihood of violence, particularly when young people cannot easily migrate away from their societies in search of a better life as they did in 19th century Europe. Amirali²¹ investigates the relationship between the youth bulge and political unrest to understand when and why young Iraqis resort to violence or disruption. In Iraq, widespread youth unemployment combines with high levels of political exclusion, sectarian politics, militarization, perceptions of injustice, frustrated aspirations, war-related trauma, and the rapid breakdown and transformation of traditional institutions such as family and tribe.

- 15 Azeng, et al., Youth unemployment and political instability in selected developing countries. African Development Bank (2013)
- 16 Fakih, A., Haimoun, N., & Kassem, M. Youth unemployment, gender and institutions during transition: Evidence from the Arab Spring. Social Indicators Research, 150(1), 311–336 (2020)
- 17 Apolte, T., & Gerling, L. Youth bulges, insurrections, and politico-economic institutions: Theory and empirical evidence (No. 3/2015). Discussion Paper, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (2015).
- 18 Oosterom, M. A., Youth Employment and Citizenship: Problematising Theories of Change, K4D Emerging Issues Report, Institute of Development Studies (2018)
- 19 Collier, P. (2000). Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy.
- 20 Urdal, H., & Hoelscher, K. Explaining urban social disorder and violence: An empirical study of event data from Asian and sub-Saharan African cities. International Interactions, 38(4), 512–528 (2012).
- 21 See Amirali on youth unemployment and their effects on political instability (2005)

Together, these factors (and others not covered in this review) produce violence in specific moments. A systematic study of how Iraq's youth 'bulge' affects the country's political dynamics is warranted. Similarly, Sambanis,²² the empirical analysis does indeed suggest young male bulges are more likely to increase the risk of conflict in societies where male secondary education is low. This suggests that the availability of large cohorts of poorly educated youth can support armed conflict. Saylor²³ undertook a study on the unemployment and implications for social and political conflict in Zimbabwe. The study showed that for the last three decades, Zimbabwean youth have been involved as main factors behind the social unrest and violent activities in the country. This paper argues that dissatisfaction and frustration of youth especially graduate urban youth are regarded as one of the major threats to social and political instability. The paper also presents various challenges Zimbabwean youth face and their implications to social and political conflict. The paper discussed the major causes of youth unemployment such as: sluggish investment and growth, weak export performance, population growth rate, geography, poor macroeconomic policy, and the growth path. The paper suggests that there should be land reform, but land reform without the creation of youth employment is only leading to the alienation of youth groups that will fight against the establishment. Thomas²⁴ focuses on addressing youth unemployment in Morocco examines the challenges related to youth unemployment and how Morocco, as a country with high rates of youth unemployment, can benefit from international experiences. High youth unemployment has potentially severe implications on overall economic stability and social cohesion. The issue of youth unemployment must be addressed promptly when youth unemployment rates are high. Research points to a strong correlation between youth unemployment and socio-economic and political instability. If prolonged, youth unemployment can lead to negative consequences at both the individual and societal level. This paper suggests that to tackle its youth unemployment problem Morocco can use policies resulting from lessons learned internationally such as active labour market policies, more adequate minimum wage settings, more flexible contracts, initiatives to acquire new skills related to current technological changes; and finally, more public-private partnerships (PPP). The issue of youth unemployment must be addressed when youth unemployment rates are high because of the strong link between youth unemployment and socio-economic and political instability. If prolonged, youth unemployment can lead to negative consequences at both individual and social level. A study by²⁵ addresses the effect of youth unemployment on security in Kenya. The study used both qualitative and quantitative research approaches and the investigation utilized a descriptive research design. Qualitative research design was used and the target population was leaders drawn from the youth, police, Kwale County government officials, national government administration officers in Kwale County, and the religious sector. The study utilized both primary and secondary data. The researcher used questionnaires for the majority of leaders, interviews for key informants, and focused group discussion for the youth leaders. The study has argued that youth unemployment in Kwale County has been securitized with a majority of leaders terming unemployed youth as a threat to security. Therefore, the paper concluded that unemployed youth end up engaging in crime and another effect of unemployment is hopelessness leading to drug and alcohol abuse. The reviews conducted above indicate that previous studies have made an effort to examine the effects of youth unemployment on political instability. However, despite several efforts made to address the problem of poorly skilled youths, to the best of our knowledge, the available empirical evidence is still disjointed and inadequate to warrant significant policy reforms more so in developing countries and hence, maximum research efforts are still needed for deepening our understanding of the topic. Currently, there are few studies that have examined the nexus between youth skills development and national security. From the Relative Deprivation theory, this seeks to fill that knowledge gap with the aim of contributing to the understanding of subject.

5.2 Skills Development and National Security in Developing Countries

A myriad of empirical studies in developing countries have concluded that lowly skilled youth are likely to engage in criminal activities, if no appropriate state interventions are taken to address the problem. The main argument of this line of thinking is that lack of the requisite skills among youth 'facilitates' the occurrence of political instabilities but not the major cause. In other words, a dearth of skills creates a fertile ground for political violence to occur.

- 22 Sambanis, N. A review of recent advances and future directions in the quantitative literature on civil war. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 13(3), 215–243 (2002)
- 23 Saylor, C. J. (2016). *Unemployment and implications to social and political Conflict: perspectives from Zimbabwe*. IOSR-JRME, (2016)
- 24 Thomas, M. *Frictional, Structural and Cyclical Unemployment Defined* (2015)
- 25 Riechi, B. *Youth Unemployment and Security in Kenya: The Case of Kwale County (2010–2018)* (Doctoral dissertation, United States International University-Africa) (2019)



26 The main problem according to this line of argument is the widening and deepening mismatch between skills supply in developing countries including Tanzania is weakly prepared to respond to the changing demands in the labor markets. Research by McKinsey Global Institute²⁷ of skills variance globally relies on educational qualifications but suggests that mismatches tend to vary by levels of development. Generally, (i) Low-income countries tend to have employment concentrated in low-skill jobs overall but face a surplus of workers with low-level skills alongside a shortage of workers to fill critical (if fairly limited) jobs requiring mid-level skills; (ii) Mid-income countries tend to have roughly balanced supply and demand for workers with low-level and mid-level skills but face significant shortages of highly skilled workers to fill emerging occupations requiring advanced skills; and (iii) Advanced countries tend to face skills mismatch characterized by having a surplus of workers with mid-level skills alongside a shortage of workers with advanced skills. Overall, the study predicts that in future, there will be global shortages of high-skilled (advanced) and medium-skilled workers, and a surplus of low-skilled workers. This finding suggests the probability of political chaos to also increase in future.

5.3 Principles and Approaches to Effective Skills Development

Adopting demand-led models: An active involvement of local communities, employers, unions, and other social partners is crucial for planning, carrying out and following up of responsive skills development programs. It helps the training providers to better understand the variety of needs in the workplaces and respond appropriately. Such interaction will create win-win relationships between the world of learning and training and the world of work.

Ensuring quality training: Well qualified teachers are important for improving quality of training. Thus, investing in training of teachers, trainers and managers is decisive for quality. Interaction with the world of work is also crucial for improving the quality of learning and training activities. Improved quality in turn increases the attractiveness of skills training programs. Apprenticeship training is one way to make employers more actively involved in skills development and contributing to the improvement of quality.

Enhanced capacity of delivery: In many low-income countries skills development trainers are poorly equipped to meet the required needs for adequate and quality training. Investment in infrastructure, facilities, equipment and materials to meet the ever growing and changing demands of the world of work requires incentives and support mechanisms to stimulate and improve training capacity ensuring broad and continued access to quality training and skills development, including quality counseling. It is essential to foster opportunities and benefits of initial and lifelong learning for all, including disadvantaged young people who have dropped out of school or are working in the informal sector under precarious conditions. The participation of women in skills training should be ensured and gender stereotyping in occupational choice should be actively discouraged.

Effective labour market forecasting and information: Up-to-date labour market information and forecasting is important for matching current and future labour market needs for skills with the supply of skills. Such a system will provide necessary information for short-term and long-term planning as well as provide disaggregated data to track changes in labour market outcomes for different population groups (women, youth, the disabled and minority groups). Mechanisms for efficient recognition, validation and accreditation of skills: Such a system is necessary to allow for multiple paths for further learning and training (formal, non-formal and/or informal) and for the mobility of the workforce. Furthermore, such mechanisms for efficient recognition, validation and accreditation need to be developed with active participation of labour market actors.

6. Analysis and Discussion

Based on the above examination, it is quite evident that there is a close relationship between skills development and national security. Education system which produces substantial number of young graduates who are not employed or which does not offer life skills to its graduates is more susceptible to political instability. Most of the time unemployment gives birth to political instability in a country because unemployed persons (youth) are easily lured and thus can participate in criminal activities. They consider that government is worthless, which fails to provide them work. In

26 Urdal, H. The devil in the demographics: The effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict, 1950–2000. Social Development Papers, 14, 1–25 (2004)

27 McKinsey Global Institute. The World at Work: Jobs, Pay, and Skills for 3.5 Billion People (2012)

Africa, where the dependence ratio on government is very high, people tend to resort to any means to retaliate to get their issues addressed. This implies that countries that have succeeded to match educational skills and labor market demands are less likely to experience political violence. Empirical evidence abounds to prove that in most African countries akin to Tanzania the labor market is incapable of absorbing a huge number of educated youth. As a consequence, the tendency has always been to create a huge number of job-seekers rather than wealth creators. If this problem is not addressed, chances are that unemployed youth may resort to criminal activities. The socio-economic problems linked to youth bulges may provide fertile ground for recruitment to terrorist organizations, drug trafficking and armed robbery. However, this position does not claim that for a country to be secure, all educated youths must be formally employed but rather underlines the importance of government investments in youth skills development programs. Empirical evidence proves that most of the African countries do not invest in youth skills development programs for reason that they are extremely expensive and time consuming. Even if they do, such programs are implemented in a chaotic fashion, seriously underfunded and staffed and worst of all; skills development plans and national security they are not implemented in an integrated manner. The designing, adoption and implementation of skills development programs always does not take into account the issues to do with national security. Although it is true that youth skills development programs are quite costly, their benefits far outweigh the costs of not investing in them. The reason being insecurity is more costly than security. Thus, neglecting youth skills development is simply compromising national peace and security in developing countries as high youth unemployment rate make these countries more susceptible to political instability and national insecurity. It is argued that skills development plans are an integral part of the national security as the former (skills development) feeds the latter (national security).

7. Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations

The aim of this article was to examine how lack of integration between skills development and national security education impairs the successful implementation of skills development programs in developing countries. It is argued that all attempts to implement skills development programs among youth which do not take into account issues of national security strategies/awareness is bound to fail. It has been established that unemployment is one of the key factors causing political violence in developing economies akin to Tanzania. Skills development programs can only produce their intended objectives; if youth understand clearly the value of preserving and cherishing national interests and thus national security. Or else, assuming that they know is simply deceiving ourselves. Governments should strive to address the problem of skills mismatch. This paper offers the following three types of policy recommendations:-

i) Integrating Skills Development programs to National Security Education

Over the last two decades the experience has shown that in many developing countries akin to Tanzania the development and implementation of youth skills development programs is not linked to national security strategies. Lack of integration between youth skills development plans and national security strategies has impaired successful implementation of skills development initiatives. As a consequence, majority of youth graduates whose skills are unwanted in the labor markets may cause grievances among frustrated youths. As a matter of fact, joblessness among educated and frustrated young people may lead into political instability. Lack of national security awareness coupled with frustrations; contrary to their expectations; increases vulnerability of the unemployed youth to engage in criminal businesses such as terrorism and drugs trafficking. Put differently, the combination of youth bulges and widespread unemployment increases the likelihood of violence, particularly when young people cannot easily migrate away from their societies in search of a better life and they do not see any other better coping options.

ii) Skills Development as a Component in National Planning

International experience suggests that it is critical for countries to develop strong national strategy and planning for skills development that is coordinated and aligned with national economic, industrial, and sector growth strategies. Sound strategies and planning are prerequisites for ensuring that skills development effectively aligns skills supply with skills demand and promotes improvements in worker employability, industry productivity and competitiveness, and dynamism and inclusiveness of economic growth. Skills development should be prominently cast into a country's national planning as a top priority and central pillar supporting long-term economic and social development goals, and must be backed up by increased government financing. A holistic plan at the national level with sufficient political and financial support is critical to guide line ministries and training providers to align efforts.

iii) Refocusing and Rebalancing Education Policy to align with the Skill Needs

Education policies in developing countries explicitly or implicitly prioritize advanced and highly specialized education programs focused on developing a small number of elite experts (i.e., 'experts' with the intention to stimulate technological innovation and spur rapid growth. However, to achieve economic modernization and maximize the



economic benefits from technology, the right proportion of ‘experts’ and workers with basic hard and soft skills is required. Economies need ‘experts’ to innovate and develop new technologies, and also require a workforce with at least basic skills to implement technology in production. Education systems need to thus strengthen both top-down and bottom-up approaches to generate the optimal mix of ‘experts’ and workers with basic hard and soft skills required in the current labor market and an emerging economy. This will reduce the problem of skills mismatch in developing countries.

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SUCCESSION POLITICS AS A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: THE CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATION



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1. Introduction

Succession politics is understood to mean the process of changing leadership and includes the vacating of power by the old ruler, the choice of the new, and his or her legitimation. Periods of succession are often tense for all regimes; even periods of succession are often tense for all regimes, even where there are established procedures and easy legitimation. Succession times are considerably more risky and precarious for tyrannical, authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. The discussion of succession presents a contested and topical issue in Africa. Political succession has shown that leaders in African countries manipulate and exploit state apparatus for their interests at the expense of promoting an efficient, effective and responsive government characterized by peace, stability, democracy and the growth of the political economy.¹ This view is compounded by muzzling dissent, cumulating in strong personalities and weak institutions. The argument of strong personalities and weak political institutions has wide application in Africa, since some leaders view political leadership as a solo project rather than a collective political process. Thus, passing the baton unto the next leader has been a challenge resulting in the personalization of governments and political parties by leaders. Political and administrative organs are crucial components for the effective functioning and development of nations since there is a direct correlation between the configuration of the political architecture and the functionality of the administrative apparatus of the state. The political dynamics of a state influence changes in the administrative leadership, since the political architecture determines the turnover of administrative staff. This is why regular transfer of power is the major test of stability in a nation's political system. In many African countries leaders have shown a consistent trajectory of amending state constitutions so as to prolong their stay in power.

Crucially, leadership succession in African politics has been one of the major sources of conflict in Africa. This problem stems from both political party levels and systemic levels. Political parties serve as the main instruments of mass mobilization for political participation and for democratization. In addition, many African political parties suffer from democratic weaknesses just like the State that make succession politics conflictive. The conflict resulting from succession politics acquires ethnic, class and elitist nature as it degenerates into violence. This violence and systemic disturbance due to succession conflicts ultimately threaten the peace and stability in Africa. However, all is not lost; the succession posture is not completely murky in Africa, as several countries offer good examples of peaceful and orderly leadership change. These include, most importantly, Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, Mozambique, and Ghana.² Despite the few good examples of routine regime change, it is clear that incumbent leaders in many African countries have seized power from both political parties and governments. The result is a stifling of leadership renewal and reconfiguration of governance structures resulting in the collapse of administrative units and statutory state organs. This article explains how succession politics can be a menace to peace and security. It argues for constitutionalism and democratization as remedies to succession crises in Africa. The article is organized in five parts. The first part covers an introduction. Part two covers a brief historical account of succession politics in Africa. Part three discusses the drivers of succession politics. Part four offers some concluding remarks. Part five offers some policy recommendations.

¹ Afro barometer (2015)

² Habisso, T. 'Politics of succession: coping when leaders die', African Renewal, (2011).



2. History of Succession Politics

Historically, the term succession was applied to monarchies, signifying the substitution and replacement of one sovereign by another.³ They further aver that in hereditary monarchies there tend to be less frequent clashes over the authentic or legitimate heir or beneficiary. In most monarchical regimes, traditional authority was recognized as legitimate by virtue of tradition, custom, and the veneration of previous generations.⁴ Under this form of political system, laws and customs are handed down from earlier generations to validate the existing political structure,⁵ and the transmission of authority is normally heritable in monarchies. Thus, there are few if any succession problems since there is a solitary succession framework that is usually followed after the death of the monarch. The progressive bureaucratic state has embraced a legally-sanctioned rational succession procedure in which authority is derived from a system of rules that is agreed to by the population. In this rational procedure, states become progressively bureaucratic, monarchs either become figureheads or disappear, and government shifts to political parties and party coalitions.⁶ Most modern states have shifted from the traditional/ monarchical succession framework to that of legal-rational succession. The succession problem in Africa, however, seems to be characterized by the postcolonial state coupled with political power as a means to accumulate riches.⁷ This results in the gradual attrition of the constitutive and regulative rules, institutional processes and mechanism for succession leading to political volatility, illegitimate governments and conflict. Among others, most of the succession conflicts witnessed today in African countries are caused by voracious hunger for political power. For example in Kenya, conflict over succession has largely been constitutionally driven, that is, candidates have accepted the legitimacy of the constitution and the provisions which regulate succession. Secondly, political murder and assassination have intimidated potential successors narrowing the range and scope of conflict over succession. Thirdly, conflict regarding succession has been predominantly issue-driven, that is, Section 2(A), licensing of political rallies and constitution reforms has meant that conflict is contained within the existing political framework. Finally, all political conflicts in Kenya has been elite dominated, as stake holders in the Kenyan state the competing elites are willing to contain conflict so as not to threaten stability and peace.

3. Drivers of Succession Politics in Africa

▪ Personality Politics

Many political parties in Africa in practice centrally consolidate power in the person of the party leader (and/or chairman). This entity is always on the political frontline and uses this position to personalize power and almost the party. Political parties have instead turned subjects of arbitrary abuse by party leaders if not sinews of total power for party leaders. They are therefore driven by interests of party leaders and not founding values, principles and ideologies thereby losing their institutional character.⁸ It is from these political interests, patrimonial relations are often built.

Party leaders have unbridled influence on the political parties to the extent that party membership, delegates and officials only play a cheerleading role that builds party leaders into powerful political totems. This helps them to develop loyalty structures from the party down to the local support bases. Party leaders become unquestionable and those who contend with party leaders' positions and style are perceived enemies of the party and, in case of the ruling party, enemies of government. This almost politically deifies party leaders and absolves them from internal party competition that necessitates espousal of political succession principles.

President Jomo Kenyatta enjoyed torrential party support due to his charisma and liberation legacy during his chairmanship of Kenya African National Union (KANU).⁹ The question of his succession in the party was therefore muted until his death. This led to factionalism that embarked on vicious power struggle to replace Kenyatta within the party arousing tensions across the country and among political elites.

3 Hughes, A & May, R 'The politics of succession in Black Africa', Third World Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1–22 (1998)

4 Hughes, A & May, R 'The politics of succession in Black Africa', Third World Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1–22 (1998)

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9 Mwaura, N. C. Political Succession and Related Conflicts in Kenya. A paper prepared for the USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Greater Horn of Africa held at Methodist Guest House, Nairobi, (1997).

In Uganda, National Resistance Movement (NRM) has been under President Yoweri Museveni's total influence since 1986. Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) was under total influence of President Robert Mugabe since the country's independence in 1980 until his military-aided ouster in 2017. Tanzania's Chama cha Mapinduzi was under President Julius Nyerere from 1961 until 1985 when he retired. During their hold onto power within their respective political parties, the question of political leadership succession was and is not tolerated.

Lack of internal party democracy arouses resentment and splintering which then clutters democratic space with a multitude of parties. For example in 2004 in Malawi, National Democratic Alliance (NDA) broke away from United Democratic Front (UDF), Republican Party broke away from Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and three more new parties emerged, giving the ruling party victory in the presidential poll over many splinter parties.¹⁰ This failed basic standards of democratic competition and goals. This proliferation of political parties obfuscates political discourse, detaching many political parties from the society they seek to represent.¹¹ This can lead to political entropy. Most of these parties are ethno-regional which perpetuates ethnic conflict around resource and power distribution in African countries. Regional and ethnic mobilization of these parties also disintegrates African nations into ethnic enclaves, further Balkanizing a country.

▪ **One Party-Rule Hangover**

Many post-independence African ruling political parties through tact and might consolidated power ultimately creating single-party states across Africa. Mali, South Africa, Senegal, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya among others became single party states. The ruling elites justified though never adequately, the development, as rooted in African political philosophy. Ruling parties centralized power and even banned other political parties, as happened in Kenya in 1969 when Kenya People's Union (KPU) was banned and Kenya was made a one party (KANU) state by law in 1982. They fused party structures with government machinery and party manifestos (and decisions) with public policy blurring the line between party and government. This ensured that they wield total power. This wielding of total power and lock-down on other political parties created more political conflicts across Africa, as elites fought off one party tyranny. In Kenya, politics turned tumultuous since the banning of other parties in 1969 and even more turbulent since 1982, as opposition elites led the clamor for multi-party democracy against a repressive regime. However, single party rule has been long sustained by patterns of patron-client relationship that ruling parties form with politicians and the population. Politicians sell their loyalty for trappings of power to the ruling party while the population pledges their allegiance to the same in exchange for 'development.' Rebel politicians and rebel regions are therefore treated to marginalization, deprivation and coercion till they oblige to structured clientelism. Meanwhile, inequitable distribution of resources would provoke the struggle for equity by deprived regions. The tendency of ruling parties with centralized power to abuse state machinery and resources for party politics is rampant in Africa. This can be seen in rigged elections, arbitrary arrest and prosecution of opposition leaders, crackdown on media and civil society, and limitation of civil liberties and freedoms. Currently for example, Ethiopia is facing unrests due to repressive Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front's rule which now has imposed a second State of Emergency barely few months apart.

▪ **Constitutional Failures**

Constitutional failures happen at both political party and systemic levels.

(a) Political Party Level

Political parties in post-independence Africa adopted good constitutions but gradual consolidation of power in the person of the party leader eroded this democratic achievement. Political parties, their membership and executive bodies could no longer check the powers, excesses and arbitrariness of the party leader. Other political parties, especially opposition parties, were small and weak with ad hoc structures leaving party leaders as the lifeline of those parties. However, some political parties had prohibitive clauses in their constitutions that protected the party leader from competition.

10 Chiroro, B. (2006). The Dilemma of Opposition Political Parties in Southern Africa. *Journal of African Elections*, Vol 5 No 1 (2016)

11 Ibid



In Kenya in 2013, this prohibitive clause is what led to the break-up of Orange Democratic Movement when the deputy party leader, Musalia Mudavadi, vainly complained against the clause protecting Raila Odinga's position as the party leader and his automatic candidacy in presidential elections.¹² Till now, Raila Odinga is the party leader and has been since its formation sometime in 2005 and the question of succession is silent in the party. Party leaders have, by virtue of their immense influence on their parties, by-passed party procedures and constitutions to appoint or anoint successors. This creates political disputes within parties, tensions among supporters and even dealt those parties final blows. In Kenya in 2002, when KANU's party leader and chairman, outgoing president Moi, belatedly anointed Uhuru Kenyatta his successor, factions grew in the party leading to mass exodus of politicians who joined the opposition. The party lost the elections of 2002 and has since been relegated in Kenyan politics. In February 2018, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)'s party leader Morgan Tsvangirai passed. He had however anointed Nelson Chamisa to take over as party leader by-passing party procedures and constitution. This created a big storm in Zimbabwe's main opposition party, threatening its very existence or continuity, as factions opposed to Chamisa strongly emerged. A faction led by Thokozani Khupe has for example propped her claim to the party's leadership by virtue of her election as vice party leader by relevant party body before the party leader's demise. This may cost the party next elections (if it survives the crisis), given the crisis is untimely as elections are due in July of 2018. There is also possibility of splintering into several political parties.

(b) Systemic Level

Here, constitutional failures happen due to (i) hostile constitutional amendments, (ii) amendment attempts to extend term limits for incumbents, (iii) constitutional lacunae that fails to limit presidential terms and, (iv) amendments (or provisions) that give absolute power to incumbents.

In Togo, President Eyadema died in office in 2005, having been the longest serving African president at the time. The military imposed his son Faure as the successor citing a dangerous power vacuum. Later the parliament amended the constitution to cement his position. This has taken Togo through political conflict among elites, ethnic conflict and unrests that threaten its stability (Banjo, 2005). In Kenya, the parliament passed a law that made the country a one party State, outlawing formation of other political parties. This lasted from 1982 till 1991, having given the incumbent of the ruling party undue advantage over his competitors. This however spawned clamor for multiparty democracy led by civil society and politicians, receiving repressive regime reaction. There have also been disruptive attempts by some African parliaments to extend the term limits of incumbent presidents. These have led to serious political conflict and even popular rebellion against parliament and the president, as seen in Burkina Faso. President Campaore was overthrown by the people in 2014 and parliament burnt down when he sought to extend term limits through parliament. Lack of term limits among other reasons inspired armed resistance to Milton Obote-led government by Yoweri Museveni when it was clear that Obote was staying in power. The permanence of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia's tenure also inspired rebellion against him in 1974. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania wished to resign of his own accord in 1980, but CCM and the people urged him not to, citing unavailability of a suitable successor and non-existence of succession formula. Still, successor unavailability is just a political excuse to remain in power. These are just few out of many examples to indicate disregard for the constitutionalism to justify power extension for supposedly political stability.

Shortly after independence in Kenya, KANU embarked on power consolidation in a way that centralized power in the presidency through constitutional amendments. The issue of succession could therefore not be definite in the existence of the vice president because he was not permanent and could be sacked by the president anytime. The Chief Justice could not as allowed by the constitution determine the president's incapacity and recommend his impeachment because he himself could be appointed and sacked by the president anytime. Parliament could also not successfully move a motion-of-no-confidence and impeach the president, because he was protected by his parliamentary majority.

This left the question of succession to the president's discretion which was obviously unpredictable, causing political tension. An aggressive move led by Njoroge Mungai's 'Change-the-Constitution' team to have the Speaker of the National Assembly take over *ad interim* in transition was also successfully fought by President Kenyatta and an opposing faction led by Kibaki - Njonjo-Moi in 1976.

Kenyatta died in office leaving Moi as the heir to the throne with serious legitimacy damage, leading to his authoritarian style that took Kenya through turbulent 24 years of liberation struggle, from 1978 to 2002.

¹² Momanyi, B. Mudavadi finally ditches ODM as presidential race heats up. Capital News. <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/04/mudavadi-finally-ditches-odm-presidential-race-heats-up/> (2012)

▪ Electoral Failures

Elections (regular, free and fair) serve as means of selection for the replacement or succession of political elites in democratic countries. However, many elections in Africa are characterized by malpractices such as rigging, intimidation of both voters and opponents and voter bribery. This leads to high numbers of election petitions and a high frequency of presidential election petitions in Africa. It however leads to politico-ethnic violence due to the political nature of African politics, which causes serious instabilities in African countries and continental Africa especially around election cycles. This again happens at both political party (party primaries) and systemic levels (general elections). At political party level, 2017 primaries in Kenya were marred by violence amid malpractice claims and clashes between selected party favorites and popular candidates across many political parties.¹³ This was but part of a pattern of electoral violence in Kenya. At the highest level (general elections), in Kenya in December 2007, the announcement of Mwai Kibaki as winner of presidential elections led to clashes that claimed more than 1,100 people, displaced more than 600,000 people and caused massive destruction of property. This was due to alleged rigging of the elections by the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki ('Kenya since post-election violence,' 2017). Many of Kenyan elections have faced credibility questions and led to violence almost every election cycle. In August 2017 again; the opposition led by Raila Odinga filed a petition against the election of President Uhuru Kenyatta which resulted in nullification of the election on grounds of electoral irregularities, illegalities and unconstitutionality.¹⁴ In 2016, President Museveni of Uganda was controversially re-elected causing violence due to serious allegations of electoral fraud (Uganda's Museveni re-elected,' 2016). Then same happened in Zimbabwe in 2008 pitting incumbent President Robert Mugabe against Morgan Tsvangirai. Many other African countries face electoral failures that caused violent conflicts and instability.

▪ Reluctance to Hand over Power

The caliber of most African nationalists was engrossed in power accumulation and consolidation at the expense of development and redesigning of governance structures/institutions. Ascendancy to power meant perpetuation of neo-patrimonial system and patronage politics. African politics 'is increasingly patrimonial and benefits oriented'. In patrimonial contexts, control is cohesive or compacted in one individual who applies it for his subjective gain, and faithful supporters are rewarded. These cohorts or political supporters are obligatory to mobilize political help for the incumbent and alluded to conclusions made by the patron'. A case in point is the manipulation of land reform by Zanu-PF to entice war veterans to become the vanguard of the party; they in turn campaigned for Zanu-PF as a sign of loyalty. In the same context, the academics strongly agree that political business in Africa is influenced by cartels controlling those with the levers of power. Furthermore, the cartels are well linked and protected and this is made easier by their ability to seize major state institutions, including those charged with oversight – the police and anti corruption courts. As a matter of fact, political systems in Africa are characterized by well-webbed cartels enjoying the protection of the political elites. The cartels thrive within an intently knit system of close connections. The cartels are awarded tenders in major sectors of the economy namely agriculture, fuel sector, mining and energy. The network is difficult to prosecute since the connections enjoy the protection of the powerful. On the other hand, the cartels support the political elites' political programs, for instance funding constituency development programs and other personal goodies. This fuels succession crises, since the cartels will oftentimes protect the systems that benefit them, and would wish them to remain in power.

Tersely, experience has shown that in most post-independence states where political power is tailored, and that politics is a form of industry as political positions offer easy access to amassing prospects and state resources. Accordingly, political succession is difficult and complex, because violence, patronage, the rendition of patriotic history, the capture of bureaucracy and social-laxity have been major attributes propelling and sustaining centralism and non-succession.

▪ Bequest of Traditional Succession Models

In pre-colonial Africa, succession was guaranteed and appointment issues were handled by spirit mediums in line with the different systems pertaining to each culture and tribe during the pre-colonial era like in the American systems, where each battalion has its own chaplain. Africa[n] tradition had two major models of succession, namely the collateral system (which rotates among family and primogeniture (a chief begets a chief)).

13 Otondi, T. S. Kenya's History of Election Violence is threatening to repeat itself (2017)

14 De freytas-tamura, K. Kenya Supreme Court Nullifies Presidential Election. New York (2017)



Some scholars have argued that succession models in modern Africa were cut and pasted from a traditional perspective by politicians to suit their egocentric perceptions. Political leaders in Africa seem to view themselves as the only sacred specie that can rule in perpetuity. The current succession frameworks in Africa are reminiscent of the traditional succession framework. In consequence, when modern legal rotational succession models were translated in Africa, the continent struggled to adapt since the models were alien to Africa's political culture. The modern models weaken the revolutionary spirit and Africa's development route, since development dictatorship guarantees continuity and stability.

4. Conclusion

The aim of this article was to explain how succession politics can be a threat to peace and security in Africa. It has been established that succession politics has been one of the major causes of political conflicts in Africa. It is fairly concluded that succession politics are a creation of historical, political, traditional and societal factors that molded political systems, governance structures and succession patterns in post-independence Africa. It is undoubtedly clear that the politics of succession create disputes, struggles for power due to perceived or real power vacuum and even unrests that threaten the stability of African countries. Moreover, national and regional security is also seriously undermined by politics of succession which have always been problematic in Africa. For Africa to stabilize and ensure the right environment for development and growth, embracing constitutionalism and democratization is critical for promoting freedoms, fairness and justice in political practice. The adoption of a collusive model anchored in a patrimonial system resulted in a small clique controlling the apparatus and institutions of the state for personal gain. The bureaucracy has been captured and used for rent-seeking purposes.

5. Recommendations

Based on the above, the following recommendations are given for resolving succession crises:-

- African governments, political parties and civil societies should be on the lead on democratization of political space to limit conflict.
- Constitutionalism should be promoted and observed by all institutions of governance in African countries.
- Presidential terms should be limited and succession procedures made clear in party constitutions and constitutions of African republics.
- Institutional reforms touching on separation of powers, institutional independence and competence should be embraced. Political practice should also be liberally institutionalized at political party and systemic levels.
- Peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms should be institutionalized and promoted in dispute resolution in Africa.
- Free, fair and credible elections should be promoted so as to build trust in democratic processes and stabilize transitions

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PHYSICAL ADDRESSING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Teddy Njau, *ndc*



1. Introduction: Setting the Scene

What constitutes a physical address system? And what does it mean to have one, or not to have one? Addresses serve as one of the basic facilitators of communication between people, public service institutions and businesses. Without them, it is difficult to reach individuals. It is difficult for governments and municipalities to deliver public services, and for businesses to operate effectively. It is therefore difficult or impossible for public services and businesses to reach their target customers. For the postal business, an accurate and complete address is the key to providing quality service, so that correspondence, documents and goods reach their destination as quickly as possible. According to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) states that the UPU carries out its mission 'with a view to developing communications between people by the efficient operation of the postal services, and to contributing to the attainment of the noble aims of international collaboration in the cultural, social and economic fields.'¹ In keeping with its mission, the UPU has been working to develop and improve national addressing and postcode systems around the world since 1999, especially in developing countries akin to Tanzania for socio economic development. However, addressing is not only about home mail delivery. It goes far beyond the postal sector and is essential for individuals, governments, and the business sector, national and international organizations – indeed, for all of society.² This article seeks to explain the linkage between physical addressing system and its implications on national security. In doing so, the evolution of physical addressing system, success story of Tanzania in implementing the PAS, the linkage between PAS national security will be discussed.



Hon. Majaliwa Kasim Majaliwa the Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania formally launching physical Addressing System (PAS) in the new Government City, Mtumba Dodoma

1 UN. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010, New York: United Nations (2010)

2 World Bank. Systems of Cities: Harnessing Urbanization for Growth and Poverty Alleviation, Washington, D.C.: World (2009a)



2. Evolution of Physical Addressing System in Tanzania

Research and studies carried out since 2001 have underlined the need to modernize the postal addressing system in Tanzania. The Government has subsequently undertaken efforts to reform the postal sector in line with the UPU's Seoul Postal Strategy. In 2003, the Tanzanian government formulated the National Postal Policy to develop a physical addressing and postcode system.³ Its principal aims were to achieve standardized address information, enhance mail processing and delivery, reduce undeliverable-as addressed mail, and provide mutual cost reduction opportunities to the business sector by improving mail efficiency. The Government also recognized the wider economic and societal benefits of the new addressing and postcode system. The new national addressing and postcode system aims at establishing an addressing system that will enable identification of individuals or businesses by their physical location and postcode. The 'operation' seeks to implement a street-type addressing system with postcodes and to create a national addressing database for Tanzania. It will involve street identification and naming, all houses will be numbered according to the new addressing standards that have been developed. Tanzania has adopted a numeric postcode system. The country has been divided into seven postcode areas/zones, and a five-digit postcode system has been used to allocate codes at the level of individual wards, which are the smallest administrative entity. Postcodes have also been allocated to post office locations, major postal customers and landmarks. The new national addressing system will have multiple advantages for Tanzania's many stakeholders. It is expected to positively affect socio-economic life and security and safety more so in vital services, health services, rescue services, law enforcement, improved navigation, trade, civic life and revenue. In the new system other economic sectors will also benefit such as tourism, postal sector, and financial institutions. Suffice to say, it can firmly be argued that, unidentified and inaccessible areas within the national territory provide a breeding ground for crime, insecurity and violence, which contribute to rising incidences of organized crime, which affect both the individual and national security. This is why spatial organization data, including addresses, provides the government with the ability to identify; locate and access marginalized areas in order to incorporate them into the nation. Tying it all, there will be no security, if local citizens cannot be easily identified, reached for both rescue and emergency services, accessed and served. We briefly elucidate the success story of Tanzania in implementing the UPU's policy.



Hon. Nape Nnauye Minister for Information Communication and ICT in one of the physical Addressing System's activities in Dodoma

3 Kaberuka, D. 'Capturing Africa's business opportunity', McKinsey Quarterly, June 2010, www.africa.com/mckinsey-on-africa/capturing_africa8217s_business_opportunity

3. Success Story in Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania is resolute to implement the Fourth Industrial Revolution which is led by ICTs. It is this willpower which calls for the establishment of an effective physical addressing infrastructure for national security. As noted earlier, national security is the heart of sustainable socio-economic development, without which; development of any sorts cannot be achieved. One of the surest ways of achieving that is to effectively use physical addressing system in a bid to easily identify, locate, access and serve communities. It is for this reason; the 6th phase administration under the leadership of H.E Samia Suluhu Hassan, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Commander-in Chief, on 8/02/2022 directed all Regional Commissioners to supervise the operation PAS in their regions. The intention, inter alia, was to fast-track the operation but as well, to promote the operation's ownership and to ensure sustainability of the same. The deadline for completing the operation was set on May 2022. A closer look at the 'operation' demonstrates that the government is indeed on the right track. It is on the records that, currently the implementation stands at 95%. Moreover, to achieve the objectives of the 'operation', the government is devoted to constantly updating and verifying data entry exercises that are presently carried out all over the regions. It is thus expected that by establishing an effective national physical addressing system; the system is likely to improve service delivery in various ways. For example, from government to citizens, citizens to government, government to business, business to government and business to business, and will facilitate service delivery to the citizens' premises. Also, the system will facilitate effective operation of e –Commerce, and enable every citizen to possess his or her own physical address, simplify revenue collection; facilitate accessibility to areas that are prone to crime and violence and improve land use/ proper planning. Based on the above, it can be fairly deduced that the government has so far made incredible strides in implementing the UPU's policy. The implementation of the physical addressing system is positive and it is a continuous process. Below a brief discussion of the nexus between the physical addressing system and national security is presented.

4. Physical Address System and National Security: Is there any Connection?

Development cannot occur in a state of constant fear, as robbery, drugs, violence and murder impede the integrity of the state and community life. Data on the spatial organization of territory and an understanding of the composition of the nation, including knowledge of the population, allows the state to ensure social stability, prepare itself against threats and respond to them. Urbanization has been accompanied by a rise in crime and violence. For example, cities like Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Arusha and Mbeya have complex addressing infrastructure and oftentimes considered to be highly precarious and inaccessible, even to state security authorities. It important to underscore that access to citizens' inhabitants is essential for their protection and security. But for this to happen, state security organs must be in a position to understanding the particularities of an area or its inhabitants before crime prevention measures are implemented.⁴ Only a physical address infrastructure can help to identify spatial patterns that highlight crime-prone-areas so that appropriate resources can be assigned to cover these areas and manage the danger. Experience has often shown that petty thieves, gangs and/or organized crime groups can take advantage of the inaccessibility of informal and unidentified areas for their illegal activities, making the regulation of national territory and citizen protection a major challenge for governments.⁵ In such situations, security personnel must be able to locate and reach an individual and a site swiftly. Additionally, preventing organized crime groups from operating domestically is a main responsibility of the government. For this reason, security measures that require individuals to quickly identify themselves and their locations restrict the ability of criminal groups to take advantage of weak infrastructure and poor coordination among the law enforcement agencies. Besides, security forces must be able to access and manage location information in order to rapidly respond to threats. Crime prevention assessments ought to be undertaken as early as possible to determine, if one of the crime prevention systems are being compromised. Thus, an effective address infrastructure serves as an invaluable tool on which to base decisions about mobilizing security forces, as well as serve as a communication and distribution network. In view of the above, the PAS has a direct linkage to our country's national security.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the above account, it is evident that PAS is an important component of socio-economic development. More importantly, it is also an effective tool for promoting national security, without which there will be no development. The decision of the 6th phase administration to establish PAS throughout the country is commendable. The implementation status of PAS shows that Tanzania is one of the African countries whose commitment to PAS' adoption and execution is a success.

4 World Bank. Systems of Cities: Harnessing Urbanization for Growth and Poverty Alleviation, Washington, D.C.: World Bank (2009)

5 UNDP (United Nations Development Program). Making the Law Work for Everyone, Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, New York: UNDP (2008)



It is further expected that the remaining 5% will be successfully implemented in accordance with the UPU's standards. It is worth noting that one of the success factors for an exemplary Tanzania's performance, inter alia, is political will. Also, the Regional Commissioners' dedication to walk the talk of the Head of State is another success factor which cannot be underrated. Tanzania remains staunchly committed to PAS execution because of its social, economic and political dividends is likely to reap out of it. It must not be forgotten that the implementation of PAS is not an *EVENT* rather a continuous process. The 6th phase leadership is unyieldingly resolute to ensure that PAS is successfully executed.

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WHY DO COUNTRIES GO TO WAR?

Brig Gen CE Msola



The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has reminded us yet again that the international conflicts are not over. This calls for countries to continue preparing for war especially when peace is seen to be prevailing because always when tranquility exist tendency for most of us forget the possibility of escalation of war and those instigating conflict always use this opportunity of lack of preparedness to launch the all-out invasion. What is not very clear to some of us is why countries fight each other? It has been argued that a nation will go to war if the benefits of war are deemed to outweigh the disadvantages, and if there is a sense that there is no other mutually agreeable solution.¹ More specifically, some have argued that wars are fought primarily for economic, religious, and political reasons.

It is said that reasons for going to war can be of two main causes, first, if there is a need to render your adversary politically and militarily impotent so that he can sue for peace and second, to occupy his territory in order to annex it.² For the case of Russia-Ukraine conflict the second reason apply better than the first. It is to be remembered that the current conflict started in 2014 following the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, and initially focused on the status of Crimea and parts of the Donbas, internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. It is also to be recalled that the very same Crimea witnessed a conflict involving Britain, France, Ottoman Empire and Russia between 1853 and 1856.

The Crimean War was the result of Russian demands to exercise protection over the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman sultan. Another cause was a dispute between Russia and France over the privileges of the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches in Palestine³.

The aim of Russia in the current conflict may be different from the first war fought almost at the same place, this time President Putin in his declaration of war speech set out objectives of what he terms as special operation that he is demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine. From the look of things President Putin is questioning the existence of the border with Ukraine taking into account the presence of Russian speaking population in the areas of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk and is taking it as justification for Russia to carry out the operations.

1 <https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/war>, accessed 25 April 2022.

2 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 1976).p. 38

3 www.britannica.com/event/Crimean-War, accessed 25 April 2022.

So what one may question is why war? Clausewitz defines war as nothing but a duel on a larger scale is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.⁴ If this is the aim of waging war have we as countries thought the differences that exist amongst us which can take us to the full scale armed conflict? Security and strategic experts have to always be concerned and have this in mind otherwise countries may be surprised by being forced to go to war unprepared which will result into defeat by our potential adversaries. It is to this fact therefore that, it is important to have plans in place for every threat the country perceives, a robust response to each of these based on the capabilities available is of utmost important otherwise our armed forces should have contingencies to respond to these perceived threats should a need arise.

What again is not clear to some of us is why America has commands to include the newly established Africa Command whose headquarters is not even in African soil, these commands have the responsibility of forecasting the potential areas of future conflicts to the US and try to come up with likely response by American armed forces and usually each potential conflicts have several ways of possible response. To do this the US has subdivided the world into zones and assigned a command to continuously assess the possible areas of conflict with her interests in those zones which are Southern Command, Africa Command, Central Command, Northern Command, Indo-Pacific Command and Alaskan Command. Since the task of preparing these contingencies is itself a labor intensive, there is a need to have the custodian of these plans who can be an institution dealing with war plans where they will be kept for possible future use should a need arise on the similar problem and which should be updated from time to time to remain relevant.

Another very important aspect is for scholars of security and strategy to be able to differentiate the terminologies such as war, battle, campaign and normal military operations. For the actions to be qualified as war it must have been sanctioned and declared, that means it has to have political ramification that is what Clausewitz defines as continuation of politics by other means. In some countries today in order to take forces to war the government in office has to send a motion to the parliament giving reasons why should the country be involved in the conflict or others are limiting the power of the commander in chief the case in point is the United States where the President is allowed to send troops to the war front not exceeding ninety days without necessarily having the consent of the Congress. This is an important aspect today in what is termed as the civilian control of the military otherwise if the control is not in place there is likely to be the misuse of the armed forces especially by dictators which can have serious consequences to the country in terms life loss and economy.

Civilian control of the military is a doctrine in military and political science that places ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making in the hands of the civilian political leadership, rather than professional military officers, civilian control of the military refers to the principle that the military is ultimately subordinate to civilian authority. This formal governance structure for the military has always been necessary, but not sufficient, to ensuring civilian control of the military. As noted by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill professor Richard H. Kohn, 'civilian control is not a fact but a process.'⁵ The establishment of a civilian head of state, head of government or other government figures as the military's commander-in-chief within the chain of command is one legal construct for the propagation of civilian control.

Although the decision to commit forces should be done legally by the body which is vested with these powers, it is to be correctly advised after the technocrats are satisfied with the cost-benefit of the operation in question. Importantly, though, this strategic appraisal should be conducted prior to committing forces, which will assist senior policy and decisionmakers better articulate strategic objectives, which should align with the nation's interests. Without this clear guidance (ends), the strategic concepts (ways) and resources (means) can become disconnected, as they too often have. Additionally, while no one can predict the outcome of a given conflict, a better understanding may influence leaders against committing military forces if a victorious outcome does not appear favorable or the costs of achieving the objective outweigh the benefits.

Understanding the nature of operational environment prior to committing forces is not a new concept. Some of the greatest military thinkers throughout history have written about its importance.

Carl Von Clausewitz, for example, stated, 'No one starts a war — or, rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—with-out first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.' This passage clearly speaks to the importance of aligning ends ('what he intends to achieve'), ways ('how he intends to conduct it'), and means (the instruments of national power).⁶ Without a clear understanding of the nature of operational envi-

4 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 44.

5 Richard H. Kohn, "An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military". *American Diplomacy*. (1997).

6 Strategic Intelligence and the Decision to Go to War - Modern War Institute (usma.edu), accessed 10 May 2022.



ronment, strategic leaders limit their ability to know what they wish to achieve, with what instruments they wish to achieve it, and without doubt, how they intend to do so.

Contemporary strategic thinkers and elected leaders continuously reference the concepts of Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu. One of the philosopher's many axioms explains that the victorious warrior wins before committing forces, while the defeated warrior commits forces and then seeks victory.⁷ This notion alone sums up the premise of the need to understand the nature of the environment. Once a leader commits forces, it is often too late to form an effective strategy. Formulating strategy must come before committing forces and the most effective way to form a coherent strategy is to fully understand the nature of operational environment. That is not to say a leader cannot adjust strategy once forces are committed, but even when a strategic course change is needed, a clearer understanding will allow for a greater ability to adjust.

There are useful analytical tools that reside in both classic theory and joint doctrine, but strategic thinkers and policy makers must continuously seek out better ways to examine and understand the strategic environment. Indeed, one would think that on this basis, strategic leaders would demand a better understanding prior to committing forces. Recent history does not reflect such a demand. Vietnam, Korea, and Libya are all conflicts in which the United States failed to achieve its political objectives, or the outcomes were ambiguous. Iraq and Afghanistan are equally of the same, only history will determine whether they are viewed as successful. What is not an issue are the strategic miscalculations of how long these conflicts would last and the costs associated with them. Strategic leadership could have mitigated these miscalculations by having a better understanding of the nature of the environment and this could assist in determining the exit strategy which is also important to be established.

When a decision has been taken to go to war the condition should be laid down which will indicate that time to exit has been reached known specifically as *exit strategy*. Clausewitz clearly puts this in perspective in his book *On War*, 'Theory, therefore, demands that at the outset of a war its character and scope should be determined on the basis of the political probabilities. The closer these political probabilities drive war toward the absolute [Total War], the more the belligerent states are involved and drawn in to its vortex, the clearer appear the connections between its separate actions, and the more imperative the need not to take the first step without considering the last.'⁸Originally manifested in the business world, 'exit strategy' proponents attempt to apply rigid scientific models of cost-benefit analysis to the all too human iterative process of foreign diplomacy and domestic politics. The differences being that in business, or personal matters, once a predetermined threshold is reached one can always move on to some new endeavor.

Generally, the best way to avoid war has been to prepare for it not otherwise, therefore maintaining a strong and formidable force is and will be the only recourse to avert war mongers, the opposite will attract them. The questions here are: Can we prevent war? If so, how? Can we make our world a safer place to live in? Fortunately, social psychological research provides some answers. One insight is provided by Social Identity Theory (SIT), originally formulated by the psychologist Henri Tajfel and John Turner. They believed that people are naturally inclined to self, categorized into an 'in-group' (us) and an 'out-group' (them).According to SIT, the ingroup seeks to distinguish itself from the outgroup by attributing them with negative qualities.⁹ The theory has been used to account for discrimination and hostility towards different groups. Outgroup members of a different race, culture, and political affiliation is seen as less trustworthy than in-group members.

From the theory cited above it follows that the way to avoid war is to dissuade the potential adversary by show of force and this is possible when the force so applied is seen to deter otherwise the threat may not work to your advantage. Show of force is an important and usually countries do this during celebrations to mark their national days which is meant to showcase the capabilities or a will to act if the country is provoked. Countries do this to show the newly acquired hardware, types of training and the readiness of the personnel in terms of morale. If meticulously done it is one of the best deterrent acts to try to wade off future conflicts.

7 Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans, Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 19.

8 Clausewitz *On War* p. 5841.

9 Henri Tajfel and John Turner, 'The Social Identity Theory of the Intergroup Behaviour' *in Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, N. Worchel and W.G. Austin (eds) (Chicago: L. Nelson Hall 1986) pp. 7-24

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

By Allen C. Kasamala, *ndc*



Public procurement is simply a process through which public resources are mobilized to obtain needs in terms of works and services as well as items with certain strict emphasis being placed on various principles that take into consideration value for public money.

However others describe Public procurement as the purchase by governments and state-owned enterprises of goods, services and works. As public procurement accounts for a substantial portion of the taxpayers' money, governments are expected to carry it out efficiently and with high standards of conduct in order to ensure high quality of service delivery and safeguard the public interest.

The significance of public procurement can be measured on the scale of the National Budget which is estimated to account for over 70% of its total sum being channeled to procurement related expenditure, from buying a little item as a pen for government use to such mega and strategic projects as the Mwalimu Nyerere dam project. Any expenditure provided there are public funds involved is public procurement; it is for that reason and owing to huge amount money involved public procurement calls for strict adherence to principles of good governance to ensure value for money.

The public procurement regime in Tanzania is centered around five key strategic institutions namely; The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA), The Government Procurement Services Agency (GPSA), The Procurement and Supplies Professionals and Technicians Board (PSPTB) and the Public Procurement Appeals Authority (PPAA) under the Ministry of Finance and Planning coordinated by the Public Procurement Policy Division (PPD). The PPRA serves as the sector regulator.

GPSA is the main buyer and supplier of Government on common use items and services ranging from green tags for Government files to the supply of fuel and procurement of vehicles for Government use as well as listing and maintaining a database of suppliers who are placed at the disposal of Procuring Entities. These are basically Government institutions ranging from Agencies and independent departments to Ministries. The PSPTB caters for training and Professional conduct of cadres in the sector and the PPAA as a quasi judicial body to entertain appeals arising from procurement processes giving rise to aggrieved parties in the supply chain management.

In addition to the above there is also the Medical Stores Department (MSD) with a specific duty for the procurement of such sensitive items as medicine and medical equipments.

Overall the legal procurement regime is catered for by the Public Procurement Act, 2011 and its Regulations, 2016.

Again that background one sees the crucial aspect of public procurement in almost all sectors, any mishandling of procurement by way of corruption risks not only the loss of public funds which could be channeled to better use but also loss of lives, delays in delivery of services and supply of substandard items and services, culminating to a huge impact on increased poverty levels and general public discontent which may lead to civil unrest affecting National security.

If drugs are delayed or substandard drugs are delivered then lives are endangered, if roads are poorly constructed then lives are endangered and so on this goes to the core of human security itself.

In the 1960s while addressing the Legislative Council of Tanganyika (LEGICO) Mwalimu Nyerere equated corruption to treason and arguing that it must be treated with the same level of seriousness, as it undermines the efforts of Government and bringing its credibility to question thus threatening its very existence.

In most recent history we witnessed the impact of corruption to National security in what is today being referred to as the Arab Spring which were basically described as uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across much of the Arab world in the early 2010s. It began in response to corruption and economic stagnation and was first started in Tunisia. From Tunisia, the protests then spread to five other countries: Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, where either the ruler was deposed or major uprisings and social violence occurred.

Therefore a well-managed corruption free public procurement system is an important pillar of National Security due to its crosscutting nature and the amount of public resources committed in the sector. It is thus crucial that key institutions in the procurement sector are well catered for and empowered and supported to enable them execute their responsibilities more efficiently.

This must go hand in hand with an emphasis on the enforcement of ethics and integrity in the private and public sector since both are important actors.



The Faculty Remembers



"Patriotism is a thing of the Heart. A man is patriot if his [her] heart beats true to his [her] Country." Edward Jefferson (1860-1937)

As the National Defence College – Tanzania celebrates its Tenth Anniversary; it also appreciates the contribution of departed leaders and scholars who have contributed significantly to shaping, raising the quality of its programmes and making the College what it currently is. The following tribute is a compilation of the contributions from the NDC Faculty Members and Administrative Staff who had an opportunity to work with them.



H.E. President Benjamin William Mkapa (1938 – 2020)

The late Benjamin William Mkapa was the Third President of the United Republic of Tanzania (1995-2005). President Mkapa was an inspirational leader, who greatly valued NDC – Tanzania for what it stands for. He was a constant speaker, always ready to deliver College's long courses on Lectures of Opportunity until his sad demise. His last lecture at the College was on *"The Crisis of Multilateralism and its Impact on African Countries"* which he delivered in March 2020. Moreover, he used to closely follow the College's activities whenever visited and he never fell short of counselling the course that the College should take in addressing some of the challenges faced. He always wished to see the College excelling to higher heights while envisioning an institution that is widely recognised within and outside Tanzania.

President Mkapa was indeed a true patriot and pan-Africanist, but above all, he stood out as a true Statesperson - per Excellency. His presence and interactions with Course Members added value to NDC programmes which, among others, provides a platform for the Course Members to interact with high profile leaders from within and outside the country.

The late President Mkapa will forever be remembered as an astute intellectual, with a natural ability to deliver powerful speeches to his audience. He could address and interact with any group of people be ordinary street people, international diplomats and world leaders and especially when challenging academicians on issues confronting the society. He remains one of the few iconic figures of the College's speakers and he will forever be cherished.



The Faculty Remembers



Lieutenant General Paul Peter Massao (rtd.) (1959 –2021)

The late Lieutenant General Paul Peter Massao was the General Officer and Commander-Gentleman in the true sense of the word. During his tenure as the Commandant of the National Defence College – Tanzania, he displayed the highest level of dedication to the challenge and responsibilities of running the College in a collegial and consultative manner, but always firm in decision making. With his vast experience of training in the military, the General was a person of high standards, integrity and strived to take the College to higher heights – as we recall that he always insisted on striving to uphold the principles and NDC standards. His leadership style particularly, lending a listening ear has left an extraordinary mark and, in a way, mentored all those who have had an opportunity of working with him.



The Faculty Remembers



Amb. Dr. Augustine Mahiga (1945 – 2020)

The late Ambassador Dr. Mahiga was not only a diplomat of the highest order but also an intellectual powerhouse in International Politics, Strategic Studies and Diplomacy. He possessed extraordinary deep and immense knowledge of Geo-politics, its relevance and how it shapes countries' behaviour. The late Ambassador devoured intellectual discussions, especially as they pertain to National and Security interests of Tanzania and Africa in general.

He was a highly committed resource person despite having demanding portfolios at the United Nations, as a Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as Minister for Constitutional and Legal Affairs. He tirelessly shared his knowledge and vast experience in national security and strategy during the College's long and Capstone courses. We remember his extraordinary ability to deliver lectures, provide [historical] facts and engage in discussions without having a piece of paper for reference...



The Faculty Remembers



Justice Augustine Lawrence Ramadhani (1945 –2020)

The late Justice Augustine Ramadhani was a learned person, whose lectures significantly contributed to shaping Course Members' understanding not only of how the Judiciary and International Courts work but also the importance of dispensing justice for national security. We recall his lectures on "Judiciary" and "African Court on Human and People's Rights." He was highly committed to the College. As we vividly recall, few days before his demise he communicated to the College to postpone his lecture until he fully recovers...



The Faculty Remembers



Professor Mohabe Nyirabu (1952 – 2020)

The late Professor Mohabe Nyirabu was an authority in International Relations, Political Economy and Strategic Studies. He made an immeasurable contribution to the College since its inception in 2012. He contributed to shaping the curriculum as well as in maintaining the quality of the programmes and research activities. He had the highest level of commitment and tirelessly availed himself whenever requested; from a resource person for long and Capstone Courses, supervisor for the Course Members' research works, to serving as an Editorial Board Member of the Academic Journal. He was almost a Faculty Member due to the highest number of lectures he delivered. We will continue to remember his critical academic perspectives and stances, his jokes – especially when he wanted to be correctly understood or make a point – during intellectual discussions at the College. As the College celebrates a decade we will always remember these leaders, strategists, intellectuals and mentors. They constantly displayed confidence and great skills, competence and strategic analytical thinking. They constantly developed an appetite for change and richly engaged knowledge in creating enthusiasm and commitment for success. We will continue to honour and cherish their commitment to the College.

"Patriotism is voluntary. It is a feeling of loyalty and allegiance that is the result of knowledge and belief. A patriot shows their patriotism through their actions, by their choice."

Jesse Ventura (1951)

May Our Almighty God rest their Souls in Eternal Peace. Amen.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



H.E. Samia Suluhu Hassan - The President of United Republic of Tanzania and Commander - in - Chief, inaugurates the National Defence College – Tanzania Building on 14th November, 2021.



H.E. Dr. Hussein Ali Mwinyi - President of Zanzibar and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, delivering his speech at NDC 10th Valedictory Fuction on 30th July, 2022.



DOWN MEMORY LANE



H.E. Dr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete - Former President of URT (seated center) in a group photo with Faculty and 09th Course Members after delivering a lecture on 25th June, 2021



Hon. Hemed Suleiman Abdalla - Second Vice President of Zanzibar, presenting certificate to one of the Participants of NDC 13th Capstone Course on 05th August, 2022 before closing the Course.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



H.E. Chen Mingjian - Ambassador of China to the United Republic of Tanzania (seated right) and Lieutenant General ME Mkingule – Former Chief of Staff Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces (seated left), signing the Handing Over Documents of the NDC Building on 14th November, 2021.



H.E. Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein – Former President of Zanzibar and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, receiving a copy of Newsletter from Major General GS Milanzi – Former Commandant of NDC, at the State House Zanzibar on 03rd July, 2015.



DOWN MEMORY LANE



Major General JF Kapwani – Formal Air Force Commander (right), receiving a token of appreciation from Lieutenant General CL Makakala – Former NDC Commandant (left), when he visited the College to deliver lecture to the 02nd Course Members on 2014.



Hon. Abdulhamid Yahya Mzee – Former Chief Secretary and Secretary of the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar (right), presenting a token of appreciation to Brigadier General JJ Mwaseba - Former NDC Acting Commandant, at Zanzibar State House during Official Visit to Zanzibar on 26th June, 2020.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



Hon. Dr. Stergomena Lawrence Tax (MP) – Minister of Defence and National Service, during her visit to the National Defence College for Officiating the 12th Capstone Course on 14th February, 2022.



Amb. Lieutenant General YH Mohamed (right) - the outgoing NDC Commandant presenting handing over documents to Amb. Major General JG Kingu (left) – Incoming NDC Commandant.



DOWN MEMORY LANE



Amb. Major General GS Milanzi (rtd) - Former NDC Commandant (centre), in a group photo with Faculty Members, Supporting Staff and 04th Course Members during the Official Course Opening Ceremony on 03rd September, 2015.



The Foundation Stone for Construction of National Defence College laid by Hon. Dr. Hussein Ali Mwinyi (MP) – Former Minister for Defence and National Service (Now the President of Zanzibar and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council) and H.E. Wang Ke – Former Amb. of China to Tanzania on 16th April, 2019.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



The late Lieutenant General PP Massao - Former NDC Commandant (right), receiving General vs Mabeyo (rtd) - Former Chief of Defence Forces during 06th valedictory fuction on 28th July 2018




Token exchange between Lt Gen Wakar (right) and Col EE Mhoro – Head of delegation when the delegation visited Armed Forces Division in Bangladesh during the Foreign Countries Field Practical Training.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



Major General AF Kapinga (rtd) – Former Chief of Operations and Training - TPDF (Left), handing over project construction site for National Defence College - Tanzania Second Phase at Kunduchi on 19th March, 2019.



General DA Mwamunyange (rtd) – Former Chief of Defence Forces (right) in a tete-a-tete with Lieutenant General AA Shimbo – Former Chief of Staff, Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces at during NDC 05th Course Valedictory Function on 29th July, 2017.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



H.E Dr. Hussein Ali Mwinyi - President of Zanzibar and Chairman of Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (left) exchanging ideas with the late Lieutenant General PP Massao Former Commandant during 06th Valedictory function on 28th July, 2018



Lieutenant General CL Makakala – Former NDC Commandant (left), presenting a token of appreciation to the late Mr. Reginald Abraham Mengi – the former Executive Director of IPP Media, when he visited the College to deliver a lecture to the 2nd Course Members in 2014.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



NDC – TZ delegation led by Major General IM Mhona – Commandant, listening to Serviceman Otieno Odiwa Ambogo – Representatives of Operation Samia Suluhu Hassan, giving a brief on cassava production during Study Tour to Ruvu JKT with 12th Capstone Course Participants On 17th February, 2022.



National Defence College delegation led by Amb. Emmanuel Noel Kaganda – Senior Directing Staff- Foreign, listening to Ms. Sophia Majid - Production Coordinator (first from left), when some Faculty and the Tenth Course Members visited PYXUS Industry during the Domestic Field Practical Training on 17th January, 2022.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



National Defence College delegation led by Brigadier General CE Msolla -Former Senior Directing Staff Army, listening to Mr. Eliasa Kelemilt – Operation Coordinator, giving a brief on Kagera Sugar Limited during the Domestic Field Practical Training on 13th January, 2020.



Major General He Xinchong (left), handing over symbolic key to Colonel HM Mzee (right) during the Handing over Ceremony of NDC II bulding on 24th November, 2020



DOWN MEMORY LANE



Rear Admiral MM Mumanga – Former Senior Directing Staff Navy, explaining the roles of Navy Command to the NDC – TZ 08th Capstone Course participants during Capstone tour to Navy Command Headquarters on 13th February, 2020.



Some of the 10th Course Members demonstrate their cultures to Hon. Pauline Gekul - Deputy Minister for Culture Arts and Sports during a Cultural Day Ceremony on 28th January, 2022.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



Brigadier General MG Mhagama (rtd) – Former Senior Directing Staff – Air (right), giving instructions to some of the Course Members, during the inauguration of the 06th Course - 2017/18.



Dr. Florens M. Turuka - Former Permanent Secretary Ministry for Defence and National Service (third from left), inspecting the construction of New NDC building on 19th August 2019.



DOWN MEMORY LANE



Amb. Major General JG Kingu (rtd) – Former NDC Commandant (left), presenting a sculpture to the Late Benjamin William Mkapa - Former President of the United Republic of Tanzania after he delivered a Lecture of Opportunity on 01st March, 2018.



General VS Mabeyo (rtd) – Former Chief of Defence Forces (seated centre), in a group photo with Chiefs and Representatives of Defence Forces and Security Organs and the late Lt Gen PP Massao - NDC Former Commandant (fifth from left seated), Faculty Members and 07th Capstone Course Participants after the interaction session on 31st August, 2019.

DOWN MEMORY LANE



Col MH Surumbu – Former College Secretary, giving a brief to the invited guests during the 06th Valedictory Function on 28th July, 2018.



Dr. Lucy Shule - Director of Studies (left), presenting a token of appreciation to H.E. Muhammad Saleem - High Commissioner Islamic Republic of Pakistan to Tanzania on 17th February, 2022



DOWN MEMORY LANE



NDC – TZ Faculty, 08th Course Members and Supporting Staff following a lecture being delivered by Hon. Abdulhamid Yahya Mzee – Former Zanzibar Chief Secretary at the State House during the Collage’s study visit to Zanzibar on 26th June, 2020.



H.E. Dr. Mohamed Ali Shein - Former President of Zanzibar and the Chairman of Revolutionary Council (center), in a group photo with Supporting staff during the working visit to Zanzibar on 29th August, 2022



NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE



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